The Sensational And A Priori Hypotheses
9. THE school of Locke maintains that " there is nothing in the Intellect which was not previously in Sense; all the differences between our thoughts and our sensations are due, not to differences of origin, but to differences of combination." The rival school of Leibnitz says : "Besides the materials furnished by Sense there must be taken into account the forms furnished by the Intellect."
So far the two schools are but little opposed. The point of separation is in the assumption of a special source of knowledge in the Intellectus ipse, -- an entity, or faculty, which has no community with Sense, and which not only furnishes Sense with forms, but also furnishes material, namely, certain Innate , Ideas, or Fundamental Truths, which relate to existences beyond the range of Sense.
Instead of simplifying the question by thus stating their common ground, and their point of separation, the two schools have been fighting on the supposition that the question was, " Is there anything in the Intellect which cannot be traced to Sense ? " Such a question could not be answered unless a distinct understanding of its terms was arrived at. This was not done. The answers were consequently acceptable, or absurd, according to the meanings each school assigned to the terms.
10. The sensational hypothesis is acceptable if by Sense we understand Sensibility and its laws of operation. This, indeed, which includes all the Biostatical and Biodynam-
ical conditions, external and internal, is an extension of the term, and obliterates the very distinction insisted ou by the other school ; but since it includes all psychical phenomena under the rubric of Sensibility, it enables psychological analysis to be consistent and exhaustive. Although such was obviously the dim meaning of the sensational school, one must admit that their language very imperfectly expressed it, and to some extent justified their adversaries in supposing them to mean by Sense simply the Five Senses ; and thus interpreted, the reduction of all knowledge to a sensuous origin is absurd.
11. The hypothesis of the â priori school is acceptable if by Intellect be meant the process by which many different sensations are grouped together, thus forming products unlike any of the several components ; and since this process of grouping may be extended from the elements to the groups, the products will, after successive evolutions, be so far removed from all resemblance to the original sensations as to appear due to a different source. This is only another and a better way of expressing the sensational doctrine. It demarcates the process of grouping from the elements grouped ; the operation from the symbols : a convenient demarcation, but liable to mislead the unwary into the belief that the separation is real, and that Intellect is a special faculty having no community with Sensibility and its laws. Once detached from Sensibility, it is easily imagined to be capable of operating on symbols that have no sensible values ; transcending the range of Sensibility, it can deal with transcendentals, as Sense deals with sensibles.
The error of both schools will be more fully exemplified when, in a future problem, we come to examine the relations of Feeling and Thought, and see reason to conclude that Sense and Intellect so thoroughly interpenetrate each other that it is no less impossible to conceive Sensation which does not embody the logical processes supposed to be peculiar to Thought, than to conceive Thought which does not embody the neural processes specially named Feeling. Meanwhile let us remark that both schools fall into the error of confounding a question of Psychogeny with a question of Psychology, — an error similar to that frequently occurring in Biology, where questions of Anatomy are confounded with questions of Morphology. Thus the point at issue is, what is the genesis of mental products, their origin and evolution ? In-stead of retracing this genesis by analysis, the debaters fix their attention on the full-statured mind,— or at any rate on some stage far removed from the embryonic, — and the constituent forms there discovered are accepted as initial phases : the results which have been evolved through successive experiences are accepted as the primary conditions of all Experience ; the inductions are made to pre-cede the particulars from which they were generalized.
12. Before entering on an examination of this question it may be well to state here briefly the leading conclusions which will guide us throughout our criticism of the two schools. The main question must remain nebulous so long as we are without a precise definition of Experience. The term is very variously and very laxly used. I have defined it " the Registration of Feeling. And what is reeling? It is the reaction of the sentient Organism under stimulus. Observe, it is not the reaction of an organ, but of the Organism, — a most important distinction, and rarely recognized. This reaction is a resultant of two factors, — one factor being the Organism and the other being the Stimulus. We are not to accept every response of an organ as a feeling ; nor every feeling as an experience. The secretion of a gland is a response physiologically similar to the response of the eye or ear; but it is not a feeling, although entering as an element into the mass of Systemic Sensation. Nor will the response of a sensory organ, even when a feeling (through its combination with other sentient responses), be an experience, unless it be registered in a modification of structure, and thus be revivable, because a statical condition is requisite for a dynamical manifestation. Rigorously speaking, of course there is no body that can be acted on without being modified : every sunbeam that beats against the wall alters the structure of that wall ; every breath of air that cools the brow alters the state of the organism. But such minute alterations are inappreciable for the most part by any means in our possession, and are not here taken into account, because, being annulled by subsequent alterations, they do not become registered in the structure. We see many sights, read many books, hear many wise remarks, but, although each of these has insensibly affected us, changed our mental structure, so that "we are a part of all that we have met," yet the registered result, the residuum, has perhaps been very small. While therefore no excitation of Feeling is really without some corresponding modification of Structure, it is only the excitations which produce permanent modifications that can be included under Experience. A feeling passed away, and incapable of revival, would never be called an experience by any strict writer. But the feelings registered are psycho-statical elements, so that henceforward. when the Organism is stimulated it must react along these lines, and the product will be a feeling more or less resembling the feeling formerly excited. The two biological principles — that an Organism is evolved through successive modifications, each of which is a reaction on stimulus, and that the dynamical effect is necessarily determined by its statical conditions, the function by the organ - assure us that what the Organ-ism is at any stage determines what will be the kind of sentient reactions it is capable of.
Such being our view of Experience, the conclusion lies near at hand that every Organism must bring with it, involved in its structure, the statical conditions of those dynamical results traceable in all Perception, Judgment, Instinct, etc. In other words, the Laws of Thought, or, more accurately, the Mental Forms, are connate, and so far c priori. But they are as much part and parcel of Experience as any individual perception, judgment, or acquired ability can be. All that can be said to difference them is that, for the most part, they are parts of the Experience of ancestors, — the feelings registered in modifications of structure which have been transmitted' from parent to child, so that
" All experience past became
How much of any one mental manifestation is due to ancestral feelings registered in the modified structure inherited, and how much is due to the individual feelings and their modifications acquired through the direct relation of the Organism to its stimuli, cannot accurately be determined. It is like the, wealth which a merchant acquires through his own efforts, by employing the accumulated results of the efforts of previous generations. But when the argument turns solely on the empirical or metempirical origin of knowledge, there is no need to determine this ; if we can show that all our knowledge arises from, and is limited to, the reactions of the Organism under stimulus, the question reduces itself to the point whether over and above the Organism known as a complex of physical, chemical, and vital conditions, there is also a Spiritual Organism interfused through this, and bringing spiritual properties to co-operate with vital properties. The vital Organism we believe to have been evolved through a succession of modifications due to its adaptations to the external Medium; consequently, we believe all its functions or manifestations to have been evolved through Experience. If, however, the spiritualist hypothesis be accepted, all this argument founded on Evolution comes to naught or it will come to naught if, instead of relying on the spiritualist hypothesis, we accept the creative hypothesis, and declare that the Organism was created from the first that which we see it now, equipped. with all its aptitudes and modes of reacting. It is one of these two hypotheses which underlies the argument of the â priori school. Nor can they be directly refuted. Indirectly, however, they may be discredited by showing that while they are wholly without positive evidence, they are imagined only to explain the existence of those very aptitudes, connate tendencies, Laws of Thought, etc., which can be explained without such imaginary data, namely, as the necessary consequences of Experience.
13. Descending from these preliminaries, we see that the true question Psychology has to determine concerning the origin of knowledge is, whether over and above the recognized avenues of Sensibility there are other avenues, in no one respect allied to them, through which Consciousness may be affected, and thus revelations reach the mind which, having no sensible origin, are not amenable to the canons of sensible Experience. But the dispute seems to turn on the very different question, whether the material furnished by Sense constitutes the whole product of Mind. The battle has been bloodless and endless, simply because the adversaries have never actually met on a common ground. The empirical proclamation, Nihil in intellectu nisi prius in sensu, was answered by the counterblast Nisi ipse intellectus. But this was no assault on the empirical position, simply because the assertion, that the Intellect existed, left wholly untouched the question as to how that Intellect could be reached, and on what material it could operate.
Both schools rested on the traditional assumption of the existence of a Mind endowed with certain Faculties. This Mind was supposed to be called into activity, and made to exercise its Faculties of Perception, Imagination, Memory, Attention, Reasoning,. etc., by the influence of external objects (according to one school), — by the influence of external objects and native forms (according to the other). Now, it was obviously no answer to the sensationalists to proclaim what they never denied, — the existence of Mind. What was required was to show that this Mind is furnished with conceptions not in any way reducible to sensible experiences or combinations of such experiences ; to show, in fact, that there were innate ideas and truths, whose origin transcended Experience. On this point the argumentation of Locke is so triumphant that the doctrine of innate ideas has long been given up, — or rather has become transformed into a doctrine, which, while seeming to occupy the old position, does in truth relinquish it, but brings into prominence a truth never sufficiently allowed for by the school of Locke, — I mean the part played by the Organism and its inherited modes of reaction.
14. The psychologist finds among the phenomena classed under Mind two very distinct groups : perceptions and conceptions, — images of concrete objects, and abstract symbols from which all trace of an image has escaped. He calls the one the products of Sense, and the other the products of Intellect. Not understanding their genesis, and impressed by their disparity, unable to detect any common measure between them, and persuaded that very many of our most important ideas cannot be analyzed into mere affections of Sense, the a priori philosopher takes his stand on this evidence of the speciality of Intellect, and impatiently rejects the empirical hypothesis. It is clear that out of mere sensations as affections of the organism we cannot get negative conceptions and abstract notions. What is the sensible representative of our idea of Mind ? What is that of Life ? Granting these, and all other abstractions, to have originally had sensible concretes, it is still indisputable that these objects of Thought never could have been objects of Sense. Whence are they derived ? If Sensation be restricted to the passive affections of Sense from which the co-operation of the logical processes is excluded, there is a radical defect in the sensational hypothesis. But the d, priori hypothesis only cloaks this defect by a phrase ; it does not explain the phenomena. When Kant says that in order to render any sensible phenomenon intelligible, the Understanding must add the notion of Substance, a notion which cannot be given through Sense, the statement really amounts to this : before a phenomenon can be raised into the logical sphere it must submit to logical conditions ; before the sensible, can become intelligible it must assume intelligible characters. No one would dispute the position. No one would deny that there are logical processes which may be called Laws of Thought, the operation of which is as indispensable in the formation of judgments, as the laws of Geometry in the construction of figures. The question of vital importance is : What are these Laws, and whence their origin ? Kant declared that they were antecedent to all Experience, and made Experience possible ; he would not allow them to be innate ideas, but he refrained from specifying what they were, except that they were native elements of Mind. The modern biological school of psychologists fully admitting the operation of logical processes, and the wide differences between such processes and passive affections of Sense, endeavors to trace the genesis of these, their organic evolution, and their identity throughout psychical phenomena, from the simplest perception up to, the most complex conception. It admits that the Mind, considered psychostatically, in the developed state, has certain endowments, or modes of operation, which determine the forms and products of its thinking ; and these are general laws which determine â priori, so to speak, even particular opinions, 'as general laws of Motion determine particular motions. It further admits that these endowments, these Laws of Thought, and the conceptions which are their products when combined with sensible experiences, are assuredly not reducible to any individual experience, but to the evolved Experience of the race.
15. These large admissions, rightly interpreted, give no support to the â priori school. In interpreting them it is necessary to guard against the illusion incident to Abstraction, and the illusion incident to Metaphor. The Mind is commonly spoken of in oblivion of the fact that it is an abstract term expressing the sum of mental phenomena (with, or without, an unexplored remainder, ac-cording to the point of view) ; as an abstraction it comes to be regarded in the light of an entity, or separate source of the phenomena which constitute it. A thought, which as a product is simply an embodied process, comes to be regarded in the light of something distinct from the process ; and thus two aspects of one and the same phenomenon are held to be two distinct phenomena. Because we abstract the material of an object from its form, considering each apart, we get into the habit of treating form as if it were in reality separable from material. By a similar illusion we come to regard the process (of thinking) apart from the product (thought), and, generalizing the process, we call it Mind, or Intellect, which then means no longer the mental phenomena condensed into a term, but the source of these phenomena. This illusion is further strengthened by the metaphors in which it is commonly expressed. We speak of the Mind being furnished with material by Sense ; or we liken it to a loom which weaves the threads of Experience into a wondrous web. But if we substitute for these metaphors another more nearly resembling the fact, and instead of a machine take the vital organism for comparison, we may parallel the aphorism : "Nothing in the Intellect not previously in Sense," by the aphorism : "Nothing in the Organism not previously in Food." On hearing this latter statement, a biologist who had no conception of the evolution of an organism, individual and ancestral, might patiently ask " But whence came this organism? whence its power of fashioning the food ? I see no trace of the organism and its functions in the nutritive materials ; hence I conclude that these pre-exist, and because they are pre existen there is the possibility of nutritive materials be-'coming food." It is thus the â priori psychologist asks : Whence the Mind and its Forms of Thought ? Whence those conditions which render it possible for sensitive impressions to become Experience ?
The answers to such questions must depend on whether we are considering the functions, or their genesis. It is indisputable that every particular man comes into the world with a heritage of organized forms and definite tendencies, which will determine his feeling and thinking in certain definite ways, whenever the suitable conditions are present. And all who believe in evolution believe that these forms and tendencies represent ancestral experiences and adaptations ; believe that not only is the pointer born with an organized tendency to point, the setter to set, the beaver to build, and the bird to fly, but that the man is born with a tendency to think in images and symbols according to given 'relations and sequences which constitute logical laws, and that what he thinks is the necessary product of his organism and the external conditions. This organism itself is a product of its history ; it is what it has become; it is a part of the history of the human race, and in so far resembles that of other members of the race ; it is also specially individualized by the particular personal conditions which have distinguished him from his fellow-men. Thus resembling all men in general characters he will in general feel as they feel, think as they think ; and differing from all men in special characters, he will have personal differences of feeling and shades of feeling, thought and combinations of thought. All this is equally true of the organism and its food. The body is built up out of elements furnished in the food, and this not simply by a juxtaposition of the elements, but by their selection, combination, recombination, and assimilation (or making like) ; and this assimilation is rigorously determined, 1°, by the special properties of the elements themselves in these relations ; and, 2°, by the special properties of the tissues which assimilate them; and these latter are determined by inherited tendencies of the organism. Thus only those elements in the food supplied which admit of being assimilated under these conditions are incorporated in the organism, and help the growth and preservation of the organism; the other elements are rejected, and are, so to speak, non-existent for the organism.
The case is parallel in mental assimilation. The reactions of Feeling are determined by the general laws of Sensibility and the special modes of the individual. The Mind is built up out of assimilated experiences, its perceptions being shaped by its pre-perceptions, its conceptions by its pre-conceptions. Like the body, the Mind is shaped through its history.* It is in this sense — and this only — that we ought to speak of Intellect as a process apart from its products, and continue the metaphor of sensations being the food of the Intellect. Food, regarded objectively, is something not belonging to the organism; although, strictly, a substance never is food except in becoming part of an organism. In like manner Sensation is held to imply an element foreign to Mind, in contradistinction to Thought, which like the air we breathe seems part of ourselves. It is reflection and experiment which convince us that the air is a material object capable of being weighed and measured. It is reflection and experiment which convince us that Thought is an embodied process, which has its conditions in the history of the race no less than in that of the individual.
16. Thus explained the doctrine of the sensationalists may be accepted; all ideas may have a sensible origin assigned them when Sensation itself is understood to involve the primary condition of an organized structure whose function, is logical (i. e. constituted by the grouping of neural units) and whose aptitudes are inherited Experiences. And, thus explained, the doctrine may be reconciled with all that is valid in the a priori hypothesis, namely, that which insists on the necessary co-operation of logical processes with organized aptitudes. The crude sensational doctrine is equivalent to the crude statement that the Organism and its functions are given in the food. Whether any reputable thinker ever really maintained this doctrine, may reasonably be doubted ; many writers have seemed to maintain it, owing to the imperfect precision of their language ; yet all would admit that no analysis of food, irrespective of the Organism and its assimilative processes, would yield an explanation even of food, much less of vital phenomena ; nor would analysis of external stimuli, irrespective of the sensitive mechanism, yield an explanation of Sensation, much less of higher phenomena: The resistance of the a priori school to such crude explanations has been of decided utility.
Respecting the so-called Mental Forms both schools are right, though standing at different points of view. The psychological fact tells us that the Forms are connate, therefore a priori; the psychogenetical fact tells us that the Forms are products of ancestral Experience, and therefore d posteriori. But the vital question is not whether we have modes of feeling and thinking which determine the nature of our feelings and thoughts, but whether we can have any knowledge of things which have not been felt, i. e. whether there is a sensible basis and sensible test requisite for every conception, or whether a Supra-sensible is knowable.
17. The transformations which hypotheses undergo have been instructively illustrated by Whewell. " When a prevalent theory is found to be untenable, and consequently is succeeded by a different or even by an opposite one, the change is not made suddenly or completed at once, at least in the minds of the most tenacious adherents of the earlier doctrine ; but is effected by a transformation or series of transformations of the earlier hypothesis, by means of which it is gradually brought nearer and nearer to the second ; and thus the defenders of the ancient doctrine are able to go on as if still asserting their first opinions, and continue to press their points of advantage, if they have any, against the new theory. They borrow or imitate, and in some way accommodate to their original hypothesis the new explanation which the new theory gives of the observed facts ; and thus they preserve a sort of verbal consistency ; till the original hypothesis becomes inextricably confused, or breaks down under the weight of the auxiliary hypotheses thus fastened upon it in order to make it consistent with the facts." * Such has been the case with the hypothesis respecting the origin of knowledge. Each school has modified its views to include what is valid in the doctrine of its opponent. When the arguments of Gassendi and Hobbes made Descartes aware of the manifest impropriety of supposing that the infant came into the world ready furnished with ideas of objects which could only be presented to Sense, and of ideas which could only be furnished by combinations and abstractions from sensations, — with ideas of Geometry before there had been sensible experiences of Extension, etc., — the philosopher declared that his meaning had been misinterpreted. He declared that he never conceived that the infant had more than an innate faculty of acquiring such ideas under suitable conditions. His admirers and followers have been at some pains to show that this was his meaning. Thus interpreted, the doctrine of innate ideas amounts to the evident proposition that the native construction of the human .mind is such that when given conditions are present given results must follow ; when objects are apprehended there will be certain ideas formed, and when certain propositions expressive of the relations of such ideas are stated, the truth of such propositions is seen at once. No sensationalist would demur to this.
18. Let us for a moment glance at the statement of this doctrine by two illustrious defenders of it. Schelling argues thus : All knowledge in as far as it is the product of the Ego is â priori; but in as far as it is unconsciously produced it is â posteriori. There are therefore d priori concepts, without there being innate concepts. The concepts are not innate ; but our nature and its mechanism is innate.* Leibnitz is equally explicit: "Philalèthe. S'il y a des vérités innées ne faut il pas qu'il y ait des pensées innées ? Théophile. Point du tout, car les pensées sont des actions, et les connaissances ou les vérités, en tant qu'elles sont en nous quand même on n'y pense point, sont des habitudes ou des dispositions."
In this statement of the doctrine the absurdity is escaped but at the same time its significance vanishes. We have only to open Locke to see that in this form he frankly accepted it. "I imagine," he says, "any one will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose ideas of colors innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects : and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and innate characters when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit, to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind." In-deed the very distinction on which stress is laid, between capacity and knowledge, is thus expressed by Locke : " The capacity they say is innate ; the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims ? "
19. This is the real point : the "capacity to acquire " must be presupposed in the case of maxims avowedly the products of Experience, no less than of maxims declared to be anterior to Experience; on the other hand, "the knowledge acquired" must be the product of Experience in both cases. Leibnitz says that when a man at fifty learns the proposition of the square of the hypothenuse "he acquires an innate idea" ; and thus all the truths of Geometry are innate, though millions of men never acquire them. This position, which was reproduced by Whewell in his controversy on the subject with Mr. Mill and my-self,* simply amounts to asserting that the mind is so constituted as inevitably to form certain conclusions under certain conditions. Who ever doubted this ? It is wholly irrelevant. We are so constituted that under certain conditions inevitably we have sensations of color, sound, taste, etc. ; yet no one considers the ideas of color, sound, and taste to be innate. The mind is so constituted as inevitably to conclude (until better instructed) that the sun turns round the earth, moving from east to west, but no one would admit this conclusion to be innate. It is with the functions of our intellectual organs as with the functions of our vital organs, — when the organ is mature, is healthy, and is stimulated, its action is irresistible ; and when similar organs in various organisms are stimulated under similar conditions, the action is in each case similar.
20. That all men should form the same conceptions, — mathematical or metaphysical, — under conditions that are universal, is not surprising ; but it is surprising, at first, to observe the strange yet identical conceptions formed by lunatics under external circumstances of the widest dissimilarity ; and the surprise only ceases when we discover the cause of this identity to be the similarity of cerebral conditions. In the course of my observations in English and German asylums I have been forcibly impressed with the fact, abundantly illustrated in the records of Insanity, that patients belonging to very different classes of society and to different nations have precisely similar hallucinations, which. they express in terms so closely alike, that the one might have been a free translation of the other. The pauper lunatic in England will often have the same illusion as the insane German merchant ; and the insane soldier in Bohemia will seem to be repeating the absurdities of the insane farmer in Sussex. Not only does the fact of cerebral congestion determine hallucination in the Englishman as in the German, but deter-mines the precise form which that hallucination will take. Twenty different patients of both sexes and of different age, country, and status, will be found having similar morbid sensations ; and will all form a similar hypothesis to explain what they feel. Not only will they agree in attributing their distressing sensations to the malevolent action of invisible enemies, but will also agree in describing how these enemies molest them ; even when such imaginary explanations take peculiar shapes, — for example, that the enemy blows poisonous vapors through the key-hole, or chinks in the wall, strikes them with galvanic batteries hidden under the table, roars and threatens them from underground cellars, etc. To hear in Germany a narrative which one has already heard in England, gravely particularizing the same preposterous details, almost as if the thoughts of the one were the echo of the thoughts of the other, has a startling effect. I do not refer simply to the well-known general types of hallucination in which patients fancy themselves emperors, Christs, great actors, or great statesmen, or fancy themselves doomed to perdition, made of glass and liable to break in pieces if they move, — I refer to the singular resemblance noticeable in the expression of these forms, so that one patient has the same irrational conceptions as another.* This identity of conception rests on identity of cerebral congestion. Remove the congestion and the hallucination vanishes.
21. And here I will digress a little on the subject of Instinct, which, because it is so frequently cited to prove the doctrine of Innate Ideas, may best serve to illustrate the doctrine of evolution. The marvel and mystery of Instinct naturally render it a favorite topic in the writings of those who oppose the experiential School. Instinct is often regarded as so superior to Intelligence in the certainty of its action, that nothing except Creative Wisdom is admitted in explanation of it ; while from other sides it is regarded as so removed from all community with Intelligence, that it is declared to be the blind action of a mechanism, not the operation of a rational Soul.
Psychogenesis seems to me to teach the direct contrary of all this. It teaches that Instinct is organized Experience : i. e. undiscursive Intelligence ; that is to say, while the neural and logical processes are the same in both, the operations in what is specially termed Intelligence are facultative, and involve the element of choice in the selection of means to ends ; Intelligence is therefore discursive ; whereas in Instinct the operations are fixed, uniform, with no hesitation in the selection of means.
That Instinct, although in the individual it precedes Experience, is a product of what was Experience in the ancestral organisms from which the individual has inherited his structure, may best be shown by tracing its genesis from actions that at first were tentative, in other words intelligent. We have already (Psychological Principles, § 52) established the needful distinction between Intelligence and Intellect, and characterized the former as the discrimination of means to ends, — the guidance of the Organism towards the satisfaction of its impulses ; and (Ibid., § 30 and § 74) we have distinguished Instincts from Impulses solely on the ground of the former being guided by discernment of relations. So that the three orders of phenomena may be thus characterized : in cases where there never was an alternative open to an action, the action being the necessary activity of the stimulated organ, — as in Secretion, Respiration, etc., — the action is impulsive ; in cases where there was once an alternative, and when the action may still be controlled or modified in consequence, and is always guided by discernment of relations, the action is instinctive : however fixed now, it was not always so, and will vary with variations in the conditions ; in cases where there are alternatives which may determine the action, the means being various and those that are selected in one case being rejected in another, the action is intelligent, discursive. Thus the nutritive Impulse which urges an animal in search of food is to be distinguished from the Instinct which causes it to select only one kind of food from out of several kinds accessible, all of which would be nutritious, or causes it to procure that one kind only in the ways followed by its ancestors, though many other ways are really open to it. The peculiarity of Instinct is that although guided by discernment of relations which is intelligent, it is restricted in its pathway and rendered undiscursive by an organized tendency of structure resulting from ancestral restrictions. The character of uniformity so often insisted on arises naturally from the success of the means chosen ; the Impulse having been satisfied by the object selected, no other object is sought, and the choice once made is made forever. But that the object was chosen is proved by the fact that when, under other conditions, it no longer satisfies the impulse, it is rejected, and another sought ; moreover, not only is the old object rejected when it ceases to satisfy the Impulse, but a new object will be selected in preference if it gratifies the Impulse. Thus we see insects in our conservatories select their food and nidus among tropical plants which could not live in the open air which these insects were born and bred in ; thus indigenous plants which have formed the nidus and the food for generation after generation, are neglected in favor of the new plants which the insects now first discover. Every one who has watched birds knows that they always select the best materials for their nests, and will leave untouched material they and their kind have been accustomed to select, if softer material is at hand. The fact of choice is further confirmed by the fact that Instincts are subject to illusions as Reason is. I shall hereafter have occasion. to specify many striking examples.
The daily facts of Habit show how easily tendencies become organized, how the actions which at first were tentative, laborious, slow, become inevitable, easy, rapid ; and the notorious facts of Heredity show how habits once organized may become transmitted to descendants, so that the unnatural action of " begging," when a dog is taught to perform it, may become a natural action in its descendants, requiring no teaching. Nay, this very process underlies all development. The voluntary actions become involuntary, the involuntary become automatic, the intelligent become habitual, and the habitual become instinctive. It is the same in the higher regions of Intellect the slow acquisitions of centuries of research become condensed into axioms which are intuitions.
However undiscursive Instinct may be it has always the intelligent character of discernment of relations and consequent control. For example, the instinct in an angry man to strike the offender, or in a dog to bite, is not, as Bossuet' and other writers suppose, a blind impulse unprescient of means and end ; on the contrary, the man, however angry, will not strike an offender before whom he stands in awe, or for whose weakness he has pity ; nor will the dog bite his master. It is instructive to observe a dog whose tail is pinched by one he loves; the pain excites the impulse to bite, the mouth is rapidly brought down upon the offending fingers, but the biting impulse is restrained, and the teeth do not close on the fingers; whereas if it is a stranger's fingers that have caused the pain, the biting instinct has free play.
21a. The general notion that voluntary movements arise out of involuntary movements is only acceptable when by Volition is meant the determination of an impulse by a guiding idea : but if we disengage it from this place in the intellectual region, and restore it to its primary position in the Logic of Feeling, - and otherwise we must deny Volition to animals and infants, — it seems to me demonstrable that the movements now involuntary were originally voluntary, precisely as the instinctive actions were originally intelligent, the undiscursive discursive (Psychol. Principles, § 31). One illustration may suffice. The movements of the eye are generally acknowledged to be involuntary ; that they are originally voluntary, and have still their guidance in discriminative sensation, and their pole-star in the external object, will be evident to any one who studies their mechanism.
Now since we know that many Instincts which are manifested as soon as the organisms have acquired the requisite development and are appropriately stimulated, were originally acquired in ancestral experiences, — a striking example being that of the instinctive terror of man felt by animals, a terror which was organized in their immediate ancestors, and was absent from their remote ancestors, — since we know that Instincts like many Diseases are due to registered modifications of structure, transmitted by Heredity, and since these registrations are themselves acquired results, the conclusion that all Instincts are acquired becomes irresistible. Indeed we have only to remember that every mental manifestation is simply the activity of an organized structure, and is rigorously determined by that structure, to see that if the present structure is acquired through successive modifications of pre-existent structures, the present manifestation must have been acquired. It is forgetfulness of this cardinal principle, of the necessary dependence of the dynamical effect on the statical conditions, which renders the interpretation of some familiar facts so uncertain. Thus when the helplessness of the human infant is contrasted with the helpfulness of the young animal, so that what requires a long initiation of experience in the one is seen to be present from the first in the other, and the necessity which the infant is under of learning to walk, learning to see, learning to localize its sensations, is not observable in the rabbit or the bird, it is concluded that these actions have a different genesis in each. Hence one party holds that our perception of Space is innate, because the bird manifests it on quitting the shell ; another party holds that our perception of Space is acquired, because the infant has to learn how to see, and how to estimate positions. The truth seems to be that the bird quits the shell in a far more developed condition than the infant on entering the world, — has its organism and its visual organs more ready to enter upon their normal activities, and therefore more quickly manifests what the infant will only manifest when a corresponding development has taken place. On the other hand, in observing how the infant slowly acquires the perception of Space we learn what has been the process of registration in the development of the bird-structure. The state of the infant organism, before it has been modified by the registration of changes produced by reactions on external stimuli, represents what was the state of the ancestral organism before it had been so modified. Embryology teaches us that the embryonic phases of the higher animals repeat the phases of development at which the lower animals are arrested. It is because the immature brain of the infant represents a stage when the Experience was immature, that the infant cannot manifest aptitudes which depend on subsequent Experience ; and it is because the stages of subsequent development will take place under similar conditions to those which have occasioned the development of the parents, that the functions of the infant will in time come to resemble the functions of the parents. Let the infant be developed under dissimilar conditions, and it will proportionately deviate in structure, consequently in functions, from the parents. A child born blind will bring with it the requisite conditions for subsequently acquiring the perception of tactual Space, but will obviously never acquire the perception of optical Space, A child born deaf and dumb will bring with it the conditions requisite for the acquisition of visible and tactual symbols, but not for the acquisition of verbal symbols, To these organic conditions let us now add the external conditions. A child born with eyes, but kept in constant darkness, or with only intermittent and brief excitations of light, or born with vocal and auditory organs, but in a society of deaf and dumb companions, rarely hearing the speech of man, — this child will never acquire the perception of visible space, nor the use of verbal symbols which characterize ordinary men. What the child brings with it into the world is an immature organism which under similar conditions will develop into an organism similar to that of other men.
21b. How intimately the functions depend upon the organism may be illustrated in this striking example : The tadpole of the salamander is a vegetable feeder ; al-though it is also an animal feeder, it is not exclusively nor mainly this; but in its mature phase, when it has acquired its distinctive structure as a salamander, it is wholly an animal feeder, and cannot be induced to take vegetable food, even when starving. There is one kind of salamander (salamandra atra) which is peculiarly interesting from the fact that it is born a salamander, and not a tadpole, — passing through its tadpole metamorphoses while still in its mother's womb. Now no one will dispute that the selection of food is an Instinct, and that one animal is herbivorous, another carnivorous, just as one animal is aquatic, another amphibious, and a third terrestrial, in accordance with its Instinct. Well, this salamander which is instinctively carnivorous, is in its tadpole stage instinctively herbivorous and carnivorous. I found that if it were taken from the womb while still a tadpole, it' would live in water, and feed on vegetable and animal substances. Let it complete its metamorphoses, within the womb, or without, and no sooner does it acquire the organization of the salamander than it acquires the carnivorous Instinct. Again : a pigeon has the Instinct to preen its feathers, and to sleep with the beak under its wing. It does not manifest these tendencies from the first, but always acquires them sooner or later ; when once acquired, these actions are performed even after its cerebral lobes have been removed ; but it never acquires them if the cerebral lobes be removed before the mechanism has been established. Here we have Instincts manifestly acquired, just as the child acquires the Instinct to scratch itself when it itches ; being for a long while unable to localize its sensations, and consequently unable to scratch itself however it may itch, it does nevertheless inevitably, in the course of time, acquire the Instinct. But compare this with the same Instinct congenital in animals who are able to scratch themselves from the first. So indubitably is this tendency an organized inherited tendency that it is manifested even when some congenital imperfection prevents its perfect realization. Thus Gudden had a rabbit born with paralysis of the hinder legs, incapable therefore of scratching, and this rabbit which had never scratched itself would, when tickled, turn its head to and fro towards the motionless hinder legs ; thus in part realizing the inherited tendency which it was in-capable of completely carrying into effect.
These, and multitudes of other examples which might be cited, prove, what is evident theoretically, that the manifestations, whether under the form of perceptions or instincts, are rigorously determined by the state of the Organism. Indeed the Organism is an ensemble of statical conditions, and its dynamical tendencies vary with these. It is thus that we see temporary states successively manifesting tendencies which are classed as Instincts ; and the epileptic patient may be observed passing successively through phases which manifest homicidal, kleptomaniacal, and pyromaniacal Instincts, which are temporary if their statical conditions are temporary. Or, since this illustration may be disputed, consider the periodicity of the sexual Instinct in animals, which is assuredly due to a periodicity in the statical conditions. But although the sexual Instinct is less disputable than those fleeting manifestations observable in Insanity, I adduce the evidence of the latter for the sake of illustrating the position that Experience depends on the registration of Feeling, and exists only so long as the registrations, i. e. modifications, exist. For many of these passing states of Insanity, however violent their manifestations, are forgotten like the visions of a dream, when the abnormal conditions give place to normal conditions, and the over-excited brain resumes its former state. If the statical modification become permanent, there is registration of the feelings, and the patient is permanently in-sane ; if they are fleeting there is no registration, and the patient returned to his normal state has no Experience of all that occurred during his abnormal state.
22. We do not usually class any of the fleeting manifestations under the general term Instinct, though obviously some of the Instincts are but temporary manifestations of temporary states, nor do we class any manifestations that are peculiar to individuals as Instincts, but rather as Idiosyncrasies. Only those manifestations that are common to the species, and are responses to external stimuli of common recurrence, are classed among the Instincts. There are certain statical conditions which are invariable,-such are those dynamically represented in Space, Time, Causation, etc., which may be set apart, and considered, on this account, as specially entitled o the character of â priori Mental Forms, not indeed in the Kantian sense, but in the sense in which Biology under-stands organized forms. What concerns us here, how-ever, is not the psychological but the psychogenetical interpretation, — not whether man comes into the world with an organized structure the activities of which necessarily lead to the perceptions of Extension, Duration, Causation, etc., and also to the conceptions of Space, Time, Cause, etc., but whether these perceptions and conceptions have any higher source and deeper validity than the perceptions and conceptions which arise from individual experiences. Neither observation nor reflection warrants the supposition that the infant, in spite of inheritance, has on entering the world innate ideas of Space, Time, Causation ; what is innate, or connate, is the structure which will react under stimulus in certain definite ways, and these reactions will depend on the degree of development which the structure has acquired. The infant whose optical organs are imperfect will never. react on the stimulus of light in the same way as another infant whose organs are more developed. At birth no child sees. It usually takes several days before the child makes any movement of the head towards the light, and four or five weeks before he learns to converge the axes of both eyes.* But, could the infant see at birth, this would not indicate that the perception of Space or of external objects was innate ; only that the structure was ready for its function ; and how that structure came to be formed would still remain a question. And there is one argument which is decisive. Even if we assume, with the advocates of creation, that the structure was not evolved through modifications impressed on organic substance by successive adaptations of the Organism to the external Medium, — that the eye, for example, was created, and not evolved by the action of light upon the sensitive surface, - created with all the powers which it is known to manifest, — still there would remain the necessity of this eye being brought into the appropriate relation with the external object; and in the absence of this, in the absence of light to call the energy of the eye into existence, there would be no visual perception, much less an idea of Space. Nor would this be denied ; certainly not by Kant. Yet its admission is an admission of the cardinal principle of the Empirical doctrine, that all perception, consequently all conception, is the product of the reactions of the Organism stimulated by. the Cosmos ; which is saying in other words that all our knowledge has its origin in Experience, — the registration of such reactions. And this is further confirmed by the fact that on the one hand the development of the Organ-ism has its prescribed course, any interference with the series of successive stages causing another form of structure to result, while on the other hand any interference with the normal course of experience will correspondingly affect the result, so that even results which have the fixed character of Instincts may be frustrated by an interruption of the prescribed course of evolution. Many examples might be given, but it will suffice to mention the Instinct of sucking, which is manifested by all mammals very soon after birth. Here is a structure ready for reaction in a particular way directly the appropriate stimulus is felt. But (the observation had not escaped Harvey) if, instead of being put to the breast, the child be fed from a spoon, in a few days it loses the power of sucking the breast, and can only feed from the spoon. Obviously the explanation of this is that the Organism, having been induced to react in a way unlike the normal way, becomes in consequence so modified that it will no longer react in the normal way even when the normal stimulus is applied.
23. This digression has been made to fix our notion of what is really valid in the doctrine of Mental Forms, as organized tendencies acquired through successive experiences ; and to disprove the conclusion that the existence of such Mental Forms indicates metempirical sources of knowledge. When we admit the existence of â priori tendencies, we do not admit the existence of d priori truths, i. e. conceptions of sensible facts irrespective of Experience, or of supra-sensible facts which no Experience could furnish. When we admit that there are in the organism statical conditions which must determine the directions of its manifestations, so that every Mind must necessarily feel in certain ways and think in certain ways, we do not admit that the feelings, and the truths which are their results, are engraven on the Mind, and require no excitations from the external world to elicit them; still less that they can reveal to us a world which never was presented in Experience. The Forms of Sense and the Forms of Thought are evolved, as the branches and foliage of an oak are evolved from the acorn. No one now supposes that the oak is ready formed in the acorn, lying there in miniature. The oak is quite as much in the atmosphere and soil ; it really is in neither, but will be evolved from both. Given the two factors, — an Organism and its Medium,— and the product will necessarily be evolved ; and will be according as they are. Thus the seed of the poplar and the seed of the chestnut are different structures, and will evolve into different trees.
We learn by individual experiences, registrations of feeling, rendered possible by ancestral experiences.' The individual structural evolution, in its embryonic phases, rapidly runs through all the grades of vertebrate development. The individual mental evolution in its early phases likewise runs rapidly through all the general experiences of the race ; and youth acquires ideas, the products of such experiences, by going through similar successions of feeling. What marvel is there that constant conditions acting upon structures which are similar should produce similar results ? It is in this sense that the paradox of Leibnitz is true, and we can be said " to acquire an innate idea" ; only the idea is not acquired independently of Experience, but through the process of Experience similar to that which originally produced it. The truth that a straight line is the shortest line between two points, is one which millions of men pass to their graves without acquiring ; yet it is a truth which may justly be called innate in so far as it lies involved in the sensible experiences from which Philosophy extricates it, — I mean, it is necessarily given in the Logic of Feeling, before Psychology recognizes it as an Intuition. The rational instinct which makes a man infer a cause wherever he observes a change, is in one sense connate, in another acquired, — it is the acquired result of a connate tendency, quite as much as the sexual Instinct, which seeks the gratification of desires by union with another, is the acquired result of a connate tendency : both are developed some time after birth, the development of both requiring a special state of the Organism, and a special excitation of that state. The infant has no more the idea of Causality, than it has the feeling of sexuality. I shall here-after show that Causality is an inwoven law of Feeling, not primarily an Induction : it may be said to precede Feeling, and render Experience possible, in so far as it is an organized tendency of Feeling to connect a consequent with an antecedent ; it may be called an Intuition in so far as it is the perception of the relation of equivalence ; and it may be called an Induction in so far as this perception is raised into a conception, and extended from the particular to the general, raised from a fact of Feeling into an universal Law of Nature.
24. With this view of the genesis of a priori truths it is obvious that the ordinary argument which relies on these for an extra-experiential origin and a deeper validity cannot be accepted. True it may be that conceptions which demanded centuries of research are no sooner reached than they are seen to be axiomatic, irresistible ; but the fact that they required this research is sufficiently instructive respecting their origin ; and if their presence in the primary conditions of Feeling be detected, so that we discover them to be inwoven with our earliest experiences, this does not give them a higher validity than Feeling.
It is Kant's fundamental mistake, which will be elucidated farther on, to treat the a priori conditions of Knowledge as evidence of our possessing Knowledge which is itself â priori and metempirical, — to assume that be-cause knowledge is rendered possible by organic conditions, and these are not present in the external causes of excitation, therefore there is a Knowledge which is anterior to all excitation, independent of all Experience. But if we get rid of this view we may reasonably admit that there must be a priori conditions which render Knowledge possible; and we may also conveniently establish a distinction between a priori and â posteriori knowledge, — not that either of them can be supposed to have originated independently of Experience, ancestral and individual, or to be founded on different processes, but that the one embraces conceptions which must inevitably and always be formed, because their conditions — psychical and cosmical — are constant, whereas the others are contingent, depending on variable conditions. In illustration take Mathematics and Biology. The former is an a priori science, not that it is in any sense independent of Experience (see Chap. XIII.), but that its data and results are invariable : the logical conditions and the external conditions are constants : what is seen to be true of one circle is seen to be true of every circle ; therefore the knowledge of one includes a priori the knowledge of all, and there is no need of experiment or comparison to determine whether each new case is identical with the known cases. Not so with Biology,— except when its abstract propositions are dealt with. The state of our scientific experience is here a variable factor, and the external conditions are likewise variable. We can imagine a variety of hypotheses to explain every unexplained phenomenon, and it is only by successive tentatives that we reach any reliable explanation. More than this, the most accurate knowledge of any one phenomenon does not enable us d priori to conclude respecting every other that may resemble it ; each fact demands d posteriori verification of its explanation, since we cannot always be sure that it resembles in all respects those which it is seen to resemble in some respects.
Kant erred, I think, in two ways : first, in accepting the traditional Dualism which regarded Mind in the light of a separate entity, having its inherent Forms, or Laws, which had no community with the Laws of the Cosmos ; secondly, in limiting the number of these Forms, and not seeing that as evolved products they were necessarily enlarged by increasing Experience. With this rectification, we may accept the position that there are â priori Forms of Sensibility necessarily inherent in the organized structure ; and these, which may be classed under Forms of Feeling and Forms of Thought, are correctly said to be connate, in' precisely the same way that the vertebrate form, or the special forms of the several organs, are connate. Since the manifestations of the organism must he determined by its modes of reaction, obviously the experience of each individual will be rendered possible by the connate Forms ; and if we constructively anticipate what must necessarily result when this organism is placed under stimulus, we may say that the resulting experience, or knowledge, is connate. In this sense it is true that man brings with him into the world the potential knowledge that a straight line is the shortest line between two points, and that every effect must have a cause, just as he brings with him the potential knowledge that sugar is sweet and roses are red ; but in no other sense.
The Mental Forms are general and special, i. e. common to an entire group of feelings, and particular to special groups. The analytical Forms of Feeling, are Extensity, Intensity, Pleasure (and its correlative Pain), Duration, Motion, Difference. There is no sensation which does not involve magnitude; degree, a pleasurable or painful quality, a motor quality, a duration, and a discrimination separating it from other sensations. From these are abstracted the analytical Forms of Thought, such as Quantity, Relation, Change, Coexistence, Succession, etc., which are raised from the Logic of Feeling into the Logic of Signs. What may be called the particular Forms are those of the Special Senses, such as Color, Odor, Taste, etc.
But these Mental Forms, like the so-called Laws of Nature, are not to be conceived as antecedent and independent realities ruling mental and cosmical phenomena. They are only d priori in our theoretical constructions. They are not properly speaking conditions which precede the phenomena, but modalities under which the phenomena appear, and which Analysis separates, and then assigns them logical priority.
25. We may here bring this discussion. to a close in the hope that it has exhibited the promised reconciliation between the experiential and â priori schools, by elucidating what is valid in both, and rectifying what is erroneous in both. Although I have argued the question in my own way, it is proper to add that the point of view here advanced is historically. to be assigned to the labors of Gall, some modern physiologists, and above all Mr. Herbert Spencer. In Gall's system it is a vital point that our various aptitudes, instincts, and faculties are connate. He particularly distinguishes it from the hypothesis of innate ideas and innate principles, on the one hand, and from that of mere passive capacities on the other, — as if the organism were a block of marble ready to be shaped according to the fancy of the sculptor.
But Gall's analysis, apart from many imperfections, is simply psychological, whereas Mr. Spencer's is psycho-genetical. He not only recognizes the existence of the modalities, he explains their genesis ; and by showing that the constant experiences of the race become organized tendencies which are transmitted as a heritage, he shows that even such â priori forms as those of Space, Time, Causality, etc., which must have arisen in Experience, because of the constancy and universality of the external relations, are necessarily connate. Just as the optical structure of the eye has been, so to speak, fashioned by the external influences incessantly modifying the primitive' tissues, and thereby rendering possible and inevitable the fun ctional reaction of that organ, so the cerebral structure has been fashioned by the necessities of internal adaptation to external influences, and thus the constant relations of Space, etc., organized in us.
Such is one of the many profound conceptions with which this great thinker has enriched Philosophy ; and it ought to have finally closed the debate between the a priori and the experiential schools in so far as both admit a common ground of biological interpretation ; though of course it leaves the metempirical hypothesis untouched. The metempiricist not only maintains that there is a something in the mind over and above the mere capacity to know, something not belonging at all to the Organism, but he concludes that we have evidence of this in a higher source of knowledge than can be gained through Experience of the individual or the race. He maintains that a mark exists by which this can be recognized ; and that mark is the twofold character of Universality and Necessity. I shall hereafter devote a chapter to the discussion of this point. Here I can only notice its bearing on the question respecting innate ideas. Obviously since the experiential doctrine admits the universality and necessity of mathematical truths (though Mr. Mill and some others would restrict even these), this character will not of itself suffice to prove the a priori position. The origin of these truths still remains a question. Both schools agree that the mind is so constituted as irresistibly to form these conclusions when experience presents the sensible occasions; both schools agree that until such sensible occasions are presented no such conclusions can be formed. The a priori school maintains that, although Experience may be necessary to call the latent truths into emergent consciousness, it only calls them out, it does not originate them, for Experience itself is only rendered possible by their pre-existence.
Let us view this hypothesis in a parallel case. Chlorine is so constituted that whenever it combines with hydrogen there is formed hydrochloric acid. From this a metempirical chemist might deduce that hydrochloric acid is innate in chlorine, since chlorine has within it something which shapes the hydrochloric acid into — hydrochloric acid. This something is itself neither chlorine nor hydrogen, nor is it a combined result of the two, but a something which renders the combination possible. The positive chemist is aghast at such a deduction ; yet if we replace the terms hydrochloric acid and chlorine and hydrogen by the terms Experience and sensible perception, the argument will be that of the a priori school. That school affirms that there is a something independent of the chlorine and the hydrogen, namely Affinity, and it is this which combines the two gases in hydrochloric acid. Affinity is neither the gases nor their product, but a power which renders the product possible.
25a. I do not pretend in this place to discuss the arguments on which the a priori school defends its thesis ; anything I might have to say on such a subject would be necessarily based upon psychological analysis which can only be attempted at a later stage. What I am here concerned with is to break down the barriers which have so long prevented the two schools from meeting on a common ground. This is effected when the admission is gained that all ideas are the products of two factors, the Subject and the Object, and that no ideas belong exclusively to one of the factors. Whether by Subject we understand the Mind and its connate aptitudes, or the Organism and its organized tendencies, matters nothing in the present question ; the admission required is that there is a predisposition to act in certain necessary ways whenever sensible stimuli call the mind into activity. Descartes and Leibnitz, as also Kant and his followers, expressly declare that no truths, not even a priori truths, are seen (emerge in consciousness), unless the relations formulated are presented in Experience. The co-operation of the Object is therefore demanded. What they insist upon is that the mind brings with it at birth a structure which renders certain conclusions necessary. This admitted, there arises the further question : why is the proposition that acids redden vegetable blues of inferior validity to the proposition "two parallel lines cannot enclose space" ? The first is said to be gathered from Experience, and therefore of . inferior validity to the second, which is shown not to belong to Experience because of its universal validity, This is an interesting question, which will hereafter occupy us; meanwhile observe that the answer cannot properly rest, on an assumed predisposition of the mind, since that is common to both examples, the mind having a native predisposition towards all the results of Experience, when the, terms of those results are presented. The body has likewise a native predisposition to move in any direction which is free from obstacles; it is the existence of obstacles, together with the direction of the impulse, which determine what shall be the direction taken by the body. In like manner the presence of external relations impresses certain directions on the course of thought, and this course is determined by the disposition and predisposition of the mind.
Since, then, the character by which certain truths are distinguished from others cannot lie in the structure of the Mind itself, it must lie in the nature of the relations presented : in the Necessity and Universality of the relations formulated. And this is the character fixed upon. Now without here assuming, what will hereafter be proved, that the celebrated distinction of Necessary and Contingent Truths conceals a fallacy, we may remark that even an admission of the distinction by no means justifies the deduction : and for these reasons, 1°, the character of Necessity cannot be assigned as a special mark of native predisposition, innate capacity, but only as a mark of a particular class of objective relations ; 2°, the only intelligible meaning of innate capacity by which these ideas are said to be formed is one which irresistibly extends to all faculties and to all ideas. Truths, whether universal or particular, necessary or contingent, are still truths evolved in and through Experience, and are subject to all the conditions of Experience.
( Originally Published 1874 )
Problems of Life and Mind:
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Rules Of Philosophizing
The Limitations Of Knowledge
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The Sensible, Extra-sensible, And Supra-sensible
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