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( Originally Published 1909 )
Preparations of Robert Bruce for a decisive Engagement—Precautions adopted by him against the Superiority of the English in Cavalry: against their Archery: against their Superiority of Numbers—He summons his Army together—Description of the Field of Battle, and of the Scottish Order of Battle—The English Vanguard comes in Sight—Action between Clifford and the Earl of Moray—Chivalrous Conduct of Douglas—Bruce kills Sir Henry Bohun—Appearance of the English Army on the ensuing Morning—Circumstances preliminary to the Battle—The English begin the Attack—Their Archers are dispersed by Cavalry kept in Reserve for that Purpose—The English fall into disorder—Bruce attacks with the Reserve—The Camp Followers appear on the Field of Battle—The English fall into irretrievable Confusion, and fly—Great Slaughter—Death of the Earl of Gloucester—King Edward leaves the Field—Death of De Argentine—Flight of the King to Dunbar—Prisoners and Spoil—Scottish Loss—Scots unable to derive a Lesson in Strategy from the Battle of Bannockburn; but supported by the Remembrance of that great Success during the succeeding Extremities of their History THE crisis of this long and inveterate war seemed approaching. From the spring of 1306 to that of 1314, the fortunes of Bruce seem to have been so much on the ascendant that none of the slight reverses with which his career was checkered could be considered as seriously interrupting it. He was now acknowledged as king through the greater part of Scotland, although far from possessing the decisive authority attached to the chief magistrate of a settled government. Zeal, goodwill, love for his person, and reverence for his talents, made up to him among his countrymen what was wanting in established and acknowledged right; so that it was with the certainty of receiving the general national support that he prepared for the approaching conflict. Bruce had chiefly to provide against three disadvantages, being the same which oppressed Wallace at the battle of Falkirk, and of which the first two at least continued to be severely felt by the Scottish in every general action with the English, while they remained separate nations. The first was the Scottish king's great deficiency in cavalry, which, more especially the men-at-arms, who were arrayed in complete steel, was accounted by far the most formidable part, or rather the only efficient part of a feudal army. On this point Bruce held an opinion more proper to our age than to his. He had, perhaps, seen the battle of Falkirk, where the resistance of the Scottish masses of infantry had been so formidable as wellnigh to foil the English cavalry, and he knew the particulars of that of Courtray, where the French men-at-arms were defeated by the Flemish pikemen. His own experience of the battle of Loudoun Hill went to support the opinion, though accounted singular at the time, that a body of steady infantry, armed with spears and other long weapons, and judiciously posted, would, if they could be brought to stand firm and keep their ranks, certainly beat off a superior body of horse a maxim uncontroverted in modern warfare. Bruce's second difficulty lay in the inferiority of his archers, whose formidable shafts constituted the artillery of the day. The bow was never a favorite weapon with the Scottish, and their archery were generally drawn from the Highlands, undisciplined, and rudely armed with a short bow, very loosely strung: this, being drawn to the breast in using it, discharged a clumsy arrow with a heavy head of forked iron, which was shot feebly, and with little effect. These W-trained and ill-armed archers were all whom the Scottish had to oppose to the celebrated yeomen of England, who were from childhood trained to the exercise of the bow. This warlike implement, of a size suited to his age, was put into every child's hand when five years old, and afterward gradually increased in size with the increasing strength of him who was to use it, until the full-grown youth could manage a bow of six feet long, and by drawing the arrow to his ear, gain purchase enough to discharge shafts of a cloth-yard long. For the great inequality of numbers and skill between the Scottish Highlanders and English bowmen, Bruce hoped also to find a remedy by his proposed array of battle. The third disadvantage at which this decisive contest must be fought on the part of Scotland, was the disparity of numbers, which was very great. The commands of Bruce, through such parts of Scotland as confessed his sovereignty, drew together indeed a considerable force, the more easily collected, as Stirling was a central situation. But the more distant districts had, during the tumult of civil war, become almost independent, and it is not probable that the Bruce's mandates had much effect on the remoter northern provinces. On the other hand, in the country to the south, and especially to the southeast of the borders, many great lords and barons continued to profess the English interest. Of these, the great Earl of March was most distinguished. We may conclude from these reasons, that the Scottish historians are right in arriving at the conclusion that Robert's utmost exertions on this trying occasion could not collect together more than about thirty thousand fighting men, though, as was usual with a Scottish army, there were followers of the camp amounting to ten thousand more, to whom, although usually a useless encumbrance, or rather a nuisance to a well-ordered army, fortune assigned on this occasion a singular influence on the fortune of the day. Bruce, thus inferior in numbers, endeavored, like an able general, to compensate the disadvantage by so choosing his ground as to compel the enemy to narrow their front of attack, and prevent them from availing themselves of their numerous forces, by extending them in order to turn his flanks. With such resolutions, Robert Bruce summoned the array of his kingdom to rendezvous in the Tor Wood, about four miles from Stirling, and by degrees prepared the field of battle which he had selected for the contest. It was a space of ground then called the New Park, perhaps reserved for the chase, since Stirling was frequently a royal residence. This ground was partly open, partly encumbered with trees, in groups or separate. It was occupied by the Scottish line of battle, extending from south to north, and fronting to the east. In this position Bruce's left flank and rear might have been exposed to a sally from the Castle of Stirling; but Mowbray the governor's faith was beyond suspicion, and the king was not in apprehension that he would violate the tenor of the treaty, by which he was bound to remain in passive expectation of his fate. The direct approach to the Scottish front was protected in a great measure by a morass called the Newmiln Bog. A brook, called Bannockburn, running to the eastward between rocky and precipitous banks, effectually covered the Scottish right wing, which rested upon it, and was totally inaccessible. Their left flank was apparently bare, but was, in fact, formidably protected in front by a peculiar kind of field-works. As the ground in that part of the field was adapted for the manoeuvres of cavalry, Bruce caused many rows of pits, three feet deep, to be dug in it, so close together as to suggest the appearance of a honeycomb, with its ranges of cells. In these pits sharp stakes were strongly pitched, and the apertures covered with sod so carefully as that the condition of the ground might escape observation. Calthrops, or spikes contrived to lame the horses, were also scattered in different directions. Having led his troops into the field of combat, on the tidings of the English approach, the 23d of June, 1314, the king of Scotland commanded his soldiers to arm themselves, and making proclamation that those who were not prepared to conquer or die with their sovereign were at liberty to de-part, he was answered by a cheerful and general expression of their determination to take their fate with him. The king proceeded to draw up the army in the following order. Three oblong columns or masses of infantry, armed with lances, arranged on the same front, with intervals between them, formed his first line. Of these Edward Bruce had the guidance of the right wing, James Douglas and Walter, the steward of Scotland, of the left, and Thomas Randolph of the central division. These three commanders had their orders to permit no English troops to pass their front, in order to gain Stirling. The second line, forming one column or mass, consisted of the men of the isles, under Bruce's faithful friend and ally, the insular Prince Angus, his own men of Carrick, and those of Argyle and Cantire. With these the king posted himself, in order to carry support and assistance wherever it might be required. With himself also he kept in the rear a select body of horse, the greater part of whom he designed for executing a particular service. The followers of the camp were dismissed with the baggage, to station themselves behind an eminence to the rear of the Scottish army, still called the Gillies' (that is, the servants') Hill. These arrangements were hardly completed by the Scottish monarch, when it was announced that the tremendous army of Edward was approaching, having marched from Falkirk early that morning. On approaching Stirling, the English king detached Sir Robert Clifford with eight hundred horse, directing him to avoid the front of the Scottish army, and, fetching a circuit round them, turn their left flank, and throw himself into Stirling. The English knight made a circuit eastward, where some low ground concealed his manoeuvres, when the eagle eye of Bruce detected a line of dust, with glancing of spears and flashing of armor, taking northward, in the direction of Stirling. He pointed this out to Randolph. "They have passed where you kept ward," said he. "Ah, Randolph, there is a rose fallen from your chaplet!" The Earl of Moray was wounded by the reproach, and with such force as he had around him, which amounted to a few scores of spearmen on foot, he advanced against Clifford to redeem his error. The English knight, interrupted in his purpose of gaining Stirling, wheeled his large body of cavalry upon Randolph, and charged him at full speed. The Earl of Moray threw his men into a circle to receive the charge, the front kneeling on the ground, the second stooping, the third standing upright, and all of them presenting their spears like' a wall against the headlong force of the advancing cavaliers. The combat appeared so unequal to those who viewed it from a distance, that they considered Randolph as lost, and Douglas requested the king's assistance to fetch him off. "It may not be," said the Bruce; "Randolph must pay the penalty of his indiscretion. I will not disorder my line of battle for him." " Ah, noble king," said Douglas, "my heart cannot suffer me to see Randolph perish for lack of aid" ; and with a permission half extorted from the king, half assumed by himself, Douglas marched to his defence; but upon approaching the scene of conflict, the little body of Randolph was seen emerging like a rock in the waves, from which the English cavalry were retreating on every side with broken ranks, like a repelled tide. "Hold and halt!" said the Douglas to his followers; "we are come too late to aid them; let us not lessen the victory they have won, by affecting to claim a share in it." When it is remembered that Douglas and Randolph were rivals for fame, this is one of the bright touches which illuminate and adorn the history of those ages of which blood and devastation are the pre-dominant character. Another preliminary event took place the same evening. Bruce himself, mounted upon a small horse or pony, was attentively marshalling the ranks of his vanguard. He carried a battle-axe in his hand, and was distinguished to friend and enemy by a golden coronet which he wore on his helmet. A part of the English vanguard made its appearance at this time; and a knight among them, Sir Henry de Bohun, conceiving he saw an opportunity of gaining himself much honor, and ending the Scottish war at a single blow, couched his lance, spurred his powerful war-horse, and rode against the king at full career, with the expectation of bearing him to the earth by the superior strength of his charger and length of his weapon. The king, aware of his purpose, stood as if expecting the shock; but the instant before it took place, he suddenly moved his little palfrey to the left, avoided the unequal encounter, and striking the English knight with his battle-axe as he passed him in his career, he dashed helmet and head to pieces, and laid Sir Henry Bohun at his feet a dead man. The animation which this event afforded to the Scots was equalled by the dismay which it struck into their enemies. The English vanguard retired from the field with ominous feelings for the event of the battle, which Edward had resolved to put off till the morrow, in consideration, perhaps, of the discouraging effects of Bohun's death and Clifford's defeat. The Scottish nobles remonstrated with Robert on the hazard in which he placed his person. The king looked at his weapon, and only replied, "I have broke my good battle-axe." He would not justify what he was conscious was an imprudence, but knew, doubtless, like other great men, that there are moments in which the rules of ordinary prudence must be transgressed by a general, in order to give an impulse of enthusiasm to his followers. On the morning of Saint Barnaby, called the Bright, being the 24th of June, 1314, Edward advanced in full form to the attack of the Scots, whom he found in their position of the preceding evening. The vanguard of the English, consisting of the archers and billmen, or lancers, comprehending almost all the infantry of the army, advanced under the command of the Earls of Gloucester and Hereford, who also had a fine body of men-at-arms to support their column. All the remainder of the English troops, consisting of nine battles or separate divisions, were so straitened by the narrowness of the ground, that, to the eye of the Scots, they seemed to form one very large body, gleaming with flashes of armor, and dark with the number of banners which floated over them. Edward himself commanded this tremendous array, and in order to guard his person was at-tended by four hundred chosen men-at-arms. Immediately around the king waited Sir Aymer de Valence, that Earl of Pembroke who defeated Bruce at Methven Wood, but was now to see a very different day, Sir Giles de Argentine, a knight of Saint John of Jerusalem, who was accounted, for his deeds in Palestine and elsewhere, one of the best knights that lived, and Sir Ingram Umfraville, an Aglicized Scottishman, also famed for his skill in arms. As the Scottish saw the immense display of their enemies rolling toward them like a surging ocean, they were called on to join in an appeal to Heaven against the strength of human foes. Maurice, the abbot of Inchaffray, bareheaded and barefooted, walked along the Scottish line, and conferred his benediction on the soldiers, who knelt to receive it, and to worship the power in whose name it was bestowed. During this time the king of England was questioning Umfraville about the purpose of his opponents. "Will they," said Edward, "abide battle?" "They assuredly will," replied Umfraville; "and to engage them with advantage, your highness were best order a seeming retreat, and draw them out of their strong ground." Edward rejected this counsel, and observing the Scottish soldiers kneel down, joyfully exclaimed, "They crave mercy." "It is from Heaven, not from your highness," answered Umfraville: "on that field they will win or die." The king then commanded the charge to be sounded and the attack to take place. The Earls of Gloucester and Hereford charged the Scots left wing, under Edward Bruce, with their men-at-arms; but some rivalry between these two great lords induced them to hurry to the charge with more of emulation than of discretion, and arriving at the shock disordered and out of breath, they were unable to force the deep ranks of the spearmen. Many horses were thrown down, and their masters left at the mercy of the enemy. The other three di-visions of the Scottish army attacked the mass of the English infantry, who resisted courageously. The English archers, as at the battle of Falkirk, now began to show their formidable skill, at the expense of the Scottish spear-men; but for this Bruce was prepared. He commanded Sir Robert Keith, the marshal of Scotland, with those four hundred men-at-arms whom he had kept in reserve for the purpose, to make a circuit and charge the English bowmen in the flank. This was done with a celerity and precision which dispersed the whole archery, who having neither stakes nor other barrier to keep off the horse, nor long weapons to repel them, were cut down at pleasure, and almost without resistance. The battle continued to rage, but with disadvantage to the English. The Scottish archers had now an opportunity of galling their infantry without opposition; and it would appear that King Edward could find no means of bringing any part of his numerous centre or rearguard to the support of those in front, who were engaged at disadvantage. The cause seems to have been that, his army consisting in a great measure of horse, a space of ground was wanted for the squadrons to act in divisions and with due order; and though there are cases in which masses of infantry may possess a kind of order, even when in a manner heaped together, this can never be the case with cavalry, the efficacy of whose movements must always depend on each horse having room for free exertion. Bruce, seeing the confusion thicken, now placed himself at the head of the reserve, and addressing Angus of the Isles in the words, "My hope is constant in thee," rushed into the engagement, followed by all the troops he had hitherto kept in reserve. The effect of such an effort, reserved for a favor-able moment, failed not to be decisive. Those of the English who had been staggered were now constrained to retreat; those who were already in retreat took to actual flight. At this critical moment, the camp-followers of the Scottish army, seized with curiosity to see how the day went, or perhaps desirous to have a share of the plunder, suddenly showed themselves on the ridge of the Gillies' Hill, in the rear of the Scottish line of battle; and as they displayed cloths and horse-coverings upon poles for ensigns, they bore in the eyes of the English the terrors of an army with banners. The belief that they beheld the rise of an ambuscade, or the arrival of a new army of Scots, gave the last impulse of terror; and all fled now, even those who had before resisted. The slaughter was immense; the deep ravine of Bannockburn, to the south of the field of battle, lying in the direction taken by most of the fugitives, was almost choked and bridged over with the slain, the difficulty of the ground retarding the fugitive horsemen till the lancers were upon them. Others, and in great numbers, rushed into the river Forth, in the blindness of terror, and perished there. No less than twenty-seven barons fell in the field : the Earl of Gloucester was at the head of the fatal list. Young, brave, and high-born, when he saw the day was lost, he rode headlong on the Scottish spears, and was slain. Sir Robert Clifford, renowned in the Scottish wars, was also killed. Two hundred knights and seven hundred esquires of high birth and blood graced the list of slaughter with the noblest names of England; and thirty thousand of the common file filled up the fatal roll. Edward, among whose weaknesses we cannot number cowardice, was reluctantly forced from the bloody field by the Earl of Pembroke. The noble Sir Giles de Argentine considered it as his duty to attend the king until he saw him in personal safety, then observing that "it was not his own wont to fly," turned back, rushed again into the battle, cried his war-cry, galloped boldly against the victorious Scots, and was slain, according to his wish, with his face to the enemy. Edward must have been bewildered in the confusion of the field, for instead of directing his course southerly to Linlithgow, from which he came, he rode northward to Stirling, and demanded admittance. Philip de Mowbray, the governor, remonstrated against this rash step, reminding the unfortunate prince that he was obliged by his treaty to surrender the castle next day, as not having been relieved according to the conditions. Edward was therefore obliged to take the southern road, and he must have made a considerable circuit to avoid the Scottish army. He was, however, discovered on his retreat, and pursued by Douglas with sixty horse, who were all that could be mustered for the service. A circumstance happened in the chase which illustrates what we have formerly said of the light and easy manner in which a. Scottish baron's allegiance at this period hung upon him. In crossing the Tor Wood, Douglas met with Sir Laurence Abernethy, who with a small body of horsemen was hastening to join King Ed-ward and his army. But learning from Douglas that the English army was destroyed and dispersed, and the king a fugitive, Sir Laurence Abernethy was easily persuaded to unite his forces with those of Douglas, and ride in pursuit of the prince to aid and defend whom he had that morning buckled on his sword and mounted his horse. The king, by a rapid and continued flight through a country in which his misfortunes must have changed many friends into enemies, at length gained the castle of Dunbar, where he was hospitably received by the Earl of March. From Dunbar Ed-ward escaped almost alone to Berwick in a fishing skiff, having left behind him the finest army a king of England ever commanded. The quantity of spoil gained by the victors at the battle of Bannockburn was inestimable, and the ransoms paid by the prisoners largely added to the mass of treasure. Five near relations to the Bruce, namely, his wife, her sister Christian, his daughter Marjory, the bishop of Glasgow (Wishart), and the young Earl of Mar, the king's nephew, were exchanged against the Earl of Hereford, high constable of England. The Scottish loss was very small. Sir William Vipont and Sir Walter Ross were the only persons of consideration slain. Sir Edward Bruce is said to have been so much attached to the last of these knights as to have expressed his wish that the battle had remained unfought so Ross had not died. As a lesson of tactics, the Scots might derive from this great action principles on which they might have gained many other victories. Robert Bruce had shown them that he could rid the phalanx of Scottish spearmen of the fatal annoyance of the English archery, and that, secured against their close and continued volleys of arrows, the infantry could experience little danger from the furious charge of the men-at-arms. Yet in no battle, save that of Bannockburn, do we observe the very obvious movement of dispersing the bowmen by means of light horse ever thought of, or at least adopted; although it is obvious that the same charge which drove the English archers from the field might have enabled the bowmen of Scotland to come into the action, with unequal powers, perhaps, but with an effect which might have been formidable when unopposed. But if, in a strategical point of view, the field of Bannockburn was lost on the Scottish nation, they derived from it a lesson of pertinacity in national defence which they never afterward forgot during the course of their remaining a separate people. They had seen, before the battle of Bannockburn, the light of national freedom reduced to the last spark, their patriots slain, their laws reversed, their monuments plundered and destroyed, their prince an excommunicated outlaw, who could not find in the wilderness of his country a cave dark and inaccessible enough to shelter his head; all this they had seen in 1306: and so completely had ten years of resistance changed the scene that the same prince rode over a field of victory a triumphant sovereign, the first nobles of the English enemies lying dead at his feet or surrendering themselves for ransom. It seems likely that it was from the recollection of that extraordinary change of fortune that the Scots drew the great lesson never to despair of the freedom of their country, but to continue resistance to invaders, even when it seemed most desperate. Dark times succeeded these brilliant days, and none more gloomy than those during the reign of the conqueror's son. But though there might be fear or doubt, there could not be a thought of despair when Scotsmen saw hanging like hallowed relics above their domestic hearths the swords with which their fathers served the Bruce at the field of Bannock-burn.' And the Scots may have the pride to recollect, and other nations to learn from their history, that to a brave people one victory will do more to sustain the honorable spirit of independence than twenty defeats can effect to suppress it. |
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