1. MAN is not simply an Animal Organism, he is also a unit in a Social Organism. He leads an individual life, which is also part of a collective life. Hence two classes of Motors : the personal and the sympathetic, — the egoistic and the altruistic. From these chiefly issue the Animal sentient life, and the Human intellectual and moral life.
Human Psychology, therefore, the science of psychical phenomena, has to seek its data in Biology and in Sociology. The great mistake hitherto has been either that of metaphysicians, seeking the data solely in introspective analysis of Consciousness ; or that of biologists, seeking the data in the combination of such analysis with interpretation of nervous phenomena.
2. The biologist who is true to scientific Method accepts Vitality as an ultimate fact, of which he only seeks the factors, i. e. its conditions, and its laws .of manifestation. He leaves to metaphysicians the ulterior task of settling, if they can, what Life is, apart from these, or in the general system of things. The mathematician does not concern himself with what Quantity, Space, and Time are ; nor the physicist with what Force is ; nor the biologist with what Life is.
The psychologist likewise must accept Consciousness, or, to speak more precisely, Sensibility, as an ultimate fact, of which he only studies the factors,— its conditions and laws.
The analogy of Life and Mind is the closest of all analogies, if indeed the latter is anything more than a special form of the other. Hence what is known of Life will be the best guide to what is knowable of Mind. Both are processes, or, under another aspect, functional products. Neither is a substance ; neither is a force. To speak of Vitality as a substance, would shock all our ideas but many speak of it as a force. They might with equal propriety hold Mortality to be a force. What, then, is meant by Vitality, or vital forces ? If the abstraction be resolved into its concretes, it will be seen that a certain process, or group of processes, is condensed into a simple expression, and the final result of this process is trans-posed from a resultant into an initial condition, the name given to the whole group of phenomena becomes the personification of the phenomena, and the product is sup-posed to have been the producer. In lieu of regarding vital actions as the dynamical results of their statical conditions, the actions are personified, and the personification comes to be regarded as indicating something independent of and antecedent to the concrete facts it expresses. The vital force manifested by an Organism may be likened to the mechanical force manifested by a Machine. No one really tries to reach and modify the mechanical force (which is a pure abstraction) ; he only tries to reach and modify the mechanical conditions (which are reals), certain that if he lessen the friction of the parts he will increase the mechanical product. In like manner, no philosophic biologist now tries to reach and modify a vital force, but only to reach and modify those biostatical conditions which, when considering them as causes, and condensing them all into a single expression, he calls Vitality or the Vital Forces. When we speak of electrical force, cohesive force, attractive force, and the like, we are using abstractions which con-dense a vast amount of concrete observation ; but it is not on these abstractions that our experiments lay hold, it is on the concrete phenomena themselves.
The same is true of Sensibility. Vitality and Sensibility, Life and Consciousness, are abstractions having real concretes. They are compendious expressions of functional processes conceived in their totality, and not at any single stage. A function is the activity of an organ. And since Function is a conception which is in its very nature distinguished from the material conditions, obviously both Life and Mind are terms which designate phenomena that are immaterial, the two conceptions of Matter and Motion, although correlative, being mutually exclusive. In so regarding them, however, we are not to conclude that this exclusion justifies the spiritual hypothesis. of Life and Mind. This hypothesis is simply a reintroduction of an unknown kind of Matter to serve as the Substance, in lieu of' the known Matter which is presented by the Organism. Who does not see the contradiction of requiring a substance for that which by its definition is not substantial at all, but pure dynamism ?
3. We cannot be sufficiently on our guard in the use of abstractions, and especially against our tendency to confound ideal separations with real separations. It is this tendency which keeps up the tradition of Mind existing apart from Life, and following other laws. We separate, for convenience, mental phenomena from other vital phenomena, and then again separate mental phenomena from neural phenomena ; this done, we overlook the real identity, and do not see that every mental phenomenon has its corresponding neural phenomenon (the two being as the convex and concave surfaces of the same sphere, distinguishable yet identical), and that every neural phenomenon involves the whole Organism ; by which alone the influence of the body on the mind, and of the mind on the body, can be explained.
Among the broad distinctions of phenomena those of Physical, Chemical, and Vital must be maintained, expressing as they do the characteristic motions of propulsion, motions of combination, and motions of evolution. A chemical combination, even if finally reducible to physical laws, is markedly distinguished by presenting new structural relations. A still broader demarcation is given in the vital phenomenon of Evolution (characterized by Nutrition, Development, and Decay, through serial changes), distinguishable from the chemical combinations out of which it emerges. Not only is it impossible to deduce the phenomenon of Evolution from the phenomena of chemical combination, not only is it impossible to explain Nutrition by Chemistry, unless we replace the Laboratory by the Organism, and thus introduce the special evolutive conditions, namely, the presence of organic substance formed into histological elements (cells, fibres, tubes) ; but it is d priori evident that a phenomenon differing so widely from all chemical phenomena must be due to widely different conditions. We may never know all these conditions ; but that analysis will ever resolve them into simple chemical conditions irrespective of the speciality of their theatre, may confidently be denied. It is an old remark that Life escapes under the scalpel, leaving only a dead "subject" for dissection. Life equally vanishes under chemical analysis.
A similar mistake perverts the efforts of most psychologists, They do not keep in view the speciality of the psychological theatre, nor allow for the continual presence of those sentient conditions implied in the general term Soul. The spiritualists are prone to split up the sentient organism into independent Faculties, dividing it into Sense, Understanding, Reason, Volition, etc. The materialists split it up into independent Organs. Thus both schools — the school which affirms the unity of the Soul in its spiritual substance, and the school which affirms the dependence of the Soul on its cerebral substance — practically deny their principle when they come to treat mental phenomena in detail.
And in both cases the source of the error is the exclusive employment of Analysis without the due regard to its needful correction by Synthesis. Theoretically taking the Organism to pieces to understand its separate parts, we fall into the error of supposing that the Organism is a mere assemblage of organs, like a machine which is put together by juxtaposition of different parts. But this is radically to misunderstand its essential nature and the universal solidarity of its parts. The Organism is not made, not put together, but evolved; its parts are not juxtaposed, but differentiated ; its organs are groups of minor organisms, all sharing in a common life, i. e. all sharing in a common substance constructed through a common process of simultaneous and continuous molecular composition and decomposition; precisely as the great Social Organism is a group of societies, each of which is a group of families, all sharing in a common life, — every family having at once its individual independence and its social dependence through connection with every other. In a machine the parts are all different, and have mechanical significance only in relation to the whole. In an Organism the parts are all identical in fundamental characters, and diverse only in their superadded differentiations : each has its independence, although all co-operate. The synthetical point of view, which should never drop out of sight, however the necessities of investigation may throw us upon analysis, is well expressed by Aristotle somewhere to the effect that all collective life depends on the separation of offices and the concurrence of efforts. In a vital organism every force is the result-ant of all the forces ; it is a disturbance of equilibrium, and equilibrium is the equivalence of convergent forces. When we speak of Intelligence as a force which deter-mines actions, we ought always to bear in mind that the efficacity of Intelligence depends on the organs which co-operate and are determined : it is not pure Thought which moves a muscle, neither is it the abstraction Contractility, but the muscle, which moves a limb.
To those who, having relinquished the spiritualist hypothesis, have adopted the view that Mind is only one of the forms of Life, and that Life is not an entity but an abstraction expressing the generalities of organic phenomena, it is obvious that Psychology must endeavor to ascertain the conditions of these phenomena, both general and special. These may be classed (by a serviceable ex-tension of the term statics) under the heads of Biostatics and Psychostatics.
4. Owing to the necessary abstraction which characterizes all analytical investigation, we are too prone to neglect that restitution of the omitted elements which is .needful when we would complete the analysis by a real explanation. It is thus that we separate each organ or function from its complications with all the others, and forget that it is really only a part of a living whole, and explicable only through the whole Organism. It is thus that we consider only one factor in studying a product, and forget that every product necessarily has at least two factors each equally indispensable. When, therefore, we define an Organism it should always be with clear vision of its relation to a Medium ; and when we define a function as the activity of an organ, we should always distinctly recognize the fact that this activity does not take place in vacuo; but involves the co-operation both of that which is acted on and of that which acts. The function of an organ is as rigorously determined by the stimulus which excites it as by the structure which is excited ; unless this unification of the two factors takes place there is no product at all, — the organ is not active because not adequately stimulated.
I shall repeatedly have occasion to invoke this principle, and here simply invoke it in reference to the nutrition of the Organism, the structure of which is built up from materials originally drawn from the external Medium, but proximately drawn from its internal Medium, or plasma. Between the reception of this external material and the assimilation of it by the tissues (of plant or animal), there is always an intermediate stage passed through, the inorganic, unvitalized material becoming there transformed into organizable, vitalized material. What this special change is we do not know; we only know that until it has taken place the inorganic material is not assimilable; it must enter as a constituent of the Bioplasm to form part of what Claude Bernard calls the Physiological Medium, before it can become a constituent of the tissues. The supposition that plants are nourished directly by inorganic substances drawn from the soil and atmosphere, is now proved to be erroneous : the Nutrition of plants takes place through processes similar to those in animals. The inorganic has in both to pass through the organizable stage, and form proximate principles, before it can become organized into elements of tissue.
5. Among the most important laws of Biostatics may be named the following : —
I. The Law of Correlated Development. — There is a marked tendency in organic substance to vary under varying excitations, which results in the individualization of the parts, so that growth is accompanied by a greater or less differentiation of structure. Were this tendency uncontrolled, there would be no organic unity : the organism would then be simply an assemblage of organs. But owing to the solidarity which underlies all differentiation, the parts are not only individualized into tissues and organs, but are all connected. Thus each new modification of structure is secured, each organ is in-dependent yet subordinated to the whole ; and instead of being an obstacle, this independence becomes, through the consensus and co-operation of each, a source of enhanced power in the organism. In organic, as in social life, the indispensable condition of perfect action is the co-operation of independent agents, — the Freedom which is subordinated to Law, and the Law which secures Freedom.
II. The Law of Adaptation.— Although an organ can only respond to a stimulus according to its own modes, which depend on its structure, and which vary with the variations of structure, yet the very reaction itself tends to establish a modification which will alter subsequent reactions. It is in this sense, and this alone, that we must understand the statement that organs are created by functions. What is exact in the statement is that by the exercise of an organ its structure becomes differentiated, and each modification renders it fitted for more energetic reaction and for new modes of reaction.* But we must never lose sight of the absolute principle that Function is the action of Organ, and can never be dynamically other than what its statical conditions permit.
III. The Law of Heredity. — The modifications of structure acquired through Adaptation tend to become transmitted to offspring, and would always in effect be transmitted were it not for perturbations of the result owing to the action of external forces during the embryonic development, and to the influence of the other parent.
6. Let us now pass from Life to Mind. The vital organism we have seen to be evolved from the Bioplasm, and we may now see how the psychical organism is evolved from what may be analogically called the Psychoplasm. The Bioplasm is characterized by a continuous and simultaneous movement of molecular composition and decomposition ; and out of these arises the whole mechanism, which is also sustained and differentiated by them. If, instead of considering the whole vital organism, we consider solely its sensitive aspects, and confine ourselves to the Nervous System, we may represent the molecular movements of the Bioplasm by the neural tremors of the Psychoplasm : these tremors are what I term neural units : the raw material of Consciousness ; the several neural groups formed by these units represent the organized elements of tissues, the tissues, and the combination of tissues into organs, and of organs into apparatus. The movements of the Bioplasm constitute Vitality ; the movements of the Psychoplasm constitute Sensibility. The forces of the cosmical medium which are transformed in the physiological medium build up the organic structture, which in the various stages of its evolution reacts according to its statical conditions, themselves the results of preceding reactions. It is the same with what may be called the mental organism. Here also every phenomenon is the product of two factors, external and internal, impersonal and personal, objective and subjective. Viewing the internal factor solely in the light of Feeling, we may say that the sentient material out of which all the forms of Consciousness are evolved is the Psychoplasm incessantly fluctuating, incessantly renewed. Viewing this on the physiological side, it is the succession of neural tremors, variously combining into neural groups.
7. An organism lives only in relation to its medium. What Growth is, in the physical sense, that is Experience in the psychical sense, namely, organic registration of assimilated material. The direct relation of the organ-ism. is to the internal medium, the indirect relation is to the cosmical medium. The Bioplasm is constituted out of the fluids which bathe the tissues, and from which each tissue derives its nourishment, molecule by molecule. It is necessarily liquid because in a tissue liquidity is requisite for chemical action. Hence Claude Bernard suggestively notes that the cellular elements of the tissues are veritable aquatic organisms. The internal medium is incessantly fluctuating, — a point to which especial .attention must be given. Materials are incessantly absorbed from without, and are there elaborated, made fit for assimilation. Materials are also incessantly thrown into it as products of waste of tissue, and have to be excreted. Thus does the Bioplasm contain the materials of Yesterday, the materials of To-day, and the materials of To-morrow. Nutrition may-, to speak mathematically, be designated a function of three variables, namely, tissue, internal medium, and cosmic medium. A little more heat or a little less of carbonic acid, or of oxygen, pressure, etc., in the external, will accelerate or retard the evolutions of Nutrition by its effects on the internal medium. But no variation in the cosmic medium which does not affect the internal medium will have any modifying influence on the organism. This also it is important to bear in mind. The direct relation is between the organ-ism and the internal medium : these two factors therefore comprise the Biostatical conditions and the influence of the external medium is through these. Food is not food, nor is poison poison, until it has passed into the Bioplasm.
8. The reader sees at once how this applies to the sentient organism. We have already spoken, metaphorically, of the Psychoplasm, or sentient material forming the psychological medium from which the Soul derives its structure and its powers. It is the mass of potential Feeling derived from all the sensitive affections of the organism, not only of the individual, but, through Heredity, of the ancestral organisms. All sensations, perceptions, emotions, volitions, are partly connate, partly acquired : partly the evolved products of the accumulated experiences of ancestors, and partly of the accumulated experiences of the individual, when each of these have left residua in the modifications of the structure.
Thus Vitality and Sensibility may be said to rest on seriated Change. If the changes were simply movements, propulsive or combined, physical or chemical, they would not present the phenomena of Life or of Consciousness. The changes must be serial, and what we term organized, to present the phenomena of Evolution. That Life is Change, and that Consciousness is Change, has always been affirmed. We have only to add that the changes are serial, and convergent through a consensus determined by essential community of structure, and we have characterized the speciality of organic change, demarcated Life. and Mind from all inorganic change.
9. Corresponding with the Biostatical laws previously formulated there are three Psychostatical laws.
I. The Law of Interest.— It has long been observed that we only see what interests us, only know what is sufficiently like former experiences to become, so to speak, incorporated with them, — assimilated by them. The satisfaction of desire is that which both impels and quiets mental movement. Were it not for this controlling effect of the established pathways, every excitation would be indefinitely irradiated throughout the whole organism ; but a pathway once established is the ready issue for any new excitation. The evolution of Mind is the establishment of definite paths this is the mental organization, fitting it for the reception of definite impressions, and their co-ordination with past feelings.
II. The Law of Signature.— Every feeling being a group of neural units, and varying with the varying units, or varying groups of such groups, has its particular signature, or mark in Consciousness, in consequence of which it acquires its objective Localization, i. e., its place in the organism or in the cosmos.
III. The Law of Experience. — This is only the mental side of the laws of Heredity and Adaptation. Experience is the registration of Feeling. Through their registered modifications, feelings once produced are capable of reproduction ; and must always be reproduced, more or less completely, whenever the new excitation is discharged along the old channels.
The laws just formulated are special forms of the primary law, which in Biology is expressed in the formula : Every vital phenomenon is the product of two factors, the Organism and its Medium ; and in Psychology is expressed in the equivalent formula Every psychical phenomenon is the product of two factors, the Subject and the Object. The importance of keeping these steadily before us in all detailed investigation, and the frequent mistakes which arise from overlooking them, will appear in the course of this work. Note, in passing, that the latter formula replaces the old Dualism, in which Subject and Object were two independent and unallied existences, by a Monism, in which only one existence, under different forms, is conceived. The old conception was of Life in conflict with the External ; the new conception recognizes their identity; and founds this recognition on the demonstrable fact that so far from the external forces tending to destroy Life (according to Bichat's view), they are the very materials out of which Life emerges, and by which it is sustained and developed.
10. There are of course several other derivative laws, but these three are the principal, and are all that need be noted here. A glance at them suffices to discredit the old idea that the Senses directly apprehend — or mirror — external things. It is equally mistaken to suppose that sensitive impressions are the immediate motors. Each excitation has to be assimilated,— taken up into the psychological medium and transformed into a sensation or perception, — a process that will depend upon the psychostatical conditions at the time being. The different ways in which the same external stimulus affects different organisms, or the same organism at different times, are thus explicable. Think of the diversities of feeling produced by the image of a sheep on the retina of a man and a wolf, or of an artist and a grazier. Think of the dissimilar effects produced by the same musical intervals on the organism of an Asiatic and on that of a European. Or, take an example from Insanity : A visceral disturbance, especially in the digestive or the generative organs, will cause a perversion of Sensibility from which will arise abnormal sensation, hallucination, moods, melancholy, depression, etc. These prompt the intellect to explanation. External causes are imagined ; and the wildest hypotheses of persecution, divine or diabolic communication, are invented. As the disturbance spreads and the organism becomes more and more abnormal, the ideas become more and more incoherent, till Dementia supervenes.
This influence of the psychostatical conditions in determining the character of every psychical phenomenon suggests an important distinction which must be established between Animal Consciousness and Human Consciousness, one far greater than any other distinction to be established between Animals and Man. It is formulated by Auguste Comte in that phrase which is placed as an epigraph to this chapter, although the phrase was not by him understood precisely in the sense here assigned. We have seen how between the Cosmos and the Consciousness there is interposed a psychological medium, briefly designated by the term Experience. This applies both to animals and to man. But in man we must recognize another medium, one from which his moral and intellectual life is mainly drawn, one which separates him from all animals by the broadest line : this is the Social Medium, — the collective accumulations Of centuries, condensed in knowledge, beliefs, prejudices, institutions, and tendencies and forming another kind of Psychoplasm to which the animal is a stranger. The animal feels the Cosmos, and adapts himself to it. Man feels the Cosmos, but he also thinks it ; again he feels the Social world, and thinks it. His feelings and his thoughts of both are powerfully modified by residua. Hence the very Cosmos is to him greatly different from what it is to the animal; for just as what is organized in the individual becomes transmitted to offspring, and determines the mode in which the offspring will react on stimulus, so what is registered in the Social Organism determines the mode in which succeeding generations will feel and think, By Tools and Instruments, by Creeds and Institutions, by Literature, Art, and Science; the Social Organism acquires and develops its powers; and how even simple perceptions are modified by social influences will strikingly appear in a subsequent part of this work, wherein it will be shown that all perceptions are the results of slow evolution, as the organic forms are ; and not only will it be shown that many thousands of years passed before even man was able to perceive the color blue for instance (though of course he felt a difference between a blue object and a brown one), it will be shown that no animal can possibly perceive blue as we perceive it ; and the reason in both cases is not to be sought in physiological processes of Vision, but in psychological processes of Thought. The possibility of this perception is due to Language ; and Language exists only as a social function.
11. Here we may briefly indicate the Method to be pursued. The mental life of man has two sources : 1°, the animal organism, and 2°, the social organism. Man apart from Society is simply an animal organism ; restore him to his real position as a social unit, and the problem changes. It is in the development of Civilization that we trace the real development of Humanity. The soul of man has thus a double root, a double history. It passes quite out of the range of 'animal life ; and no explanation of mental phenomena can be valid which does not allow for this extension of range. Nevertheless I believe this necessity of extending the survey is now for the first time placed on its true footing ; nor was it, indeed, even recognized, until Comte, in his second great work, instituted his théôrie de l'ame by the combination of the biological and the sociological points of view.*
12. For a very long period philosophers deemed it enough to study Mind with little reference to its dependence on the Organism; the introspection of Consciousness was supposed to be sufficient. Nay, even when Physiology began to furnish indications of the connection between vital and psychical phenomena, and to exhibit the dependence of mental states on neural states, the psychologists pointed to the fact that Consciousness told us nothing of such dependence ; and hence they concluded that Psychology, occupied solely with Consciousness and its changes, need not concern itself with Physiology and its laws. Rightly interpreted, this very fact that Consciousness tells. us nothing of its physiological conditions would have been recognized as fatal to the pretensions of the introspective Method. Indeed, Psychology without illumination from Biology is something like the Astronomy of the Chaldeans without the aid
In the present brief indication of my scheme I cannot pause to assign to each philosopher the conceptions adopted from him, nor will the well-read student need such references ; but, as Comte's Politique Positive will be known to few of my readers, justice demands a summary statement of the fundamental agreement and difference between his conception and my own. They agree in regarding Science as a social product stimulated by social needs, and constructed by the co-operation of successive generations, so that civilization and Humanity are developed pari passu. They agree in subordinating individual introspection to the study of the collective evolution. "Quand j'eus fondé la sociologie," says Comte, "je compris enfin que le génie de Gall n'avait pu construire une véritable physiologie du cerveau faute de connaître les lois de l'évolution collective qui seule en doit fournir à la fois le principe et le but." (I. 729. Compare III. 45, 46.),. But they differ primarily in this : he holds that Humanity develops no attribute, intellectual or moral, which is not also to be found in Animality (I. 624), whereas I hold that the attributes of Intellect and Conscience are special products of the Social Organism, and that although animals possess in common with man the Logic of Feeling, they are wholly deficient in the Logic of Signs, which is a social, not an animal function.
This need not be insisted on, however, since there is now an almost universal agreement respecting the necessity of studying the organism ; and many psychological treatises are avowedly based on the Physiology of the Nervous System, while all largely invoke physiological aid. We may observe, indeed, in most of these a disposition to translate psychological observations into physiological language, and to accept this as biological illumination ; which not unjustifiably excites the scorn of the pure psychologist. One example of this translation may be given here : some anatomists having conceived the infelicitous idea of distinguishing nerve-cells into sensory, motor, and sympathetic, this nomenclature, so misleading even when it is not profoundly unphysiological, is adopted by several writers, who first establish the illusory distinctions of sensational cells, ideational cells, and emotional cells, and then proceed to explain the mental mechanism by these imaginary cells.
The early chemists paid no attention to the part played by the air in Combustion ; nay, it was long before the fact of its materiality was vividly realized, and a century after Torricelli it was first recognized as an agent in Combustion. No wonder, therefore, if for a long while Biology paid insufficient attention to the Medium as a necessary co-operant, and directed its study mainly to the Organism. This mistake has been rectified, and now the true relation is always recognized. There must be a parallel rectification in Psychology ; the co-operation of Object and Subject -must never for a moment be lost sight of.
Yet even this will only furnish one-half of the necessary data. Let us suppose the student equipped with all the aid which the science of the day will supply, not only respecting the normal actions of the nervous system, but also respecting its abnormal actions, especially in Insanity, he will still need to invoke another aid, for he will only have what may be called biological data, and will still need the equally important sociological data. Having studied the Organism in relation to its Medium, he has only studied the Animal side of the problem ; there still remains the Human side, and he has to study the Organism in relation to the Social Medium, in which man lives no less than in the Cosmical Medium. If there is a valid objection against the functions of the brain being investigated in the cabinets of metaphysicians, there is an equally valid objection against intellectual and moral processes being sought in the laboratories of physiologists. To understand the Human Mind we must study it under its normal conditions, and these are social conditions.
And it may be observed that the psychologist, moralist, and politician often disregard a fundamental truth which is never disregarded by the physicist,— the truth that it is vain to expect a result in the absence of its necessary conditions. The politician who will cordially admit the axiom that Constitutions are not made but grow," will nevertheless daily be found endeavoring to remedy social evils by legislative enactments, which leave the conditions unchanged. The moralist will be found passionately arguing that the conduct of men, which is simply the expression of their impulses and habits, can be at once altered by giving them new ideas of right conduct. The psychologist, accustomed to consider the Mind as something apart from the Organism, individual and collective, is peculiarly liable to this error of overlooking the fact that all mental manifestations are simply the resultants of the conditions external and internal.
THE BIOLOGICAL DATA
13. In its relations to the Cosmos, and under what may be called the purely biological aspect, the Organ-ism presents two points of study : the biostatical and the biodynamical, — i. e. the consideration of the structure ready to act, and the consideration of the structure acting.
14. The statical aspect of the Organism is that of the balance of its nutritive forces developed in the molecular movements of composition and decomposition. The balance itself is incessantly fluctuating ; for the Organism, although a mechanism, is specially distinguished from every other kind of mechanism by the instability of its materials. A watch wound up to-day is the same as it was yesterday, and will be to-morrow. No Organism is so, for it is living, growing, changing. The structure and actions of the watch are unaffected by the surrounding changes, unless these changes have a direct relation to it. It is unaffected by a snow-storm, a dog in the room, a political crisis ; all of which affect the Organism, or may affect it. Moreover, the Organism is affected by its own internal changes, by the food it has eaten, the feelings it has felt, the dreams that have varied its sleep, etc.
15. The force stored up in the tissues through nutritive changes is liberated by stimuli internal and external. This is the biodynamical aspect, including the physiological properties of the tissues. From various combinations of the tissues result organs ; from various combinations of the properties result functions. (It is of supreme importance to bear in mind the distinction between the property of a tissue, and the function of an organ, or group of organs.)
16. The Organism exhibits three fundamental modes : Assimilation, Sensibility, and Motility. From the first of these issue the general laws of Nutrition, — whence Growth, Development, and Reproduction. From the second issue the general laws of Feeling, using that term in its widest sense, including Sensation, Perception, Emotion, Volition, and Intelligence, and also Instinct (which is Impulse and organized Intelligence.) From the third issue the general laws of Action, including Impulse, Automatic Movement, Reflex Movement, and Voluntary Movement.
17. This separation must be understood as purely analytical. In reality the three modes are inseparable. Assimilation may perhaps take place without the intervention of Sensibility,-- at least in Plant organisms, — but it is certain that the processes of Growth, Development, and Reproduction are in the Animal very much determined by the reactions of Sensibility; while it is obvious that they require Movement, molecular and molar.
Sensibility, in turn, requires the incessant co-operation of Assimilation, from which is drawn the material of the sensitive structure and the force expended in its function. Motility, again, requires both the stimulus and the guidance of Sensibility. The animal must feed to live ; it must move its organs to get and eat the food ; it must feel the stimulus of hunger to impel its movements, and the satisfaction of desire to determine its selection of food ; in this Discrimination lies the germ of Intelligence.
18. All sensitive affections have the quality of Pleasure, or its correlative Pain. These qualities tend to fade into relative indistinctness with the decrease in energy consequent on ease of neural discharge, consequent on frequency of repetition at brief intervals.
19. All sensitive reactions have their Signatures. In proportion as their intensity and massiveness decrease they become more and more Signs, and thus become fitted to enter into intellectual operations which are purely symbolical. The least sensible of the Senses, if the expression may be allowed, is Sight, and therefore it is the most intellectual. It is the most impersonal, — that which draws with it the least amount of feeling. In looking at an object, it is the object out of us which most calls upon the attention. Only when we touch, taste, or smell the moving object, does it seem to enter into personal feeling. On the other hand, a more subjective feeling, say of sound or taste, becomes objective so soon as it is connected with a sight or a touch.
20. Sensations are usually, but improperly, restricted to the reactions of what are called the Five Senses, and which are commonly spoken of as the Senses. This is doubly wrong. A sensation is not a simple excitation of the sensory organ, but a compound of that with the consequent excitation of a Perceptive Centre. The excitation of the sense organ is only one element in a complex process. Divide the optic nerve before its entrance into the optic ganglion, and no excitation of the retina will produce a luminous sensation ; cut off an animal's leg and stimulate the sciatic nerve, the leg will move, but no sensation will have been produced: Nor is this all. Unless the excitation is assimilated by the psychological medium it does not become' sentient; and unless it becomes sentient it cannot become a sensation.
Quitting the analytical point of view, we at once recognize the fact that every perception, instead of being the reaction of a single organ, is the resultant of the combined reactions of the whole Organism ; the only question in each case being the relative proportions' of the parts involved, and how far the irradiation has been restricted to certain channels. The several Senses are no more vicarious than the several Secretions ; and when we see an apple we do not in the visual sensation include the sensations of taste, fragrance, resistance, etc., which are all included in the perception of an apple, because all more or less excited by the irradiation of the optical stimulus. It is the non-recognition of this which originates many of the difficulties touching the theory of Vision. The organic seat of Vision is too often assumed to be the retina ; whereas that is only the seat of the visual excitation, which in the Perceptive Centre is blended with the residua of other excitations.
21. The same is true of all sensations, the Systemic no less than those of the special Senses. And this leads me to the second error just referred to, the restriction of Sensation to the reactions of the Five Senses. Physiology teaches us that there is another and indeed far more important class of sensations, arising from what I have proposed to call the Systemic Senses, because distributed through the system at large, instead of being localized in eye, ear, tongue, etc. Although not so easily and definitely assigned to special organs, they may be classified as the Nutritive, Respiratory, Generative, and Muscular Senses. The feelings accompanying secretion, excretion, hunger, thirst, etc., belong to the first. The feelings of suffocation, oppression, lightness, etc., belong to the second. The sexual and maternal feelings belong to the third ; while those of the fourth enter as elements into all the others.
The Systemic Sensations not only blend with those of the Five Senses to produce Desires, Emotions, Instincts, etc., they make up the greater part , of that continuous stream of Sentience, on which each external stimulus raises a ripple.
22. One aim of Psychology is to reduce sentient facts to physiological facts. Consciousness precedes Science. We learn slowly to assign certain feelings to the Five Senses because the stimuli of these Senses are objectively appreciable, — we can see the object we have touched, and taste the object we have seen. Not so with the Systemic feelings. Their stimuli, because internal, can-not be alternately submitted to various Senses. Still further removed from such objective appreciation are the central processes of Judgment, Memory, Imagination, etc. ; and hence the disposition to regard these feelings as due to another source : it is even paradoxical to speak of such processes belonging to Feeling, and to affirm that the Laws of Thought are identical with the Laws of Sensation, differing not as operations, but only in the materials operated on. The paradox disappears when we learn to consider psychical phenomena in the true synthetic way (§ 3).
23. The sensations of the Five Senses are more impersonal than those of the Systemic Senses ; hence their greater importance in the construction of objective knowledge. They are pre-eminently intellectual, not only- on this ground, but also because of their inferior massiveness and diffusiveness, and of their greater capability of definite localization; hence they are fitted to become signs. The systemic sensations have, however, great importance, and their immense superiority as motors has been singularly overlooked. They make up by far the larger portion of our sentient material, since from them mainly issue the Emotions, Sentiments,. etc., combined indeed with the objective sensations, but subordinating these as means to their ends, inasmuch as we only see what interests us.
Note here, in passing, the error which arises from not viewing the organism synthetically, but detaching the Intellect, and treating it independently. Having separated it from the Feelings, philosophers have been led to pay exclusive attention to the Five Senses, overlooking the necessary subordination of these to the more fundamental and energetic Systemic Senses: Hamann picturesquely expresses the general error when he says : " The Five Senses are the five loaves with which Jesus fed the multitude." I hope to show in detail that it is not these which supply our highest spiritual food ; and that the doctrine of the Sensational School is wholly untenable, partly because our highest knowledge is not gained through the Senses in any such way, but is gained through psychological evolution of sociological material ; and partly also because, if we isolate the Animal from the Social Organism, the Senses furnish only a small quota to the mass of human Experience.
24. From the biological stand-point our first division of the Organism is into Affective and Active, which division represents the reception of stimulus and the discharge of force, — sensation and movement.
The physiological fact, first enunciated by me, and now adopted. by some teachers of great eminence (Vulpian, Gavarret, etc.) that nervous tissue is identical throughout in Property as in Structure, has extremely important consequences. For if the Property be everywhere the same, all the Functions, into which that property enters, must have a common identity ; differing quantitatively among themselves only so far as neural processes are concerned, they will of course differ qualitatively in so far as other elements enter into the functions : thus the Neurility which stimulates a muscle is identical with the Neurility which stimulates a gland, but the functions of Locomotion and Secretion, involving different organs, are qualitatively different.
The great problem of Psychology as a section of Biology is, in pursuance of this conception, to develop all the psychical phenomena from one fundamental process in one vital tissue. The tissue is the nervous; the process is a Grouping of neural units. A neural unit is a tremor. Several units are grouped into a higher unity, or neural process, which is a fusion of tremors, as a sound is a fusion of aerial pulses ; and each process may in turn be grouped with others, and thus, from this grouping of groups, all the varieties emerge. What on the physiological side is simply a neural process, is on the psycho-logical side a sentient process. We may liken Sentience to Combustion, and then the neural units will stand for the oscillating molecules. Sentience may manifest itself under the form of Consciousness, or under that of Sub-Conciousness, — which may be compared to Combustion manifesting itself in Flame and in Heat.
25. The grouping, or active aspect of the affective or sentient state, is what may analytically be called the Logical element. Logic we have already seen may comprise all the laws of grouping, subjective and objective (Introd., § 65). I institute a marked division into the Logic of logical principle, and extensively applied it in the investigation of mental phenomena, is Adôlf Horwicz, whose Psychologische Analysen auf physiologischer Grundlage (Halle, 1872) may be recommended to the attentive study of all interested in this subject.
Feeling and the Logic of Signs ; ranging under the first all the laws of grouping manifested in Sensation, Perception, Emotion, Instinct, with a further subdivision into the Logic of Images, which is intermediate between that of Feeling and that of Signs ; under the second head, all the laws of Conception, or what is specially termed Thought. It is necessary to distinguish Conception, or the formation of symbols expressing general ideas, from Perception, or the formation of particular ideas by synthesis of sensations. Conceptions are no more like real objects than algebraic formulæ are like the numbers whose relations they symbolize. Our perception of an animal or a flower is the synthesis of all the sensations we have had of the object in relation to our several senses; and it is always an individual object represented by an individual idea : it is this animal or this flower. But our conception of an animal or flower is always a general idea, not' only embracing all that is known or thought of the class in all its relations, but abstracted from all individual characteristics, and is not this animal or this flower, but any one of the class ; just as a and b in Algebra are not quantities and magnitudes, but their symbols. Perceptions are concerned directly with the terms of Feeling ; Conceptions with the ratios of those terms. Hence the real nature of the one; and the symbolical nature of the other.
26. Another biological principle teaches that an Organism, being a structure in relation to a Medium, is determined to action by a stimuli, both external and internal, and therefore its most general characteristic is that of Reflex action, — the issue of an excitation in a movement. A stimulus is reflected from one part of a tissue to another, and (owing to the continuity of the tissues) from one organ to another, till it terminates in a movement which may either be the movement of some special organ or of some component part of an organ ; in every case the motion which originally came from the external Medium is restored to it again, and, so far as the Organism is concerned, it there comes to an end.
27. This REFLEX is a process of Grouping underlying all psychical phenomena. Its summa genera are FEELING and ACTION.
The Organism is stimulated to action by Sensation, and guided by Intelligence, the affective becomes active, not in the sense in which one phenomenon is succeeded by a different phenomenon, but in the sense in which vis tensions passes into vis viva. The determinations of this process are logical, even in the simplest and most rudimentary cases ; for the neural units must be grouped, if a sensation is to result.
Intelligence, which in its rudimentary form is simply Discrimination in Feeling, becomes, in its highest forms, the Discrimination of remote means towards desired ends. In what is called pure Thought, the means are so remote from the ends that the ends are scarcely recognizable; these means then become ends for the Intellect.
28. The popular classification 'which condenses one large group of phenomena under Feeling, and another under Intellect, — the one eminently personal, the other impersonal, -- would have been more serviceable had it not been hampered by two misconceptions, — one respecting the assumed independence and autonomy of the Intellect, the other respecting its superior energy and importance. Although it is pretty generally acknowledged that ideas have their origin in sensations, it is rarely acknowledged, and is often expressly denied, that all the Feelings, whether those of the Five Senses, specially styled sensations, or those prompted by the Systemic Senses, and more often called impulses, emotions, desires, etc., are the real Motors, and that it is they, not ideas, which determine actions.
The Intellect, even at its highest, is a guide, not an impulse, — it shows the way, it does not cut the way.
29. Whenever the mental phenomena are considered as wholly within the Organism, they are Sensation, Emotion, Impulse; when passing out of the Organism, they are Perception, Ideation, Volition.
The Feeling which is Sensation or Emotion has little or no reference to any object causing the feeling; whereas Perception, or Ideation, passes beyond the personal circle, projects the Feeling outside as an object. The infant feels a sweet taste or a soft surface, and feels anger or terror, long before it has assigned sweetness and softness to objects as qualities, or learned to form any idea of objects. Such discriminations are the germs of Intelligence, and when Intelligence itself becomes developed by the large accumulations of such discriminations, it reacts on the feelings, guiding them more and more, and converting blind Impulse into clear Volition.
30. Actions are the energies of organs, and the synergies of groups of organs. They are of two kinds,— 10, the Fixed, or directly reflex; and, 2°, the Facultative, or indirectly reflex, spontaneous. The Fixed Actions are those which uniformly result from excitation of their organs, — such are the energies of the Senses, and the actions classed under Impulses, Habit, etc. The Facultative Actions are those which, although ultimately de-pendent on the energies of the organs, are yet neither inevitably nor uniformly produced when the organs are stimulated, but, owing to the play of forces at work, take sometimes one issue and sometimes another. No organ has a power of control ; but the Organism will control an organ. The individual man is powerless against Society ; but Society can, and does, compel the individual. This does not prevent the individual from initiating a change, which may be passed on from one to another like yeast- cells growing in a fermenting mass ; and in this sense Society is of course affected by the actions of individuals, since, indeed, it is itself only the sum of individuals. We may note as one broad characteristic of the social organ-ism, that it is constituted by organs which are independent, and which voluntarily co-operate, the strength of each residing in the measure of its co-operation. A man, although powerless against Society, becomes a power with, Society.
31. Although all actions are prompted and really guided by Feeling, many of them have so little accompaniment of what is usually designated Consciousness that they are said to be insensible. Many of these are called automatic, they are the inevitable activities of the energies or synergies ; many of them are called involuntary, and' are supposed to be the precursors of the voluntary.
These conceptions need modifying. It can be shown that Sentience is involved in all actions, even the automatic and involuntary ; and that the actions which are now involuntary were originally voluntary, if by voluntary we understand the presence of Intelligence. I mean that all such distinctions are psychological, not psycho-genetical. They mark differences which now exist, but they do not mark differences in the genesis of the phenomena. The facts of congenital Instincts and of acquired Habits, which operate so rapidly and so securely that all the intermediate stages between impression and motion escape notice, has led to the denial of these stages. Thus the uniformity of the earth's movement causes us to consider it at rest ; we know the movement only through indirect sources. By indirect methods we may also learn that when involuntary or instinctive acts are slackened or thwarted their sentient and selective characters appear. Knowing how actions which were once slow and laborious become rapid and easy, and how what cost us painful efforts to learn is now performed without sensible effort, we understand how the voluntary lapses into the involuntary and we may be sure that, however easy and rapid the process may become, it must necessarily pass through the stages originally followed, though without the irradiation of nascent impulses in other directions.
32. This question of Instinct will occupy us more fully when we come to treat of the origin of knowledge (Prob., I. § 21). Enough here to define it as lapsed or undiscursive Intelligence, — the fixed action of an acquired organization, transmitted from ancestors who acquired it through Adaptation, whereby what was facultative became fixed, what was voluntary became involuntary.
The objection will doubtless be raised that Instinct is wholly destitute of the characteristic of Intelligence in that it has no choice ; its operation is fixed, fatal. The reply is twofold in the first place, the objection, so far as it has validity, applies equally to Judgment, where, given the premises, the conclusion is fatal, no alternative being open. Axioms, in this sense, are logical instincts. Thus the highest intellectual process is on a level with this process said to be its opposite.
And in the second place, the element of choice always does enter into Instinct; although the intelligent discrimination of means to ends may be almost absent, it never is entirely. The guiding sensation which directs the impulse is always selective. If we restrict Intelligence to the Logic of Signs, — to ideas, — there cannot of course be anything intelligent in Instinct ; but if we extend it— as we must—to the Logic of Feeling, the dispute will cease.
33. Neural processes which formerly were accompanied by Consciousness sink into 'Sub-Consciousness, and on occasion re-emerge into distinct light of day. But even in the sub-conscious stage they are always sentient. The practice, too frequent, of speaking of actions as unconscious, is more than a contradiction in terms. "Unfelt feelings" are altogether inadmissible. On the other hand, to speak of Consciousness (meaning thereby a particular aspect) as the substance of Mind, the universal condition of psychical phenomena, is also misleading. What is universal is the neural process, which on the subjective side is the sentient process. Sentience may assume the form of Consciousness, or the form of Sub-Consciousness ; as Vision may take place when the central point of the retina is impressed, and then the effect is most distinct, or when any point of the area of the retina is impressed, and then the effect is less and less distinct as it is farther from the centre. Sentience is always sentient, as Vision is always visual.
34. The region of Sub-Consciousness is much the larger region. There is more heat than flame. The difference between them depends on the greater or less irradiation, of an excitation.
Here we may note two Psychodynamic laws, — 1°, of Irradiation, and, 2°, of Restriction. Although Anatomy, for its purposes, divides the nervous system into several different organs, this division is only an artifice, and must not permit us to overlook the cardinal fact that the nervous tissue is one, and has one general Property, — Neurility, — and one general Function, — Reflexion. No stimulus can excite a single part of this whole without indirectly exciting all the other parts. Hence the law of Irradiation : every excitation must be propagated; it can-not cease with itself, for this would violate the first law of motion. But the directions in which it will be propagated' (the law of Restriction here emerges) are determined by the structural conditions at the time being. It is probable that irradiation is vague so long as it takes place through neuroglia,* and becomes definite conduction when it is restricted in its course by the cells and fibres. Be this as it may, we must understand that while, according to the abstract law of Irradiation, every excitation is diffused throughout the tissue, terminating only in a muscular excitation, this diffusion is in effect always controlled by the law of Restriction, and the pathway of discharge becomes more or less defined. The concrete facts of excitation no more agree with the abstract law, than the actual motions of bodies agree with the abstract law of uniform rectilinear Motion. Every real excitation is subject to the statical conditions of the Organism at the time being ; that is to say, what are the lines of least resistance along which a motion will be propagated must necessarily be determined by the state of the structure at the time being ; any paths which have formerly been traversed by an impulse will be more ready to yield an issue to the new impulse. These formed paths therefore restrict the irradiation, which would otherwise be indefinite.
35. Many obscure facts receive their explanation through this law of Irradiation. Two only need here be specified for illustration : the fact that Extension is felt as a continuum, although the feeling arises from the excitations of discrete nerve-fibrils and discrete pulses on those fibrils, has greatly puzzled some investigators, most of whom have been led to invent an extra-neural agency to explain it. Irradiation suffices, since by it there is a necessary blending of the discrete points, a fusion of the similar tremors.
The second fact may be the obverse of this. It was noticed by Aristotle that knowledge begins with vague conceptions, and increases with increasing definiteness in the conceptions. All impressions must at first be irradiated, and produce a chaos of vague sentience ; as these irradiations gradually become restricted, the processes are grouped, the paths are defined, distinctions are established.
It is conceivable how differentiations in the tissue arise from differentiations of the pathways of discharge; how the nerve cells and fibres, the magazines of conductible energy and the channels of conduction, arise amid the neuroglia ; and how old age or disease increasing the relative proportions of neuroglia and nerve elements reduces the mental functions to infantile or imbecile states ; finally, how the tendency of Restriction is, as old age advances, to prevent new acquisitions, and resist new combinations.
36. Although when viewed synthetically every sensation, every perception, every conception, is a unit, viewed analytically and genetically, it is a compound. There is no single sensation which is an element, i. e. irreducible.
This is to be considered in reference to the disputes respecting the unity of Consciousness, the simplicity of the Ego. Every act of Consciousness is one ; every Ego is a unity. But analysis, which resolves a sensation into its constituent neural elements, resolves Consciousness into its constituent processes, and the Ego into a consensus of psychical activities. The demonstration that thinking is seriation, and that a series involves Time, disproves the notions of ultimate unity and simplicity assigned to a Thinking Principle. In any positive meaning of the term, that Principle is not an antecedent but a resultant, not an entity but a convergence of manifold activities.
37. This convergence is a necessary consequence of the synergy of the organs dependent on Irradiation. The seriation depends on the law of Reinstatement or Reproduction, by which ,one neural process tends to re-excite those processes which formerly were excited in conjunction with it, or which are anatomically linked with it. Those pathways of discharge which were once determined by the combined action of the stimulus and reaction of the Organism are the pathways which will be statically connected, and hence they will form the lines of least resistance along which any fresh excitation will pass.
38. But this law of Reinstatement whereby one feeling calls up associated feelings, is itself only the expression of the statical conditions. We are not therefore to expect that a given stimulus will always re-excite a given group of feelings ; we can only formulate the general tendency,* in virtue of which a sensible stimulus draws with it fainter feelings of previous impressions, so that they are grouped into a judgment or perception. This group is, in turn, the element of some wider group, whenever it is not directly reflected in discharge on some organ. But in all cases an action of some kind results ; directly or indirectly, every sensation is completed in an action ; and thus Action is the pole-star of even the most wide-wandering Speculation.
39. Thus the three terms of the progression from Stimulus to Reflex, are respectively, Feeling, Logic, and Action; or Impulse, Guidance, and Result.
Let me again remind the reader that he is by no means called upon to adopt the foregoing conclusions until he has had laid before him in detail the anatomical, physiological, and psychological evidence. There is much that will no doubt seem inadmissible, much questionable. He is only asked to accept whatever he can, and to suspend his judgment on the rest.
I will now state a principle which hereafter will be extensively applied. It wears so paradoxical an air, that I should not venture to bring it forward until the evidence had been duly exhibited, but that the explicit announcement here will protect me against a possible anticipation on the part of some other writer. While lingering over the execution of the present work, I have more than once had the mingled pleasure and pain of finding results I had laboriously reached, arrived at by other writers ; and as I believe that the Psychological Spectrum is physiologically demonstrable, the possibility of some one else discovering it is worth taking into account.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SPECTRUM.
40. Briefly, then, the principle may thus be formulated.
The optical spectrum is constituted by three fundamental colors, red, green, and violet, which are due to three modes of vibration affecting the rods and cones of the retina, or perhaps to three different sets of rods and cones ; and each sensation of an individual color depends on the proportions in which these modes — the number of pulses in a second — affect the retina. Each color also contains all the characteristic vibrations of the others, and consequently each color owes its individuality, not to vibrations which the others want, but to a predominance in a certain order of vibration. Thus there is a special rapidity in the pulses on the retina in the waves producing red ; but in every red there are waves of fainter rapidity such as produce green and violet when they are dominant. In the color green, there are likewise the red and violet waves ; in the color violet, there are red and green waves.
41. The analogy of Vision and Consciousness, so use-fully employed by many writers, may justify my use of the term the Psychological Spectrum, which likewise is constituted by three fundamental modes of excitation, namely, Sensation, Thought, and Motion. I shall show that these three orders of nervo-muscular excitation are involved in every sensation, perception, image, or conception ; and of course also in every emotion, desire, volition, etc. In other words, the psychical process is everywhere a triple process. Every psychical fact is a product of sense-work, brain-work, and muscle-work. Each sentient phenomenon (perception, emotion, conception, or volition) is individualized by, and receives its specific character from, the predominance, of one of the three orders ; and one feeling is distinguished from another of the same kind by quantitative differences in their constituent units. All varieties among the several mental states are due to the varying degrees of energy with which Sensation, Thought, and Motion co-operate. Each mental state is thus a function of three variables.*
42. Leaving this to the reader's meditation, I now pass to the consideration of another result of the law of Rein-statement, which law is another aspect of the law of -Registration. A sensation or perception, once produced, may of course be reproduced by a recurrence of the original conditions ; but it may also be reproduced with fainter energy, as an image, when the original objective conditions are absent, and only the subjective conditions are present in the modification of structure. That is to say, the original feeling is registered in the organism as a modification, and whenever this neural tract which was originally in action, is again excited, the old feeling will be reinstated.. The sight of an orange thus recalls the associated feelings of taste and smell, and perhaps of the person who gave the first orange, or the plate on which it was handed. In this series the visual sensation is directly reproduced under conditions closely resembling its original production; therefore the energy of this feeling is incomparably greater than that of the indirectly reproduced feelings of smell, taste, etc. Whatever antecedent may stimulate the neural tracts, any one of these may re-excite the others. Thus the mere name of the person or the place, the sight or sound of the word " orange," will suffice.
43. All sentient acts are acts of Presentation or of Re-Presentation, usually called Sensation and Idea. The Germans distinguish the directly excited feeling as "the feeling in us," — Empfindung; and the indirectly excited feeling as " the placing before us," — Vorstellung. We have no such happy terms, but Sensation and Image, or Idea, serve pretty well.
The sensation, or presentation, is fitly considered real, because it has objective reality (res) for its antecedent stimulus. The re-presentation, whether image or symbol, is ideal, because its antecedent is a subjective state. Reality always indicates that antecedent which excites sensation when in direct relation with the sensory organ-ism. Hence we say that a feeling is real when it is felt, ideal when it is only thought, not felt. To feel cold, and to think of cold, are two markedly different states.
44. An image, therefore, — being a representation, a Vorstellung, an indirectly excited feeling, — may be called the ideal form of a sensation. It is a transition between the pure real and the pure ideal, i. e. between sensation and symbol. Because of its connection with sensation, it passes into pure sensation when the energy of its tremors is greatly increased ; as in Hallucination, wherein the feeling, although excited by internal stimuli, having its antecedent in a subjective state and not in some objective res, does assume all the energy of a sensation objectively excited. ,We may consider the gradations of Sensation, After-sensation, Imagination,* and Hallucination, as the varying energies of the same neural tracts.
Owing to the indirect, representative origin of Imagination and its ideal character, there are important differences between it and Sensation, and After-sensation ; one of these being that Images are facultative, and are thereby capable of entering into intellectual constructions.
45. Sensation, Perception, and Imagination, all involve the co-operation of the Logical or Grouping element, whence Judgment, and of the Motor element, whence Action (§ 41).
By including under these rubrics the phenomena of Cognition and Conation, and treating in due order the Appetites, Emotions, and Volitions, we shall exhaust the Biological Data of Psychology, if to this examination of the structure and functions of the Animal Organism in detail we add a consideration of it as a Whole. From this point of view we must consider certain general results.
46. Of these general results perhaps the most perplexing, as it assuredly is the most interesting, is Consciousness, which may be pictured as the mass of stationary waves t formed out of the individual waves of neural tremors. Next comes what may be called the psychical mood or attitude. Each individual feeling has its special signature, so likewise the resultant general feeling has its signature ; and we are at each moment conscious of a vague massive feeling of comfort or discomfort, exhilaration or despondency, joy or grief, fear, rage, kindness, etc. There is also a logical attitude which is called Attention, itself the product of feeling, and one of the necessary factors in Perception.
47. When this survey has been completed we have the final task of exhibiting how he sentient phenomena may be explained by neural phenomena. The structure and action of the Organism have to be psychologically interpreted. This will require a new anatomy of the nervous system. What now exists, although of immense value, is defective in many respects. Not only must each function be traced to its special organ, and the part played by each constituent assigned to it ; not only must the connection of the parts be displayed, but there must be taken into account the very important element of Vascular Irrigation. The distribution of the arteries is an essential element in the biostatical estimate. Arterial territories have to be defined. Many individual variations in mental character depend on the variations in the calibre of the cerebral and carotid trunks ; and many variations in the intellectual, emotive, and active tendencies depend on the relative importance of the cerebral and carotid trunks. The energy of the Brain depends mainly on the calibre of its arteries ; the special directions of that energy depend on the territorial distribution.
48. But when this programme is thoroughly worked out, it will only present one half of Psychology. It will embrace the Logic of Feeling, common to animals and to man, but it will still leave undeciphered that which constitutes the wonder and glory of man, — his intellectual and moral life. Rising out of the Logic of Feeling there is the Logic of Signs, which is to the former what Algebra is to Arithmetic (§ 25). Rising out of the Animal Organism there is the Social Organism, the collective life of all the individual lives ; and if we desire to decipher Human Psychology we must study the Human Organism in its relations to the Social Medium as well as in its relations to the Cosmos.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL DATA.
49. It is now almost universally admitted that animals and men having similar structures must have similar functions ; and further, that the mental manifestations being determined by organic structures, the mental functions of animals and men must be essentially similar. That animals have sensations, appetites, emotions, instincts, and intelligence, — that they exhibit memory, expectation, judgment, hope, fear, joy, -- that they learn by experience, and invent new modes of satisfying their desires, no philosopher' now denies. And yet the gap between animal and human intelligence is so wide that Philosophy is sorely puzzled to reconcile the undeniable facts. When it was customary to attribute to Instinct all the manifestations of Intelligence in animals, and to Reason all the similar manifestations in men, this difficulty was not felt. A phrase did duty for an explanation. To say that man was endowed with a Rational Soul, inhabiting the organism yet independent of it, and altogether distinct from the Vegetative Soul which ruled the body, seemed an easy way of accounting for all the observed facts.
50. Untenable as this hypothesis is, I am disposed to regard it with more favor, in some respects, than the crude materialist hypothesis ; for I, too, hold that the superiority of human Intelligence is due to the presence of an important factor, one wholly wanting in the animal. In-stead of regarding the differences between man and animal simply as differences of degree, I hold that by no conceivable extension of animal faculties, unaided by this important factor, could the highest of the animals be raised into that moral and intellectual world which is the habitual medium of the civilized human soul. Believing, as I believe, in the evolution of the higher from the lower, and disbelieving therefore in any abrupt break in the continuity of evolution, I still say that in so far as we are justified in classing phenomena into distinct groups, and thus distinguishing the products of complex factors from the products of simpler factors, the group recognized under the class "Human Intelligence" is so different from the group " Animal Intelligence " that it requires for its analytical interpretation different factors of corresponding importance. The circle and the ellipse are different figures, the former having but one centre with all its radii equal, the latter having two foci and unequal radii. Circles differ from circles in degree ; they differ from ellipses in kind. Whether large or small the circle has the same properties, and these are different from the properties of the ellipse. It is true that by insensible gradations the circle may flatten into an ellipse, or the two foci of the ellipse may blend into one, and form a circle. But so long as there are two foci, the ellipse has its characteristic roperties. In like manner the boundaries of the animal and human may be found insensibly blending at certain points ; but whenever the " animal circle" has become transformed into the "human ellipse," by the introduction of a second centre, the difference ceases to be one of degree, and becomes one of kind, the germ of infinite variations.
The question arises : What are these respective foci? What are the respective centres of animal and human Intelligence ? I answer : The Logic of Feeling and the Logic of Signs ; or, in more familiar terms, Feeling and Thought : the one belonging to the Animal Organism, the other rising out of this and out of the Social Organism.
51. The answers hitherto propounded have been either founded on the spiritualist hypothesis, endowing man with a Soul of spiritual structure ; or on the biological hypothesis (materialist or not), deducing all the mental phenomena from the animal functions in adaptation to the Cosmos.
Eminent thinkers still cling to some form or other of the spiritualist hypothesis, repelled from the biological hypothesis by their sense of its inadequacy. They admit that all our bodily functions depend on bodily organs. They admit that among these functions are those of Feeling with its varieties and complications. But they also know that animals having organs closely resembling our own, and feelings closely resembling our own, have little or nothing of the highest order of mental activity : Animals are intelligent, but have no Intellect ; they are sympathetic, but have no Ethics; they are emotive, but have no Conscience.
When it is said that Animals however intelligent have no Intellect, the meaning is that they have perceptions and judgments, but no conceptions, no general ideas, no symbols for logical operations. They are intelligent, for we see them guided to action by Judgment ; they adapt their actions by means of guiding sensations, and adapt things to their ends. Their mechanism is a sentient, intelligent mechanism. But they have not Conception, or what we specially designate as Thought, — i. e. that logical function which deals with generalities, ratios, symbols, as Feeling deals with particulars and objects, — a function sustained by and subservient to impersonal, social ends. Taking Intelligence, in general as the discrimination of means to ends,—the guidance of the Organism towards the satisfaction of its impulses, — we particularize Intellect as a highly differentiated mode of this function, namely, as the discrimination of symbols. This differs from the rudimentary mode, out of which it is nevertheless an evolution, as European Commerce differs from the rudimentary Barter of primitive tribes. Commerce is impossible except under complex social conditions out of which it springs ; and its operations are mainly carried on by means of symbols which take the place of objects : the bill of invoice represents the cargo ; the merchant's signature represents the payment. In like manner Intellect is impossible until animal development has reached the human social stage ; and it is at all periods the index of that development ; its operations are likewise carried on by means of symbols (Language) which represent real objects, and can at any time be translated into feelings.
52. It is obvious that the biological data can only re-solve one half of the psychological problem, only present one of the foci of the ellipse, since by no derivation from the purely statical considerations of man's animal organ-ism can we reach the higher dynamical products. Isolate man from the social state, and we have an animal ; set going his organism simply in relation to the Cosmos, with-out involving any relations to other men, and we can get no Intellect, no Conscience. Whence are these derived ?
The organism of the anthropoid apes is very little differenced from ours ; their sensory organs, nay, even their brain (the so-called " organ " of the mind), can be distinguished from ours only by trifling deviations ; but with this external structural resemblance, what an infinite mental disparity ! Biology forces us to seek for a status corresponding to this diversity. Between the various types of vertebrate structure there are gradations ; but between the vertebrate and invertebrate there is a gap. The internal skeleton characteristic of the Vertebrate is approached in the Cephalopoda ; the symmetrical arrangement of nerve-centres is seen in the Articulata ; but in spite of these and other indications of a general resemblance, the marked types, Vertebrate and Invertebrate, stand out distinct. So between the extremes of human Intelligence — say a Tasmanian and a Shakespeare — there are infinitesimal gradations, enabling us to follow the development of the one into the other, without the introduction of any essentially new factor. But between animal and human Intelligence there is a gap, which can only be bridged over by an addition from without. That bridge is the Language of symbols, at once the cause and effect of 'Civilization.
53. The absurdity of supposing that any ape could under any normal circumstances construct a scientific theory, analyze a fact into its component factors, frame to himself a picture of the life led by his ancestors, or consciously regulate his conduct with a view to the welfare of remote descendants, is so glaring, that we need not wonder at profoundly meditative minds having been led to reject with scorn the hypothesis which seeks for an ex-planation of human Intelligence in the functions of the bodily organism common to man and animals, and having had recourse to the hypothesis of a spiritual agent super-added to the organism.
54. Yet the spiritual hypothesis is scientifically untenable. It is an imaginary hypothesis, and has not only the defect of being incapable of verification, it has the more serious defect of being incapable of extending our insight : it gives a name to the facts observed, it throws no light on them, connecting them with others ; nor does it enable us to discover unsuspected relations. Further, it is the introduction of an unknown to take the place of a knowable. The spirit is proposed as an agent yet of its nature and agency we know absolutely nothing.
And if, for the sake of argument, we grant the existence of a spirit, and accept it as the agent, the same objection rises against it which rose against the materialist hypothesis, namely, that it fails to cover the facts. Man, possessing this spirit but isolated from Society, could no more manifest the activities classed under Intellect and Morality than the animal could. He would still require that his Spiritual Organism should be in relation to the Social Medium. For one thing he would be without the mighty instrument Language, which we shall prove to be indispensable to the creation of abstract Thought. He would only have perceptions, and the Logic of Feeling ; he would be without conceptions, and the Logic of Sins. Then, again, he would have none of the many needs which arise from social relations ; nor the accumulation of experiences which form the material of scientific evolutions. This is demonstrable from many sides. Here we simply note the fact that our intellectual wealth is not only capitalized Experience, but is always in strict accord with social development; so that the savage is not less incompetent than the animal to originate or even under-stand a philosophical conception; the peasant would be little better than the ape in presence of the problems of abstract science ; and it would be hopeless to expect either of them to weigh the stars, or to understand the equations of curves of double curvature. Nor are the moral conceptions of the savage much higher than those of the animal. His language is without terms for Justice, Sin, Crime ; he has not the ideas. He understands generosity, pity, and love little better than the dog or the horse does. His intelligence is mainly confined to perceptions and sentiments. His aims are almost all immediate and practical, rarely remote, never theoretical. The most intelligent inhabitants of Guiana, though far re-moved from primitive savagery, could not believe that Humboldt had left his own country and come to theirs "to be devoured by mosquitoes for the sake of measuring lands which were not his own."
There is a further ground, still more decisive, against the spiritualist hypothesis, namely, that we have no need of an imaginary agent to explain what can be perfectly explained by a real agent, — the Social Organism. Not having this conception, the spiritualists imagine that to deny the existence of the Spirit is to deny the existence of the Soul. It is no more a denial of the Soul, than the rejection of the old hypothesis of a nervous fluid was a denial of nervous physiology. All the facts of Consciousness, all the marvels of Thought, remain, whatever changes may take place in our theories respecting them. It is scarcely necessary to add that biologists may quietly disregard the common rhetorical objection against their " mechanical views," as if such views were self-condemned. No sooner does any philosopher attempt to substitute clear conceptions of the processes of Nature, for vague speculations incapable of verification, than the framers of such speculations and the acceptors of them with one accord exclaim, This is degrading human nature I" as if to leave men in ignorance were to sustain them in their dignity.
55. If man is a social animal, which is undeniable, the unit in a living whole, just as any one organ is the unit of an organism, obviously his functions will be determined not only by his individual structure, but also by the structure of the Collective Organism. The functions of the liver or of the kidneys are determined partly by their structure, partly by influences from the other organs. Man's individual functions arise in relations to the Cosmos ; his general functions arise in relations to the Social Medium ; thence Moral Life emerges. All the animal Impulses become blended with human Emotions. In the process of evolution, starting from the merely animal appetite of sexuality, we arrive at the purest and most far-reaching tenderness ; from the merely animal property of Sensibility we arrive at the noblest heights of Speculation. The Social Instincts, which are the analogues of the individual Instincts, tend more and more to make Sociality dominate Animality, and thus subordinate Personality to Humanity.
56. All the attempts to explain Mind without taking the social factors into account have been signal failures ; but especially mistaken have been the estimates vainly founded on anatomical data, and above all on the measurements of crania, and the weighing of brains. The. spiritualists were more philosophical in demanding an-other agent and another test. The anatomical estimates proceed on three assumptions generally regarded as axioms, -1°, that the brain is the "organ of the Mind"; 2°, that the mental diversities observable between men and animals, and between different races of men, are due solely to differences of cerebral mass ; 3°, that these diversities can be approximately estimated by estimates of volume and weight.
We must reject all three. The first, because to seek for an organ of the Mind is not less preposterous than to seek for an organ of the Life. Nor is this difficulty avoided by those who regard the brain simply as the organ of the Intellect ; for the Intellect Is also an abstraction, and if we reduce the abstraction to its concretes we have acts which involve sensory and motor organs; and groupings of their reactions. The brain may be the organ in which sensory processes are finally grouped before they are reflected on other organs; but it is only in artificial analysis that we can consider the process of grouping in-dependently of the materials grouped. Let us, however, for a moment grant that the brain is the organ of the Mind ; this will not justify the second assumption. No one will suppose that I deny the cerebral structure to be one of the determinants in all mental manifestations ; but the same scientific evidence which necessitates this conclusion, necessitates the rejection of that precipitate conclusion which assigns the whole product to one of its factors. The co-operation of the Medium is not less in-dispensable than that of the Organism ; and, in the case of man, the Medium is constituted by the education of the race and of the individual ; so that the state of social evolution which has been reached at any given time in any given place, will be one of the necessary determinants in every individual mind. I shall recur to this presently ; here it is enough to point out that, admitting the general mental resemblances, dependent on community of structure and of the general Medium, we cannot assign the diversities of the mental manifestations of such common powers to structural differences alone. Every organism has not only an inherited and gradually modified structure which is one of the determinants of its history, it has also a history of incident, that is of transient conditions, which may lead two similar organisms along divergent paths, and determine them to different manifestations.
And this leads me to the third assumption. The differences of cerebral structure which are evolved in the education of the race, and which are necessary conditions of the observed diversities in mental manifestation, can no more be estimated by measurements of volume and mass, than the skill of a Joachim, as distinguished from that of an old crowder playing a popular jig, could be estimated by taking the size and weight of his arms and fingers.
57. We return then to our position that Mind cannot be explained without constant recognition of the staticodynamical relations of Organism and Social Medium.
To understand the first we must regard it physiologically and anatomically. It is not a passive recipient of external impressions, but an active co-operant. It has not only its own laws of action, but brings with it that very elementary condition of Consciousness which most theorists attempt to derive ab extra. I mean that the sensitive mechanism is not a simple mechanism, and as such constant, but a variable mechanism, which has a history. What the Senses inscribe on it, are not merely the changes of the external world; but these characters are commingled with the characters of preceding inscriptions. The sensitive subject is no tabula rasa; it is not a blank sheet of paper, but a palimpsest. The sensational school was strangely blind to the very conditions of the results it intended to explain. It treated Thought as "transformed Sensation," without seeing that the presence of the grouping faculty, on which Thought depends, was necessary both for the Sensation and for the trans-formation. Not aware of the fact that the Organism is an evolution; bringing with it, in its structure, evolved modes of action inherited from ancestors, these writers over-looked the fact that the Organism brings with it inherited Experience, i. e. a mode of reaction antecedent to all direct relation with external influences, which necessarily determines the results of individual Experience. There is thus what may be called an â priori condition in all Sensation, and in all Ideation. But this, is historical, not transcendental ; it is itself the product of Experience, though not of the individual. Our perceptions are evolutions ; and, having necessarily a history at their back, it is clear that all perceptions are modified by pre-perceptions, all conceptions by pre-conceptions. Hence mental diversities.
58. We are not, however, to conclude that this a priori condition is metempirical. It is an inheritance of acquired modification. It may, analytically, be separated from the â posteriori experiences, as the Organism may, analytically, be separated from its functions ; and in this way we may accept Kant's position that the d priori Forms of Sense and Understanding render Experience possible. But this is only saying that function is deter-mined by structure; and we must wholly reject his position that these Forms are transcendental, and are not only antecedent to and independent of all Experience whatever, ancestral and individual, but are sources of a higher truth than can be gained through individual experiences. They are congenital modifications, and are â priori because congenital.
59. It is important here to remark, that while function is necessarily determined by structure, — being nothing but the structure in action co-operating with the medium, — the transmission from generation to generation is confined to the structural modification, not including the incidents which caused that modification, nor any of the special actions which were the products of that modification in combination with special incidents. What we inherit is the modified structure, and, with that, the aptitude to act in a certain way under certain stimuli ; but the inheritance of the historical result is not the inheritance of the incidents which severally converged to that result, nor of the consequences which issued from the result under special conditions. Thus the tissue of the lungs subjected to certain influences be-comes so modified that tubercle is formed. The child may inherit a tuberculous diathesis, but cannot inherit the causes which originated the tubercle, nor the peculiar mental experiences which resulted from the influence of tubercle in the parent organism ; these being due to a complex of conditions never recurring in the child's experience.
In discussions on Heredity it has not been sufficiently recognized that only results can be inherited, and that every modification of structure is the issue of many complex experiences. Could one experience be isolated from prior and posterior experiences, it might be transmitted from parent to child ; but each experience is not only complicated by prior experiences, its transmission is complicated by the influence of the other parent. A musical aptitude will be inherited; but no particular melody. The aptitude represents a modification of structure where-by the response to auditory stimuli takes a melodic form ; but any particular melody is the form which this general aptitude takes under very special and complex conditions. In other words, the inherited organism is predisposed to play tunes of a certain character, but the music it will give forth must depend on the player. Here once more we see the necessity of allowing for the objective factor no less than for the subjective factor. Certain external influences co-operating with the organism have modified the structure of that organism, and produced what may be called a musical instrument ; could the external influences which were originally grouped into a definite melodic form be repeated, the result would be repeated, and the musician's child would again create de novo the melody created by his parent. The chances are infinite against such a recurrence in the order of the stimuli. But there are, in other regions, necessary recurrences in the order, so that every mind rediscovers the most general truths for itself, because every mind has presented to it the same phenomena in the same order.
60. This is a biological doctrine of Innate Ideas, which we shall have presently to consider at length. Here we must be content with saying that in the old meaning the doctrine is untenable. There are no innate ideas, no innate truths, no thoughts having a metempirical source, — simply innate tendencies, congenital aptitudes, which cause us to respond in certain ways to certain stimuli ; but if the stimuli differ in kind, or in degree, or in their order of presentation, the responses must proportionately differ.
In this sense we have Moral and Intellectual Instincts, — the action of congenital arrangements in the mechanism when set going 'under appropriate stimuli. Thus defined, it is clear that we are born with Logical Instincts. Strictly speaking, we no more learn to reason than we learn to see. In one sense we learn both, since Experience (the action and reaction of Organism and Medium) is requisite for both ; and in both we have to acquire what is but partially given at birth, namely, the structure capable of co-ordinating impressions. What we learn, what we acquire, both in reasoning and vision, is the result of the aptitudes evolved through external influences acting on a primitive arrangement of nervous tissue. If any one contemplating the infant, so obviously incapable of seeing or of reasoning, should demur to our presentation of Reason as congenital, he must equally demur to the universal acceptance of the sexual instinct as congenital ; all three functions are only con-genital in the sense in which the oak is said to lie ready in the acorn. The oak will not be developed unless under the appropriate conditions, and every variation in the soil or atmosphere will impress corresponding variations on the structure of the developed product. But the acorn inherits certain structural tendencies, which will manifest themselves in definite forms. The nervous organism also inherits certain tendencies, and whether these are early or late in evolution is quite a subsidiary consideration.
61. Our activities are of two classes, — the personal and impersonal. The personal comprise Sensation, Perception, Imagination, Judgment, Volition, — all directed to the satisfaction of egoistic impulses or primary needs : the need of Food, of Exercise (with its correlative, Re-pose), of Expression, and of Reproduction. The impersonal are directed to the satisfaction of sympathetic impulses, — the need of Affection, and the need of Knowledge. Intelligence, in the one case, is the con-quest of means for immediate ends ; Intellect, in the other, is the conquest of means for remote ends.
The animal has sympathy, and is moved by sympathetic impulses, but these are never altruistic ; the ends are never remote. Moral life is based on sympathy : it is feeling for others, working for others, aiding others, quite irrespective of any personal good beyond the satisfaction of the social impulse. Enlightened by the intuition of our community of weakness, we share ideally the universal sorrows. Suffering humanizes. Feeling the need of mutual help, we are prompted by it to labor for others. The egoistic impulses are directed towards objects simply so far as these are the means of satisfying a desire. The altruistic impulses, on the contrary, have greater need of Intelligence to understand the object . itself in all its relations. Hence so much immorality is sheer stupidity.
62. Thus it is that we are to seek in the Social Organism for all the main conditions of the higher functions, and in the Social Medium of beliefs, opinions, institutions, etc., for the atmosphere breathed by the Intellect. Man is no longer to be considered simply as an assemblage of organs, but also as an organ in a Collective Organism. From thé former he derives his sensations, judgments, primary impulses ; from the latter his conceptions, theories; and virtues. This is very clear when we learn how the Intellect draws both its inspiration and its instrument from the social needs. All the materials of intellect are images and symbols, all its processes are operations on images and symbols. Language — which is wholly a social product for a social need — is the chief vehicle of symbolical operation, and the only means by which Abstraction is effected. Without Language there can be no meditation, no theory, no Thought, in the special meaning of that term. A perception condenses many feelings into one, and is so far knowledge. A word — the symbol of a conception — condenses many perceptions into one ; and is thus not only knowledge of a wider range, but is a knowledge which is facultative, and capable of transmission and preservation.
63. Language is the creator and sustainer of that Ideal World in which the noblest part of human activity finds a theatre, the world of Thought and Spiritual Insight, of Knowledge and Duty, loftily elevated above that of Sense and Appetite. Into this Ideal World man absorbs the universe as in a Transfiguration. It is here that he shapes the programme of his existence ; and to that pro-gramme he makes the Real World conform. It is here he forms his highest rules of Conduct. It is here he plants his hopes and joys. It is here he finds his dignity and power. The Ideal World becomes to him the supreme Reality. It multiplies his pleasures and his pains. Its phantoms haunt him, — filling life with in-finite misery, such as never troubles less gifted creatures setting tribe against tribe, brother against brother, father against son, spreading bitter hate and the intolerable tyrannies of Superstition. Its fantasies animate him, — filling life with infinite and subtle joy, and in many ways aggrandizing his capacities and aims. This is man's spiritual being ; who would renounce it for the comparative calm of the most fortunate brute ?
64. An animal suffers from a physical calamity, seeks to escape from it, but never seeks to understand and modify its causes. The savage also suffers, and seeks to escape. But he wonders, speculates on the causes, hopes to master them by invocations or incantations. The civilized man tries to understand the causes that he may modify them when they are modifiable, and resign him-self to them when they are unmodifiable. The animal has only the Logic of Feeling to guide his actions. He observes and concludes, never explains. The man has besides this, the Logic of Signs : he observes, and explains the visible series by an invisible series. The one has only knowledge of particular facts; the other a knowledge of general facts. The knowledge of the one is fixed, that of the other facultative.
Between the Logic of Feeling and the Logic of Signs we must intercalate the Logic of Images, since the passage from Perception to Conception is effected through Imagination. Images, although reproductions of perceptions, possess a property not possessed by perceptions, namely, that of facultative reproduction, which enables them 'to be abstracted from the sensible order of presentation, and combined and recombined anew. Animal Imagination is reproductive but not plastic ; it never constructs.
65. It is in Imagination that must be sought the first impulse towards Explanation ; and therefore all primitive explanations are so markedly imaginative. Images being the ideal forms of Sensation, the Logic of Images is the first stage of intellectual activity ; and is therefore predominant in the early history of individuals and of nations. The first attempts to explain a phenomenon must be to combine the images of past sensations with the sensations now felt, so as to form a series. In the next stage, words, representative of abstractions, take the places both of images and objects. Thus the Logic of Signs replaces the Logic of Images, as the Logic of Images replaced the Logic of Sensation. Imagination precedes Science ; Poetry precedes Prose ; Ornament pre-cedes Comfort. -
66. The Logic of Signs is a higher development of the Logic of Feeling, but its processes are similar. The differences do not spring from the laws of neural grouping, but from the groups that are grouped. Sensations are groups of neural tremors ; perceptions are groups of sensations ; therefore Perception may be styled construction in the sphere of Sense. Intuitions are perceptions of relations, — ideal observation. Conceptions are groups of intuitions symbolized in words. Conception therefore may be styled construction in the sphere of symbols.
But symbols are representatives of values ; it is only by their possible reduction to Reals — i. e. to feelings — that their employment can be justified. A bank-note is a symbol representing so much gold, which in turn represents so much food or labor. But it is always assumed that the bank is solvent, and that gold is a current article of exchange. A forged note, or a note issued by an insolvent bank, may pass from hand to hand, but its final object is not accomplished. Thus all our reasonings by means of symbols proceed on the assumption that the symbols can at any time have their values assigned, and that they represent Reals, which will excite feelings. Our perceptions proceed on the assumption that the qualities not felt, but inferred to be coexistent with those now felt, do really coexist as virtual feelings, to become actual feelings when the object is brought into direct relation with the respective Senses.
67. The Real is that which is felt. An object is to us what it is felt or thought by us. Knowledge is virtual Feeling : it is pre-vision of what will be vision, under sensible conditions, because it, or something like it, once was vision. Theory is virtual Experience, reproducing past experiences, and anticipating the effects of real presentation.
Sensation and Intuition always carry Belief. Inference is Expectation, or qualified Belief. We cannot resist belief in a sensation, though we may doubt any of the inferences it awakens. We cannot resist belief in an intuition, though we may doubt whether the relations intuited ,be real or not. In the act of intuiting, our feeling of security is undisturbed.
The distinction between Observation and Inference is the distinction between. the real and ideal, the actual and virtual. But in point of fact pure Observation—i. e. sensation wholly unmingled with Inference - is impossible ; it is so by the Laws of Reinstatement. Pure Theory — i. e. logical combination of relations unmingled with related terms - is also impossible.
68. The purpose of Intelligence being to direct our impulses towards their satisfaction, and the purpose of the Intellect being to accomplish this through a wider survey of means and possibilities, we learn how on the one hand all Intelligence must have its final test in Reality, and on the other how the Intellect, which is the highly developed form of Intelligence, has erected means into ends, and now pursues these proximate ends in oblivion of the ultimate end, and will even substitute fictions in place of facts, abstract types for concrete things. The direct object of the Intellect is not Reality; that, however, is its ultimate object. The progress of development is an ever-increasing tendency towards more and more remote conceptions and indirect methods, detaching the mind more and more from sensible observation. It may be illustrated by the stages of numerical calculation. Man begins by counting things, grouping them visibly. He then learns to count simply the numbers, in the absence of the things, using his fingers and toes for symbols. He then substitutes abstract signs, and Arithmetic begins. From this he passes to Algebra, the signs of which are not only abstract but general; and now he calculates numerical relations, not numbers. From this he passes to the higher calculus of relations of relations,
It is the same with the development of Commerce. Men begin by exchanging things. They pass to the exchange of values. First money, then notes or bills, is the symbol of value. Finally, men simply debit and credit each other, so that immense transactions are affected by means of this equation of equations. The complicated processes of sowing, reaping, collecting, shipping, and delivering a quantity of wheat are condensed into the entry of a few words in a ledger.
69. In consequence of this development of Intellect — i. e. of the interest in remote means substituted for direct ends — man acquires his immense superiority over animals in achieving the final end. It is thus, and thus only, that he is enabled to modify the course of events. It is thus that Sentience becomes Science, facts are condensed into laws, and direct vision is multiplied and magnified by remote prevision.
But while insisting on the claim of Intellect to pursue its ideal objects, and to be uncontrolled in its prosecution of even the remotest research, we must never forget that its ideal ends are only sanctified by the final end, — by that correspondence with Reality which was its starting-point and must be its goal. No speculation, however wide of actual experience, can be valueless, if, in any-way, it enlarge our vision of the Real, but this is its final test. If with mighty span of wing it soar above the sphere of the Real, it must not keep hovering there, but must at some point re-enter the sphere. Ideal construction is unlimited in freedom, on the understanding that it must always submit to real verification, and have values assigned to its symbols.
70. Thus the human Intellect emerges from animal Intelligence, and develops a vast independent creation, having the whole Cosmos and Humanity for its material. Concurrently with this, the Moral Intelligence develops its system. Both Intellect and Conscience are products of the animal impulses and social impulses acting and re-acting. While the Intellect is mainly occupied with the relations of the Cosmos and its History, having the ultimate aim of making these subservient to practical needs, the Conscience or Moral Intelligence is mainly occupied with the relations of Humanity, — human needs and human actions, — having the ultimate aim of conforming our conduct to those relations, harmonizing our impulses with the impulses of others, thus aiding others and gratifying ourselves.
The Intellect, although under sympathetic conditions, — since it depends on others for its activity, and for the means by which the activity may be guided, and since, moreover, its results are achieved for all, — is not so directly sympathetic as the Conscience. Could we suppose a man born with his inherited aptitudes, left solitary on an island, before having had access to any of the stores of knowledge accumulated by the race, he might acquire a rudimentary knowledge of cosmical relations, although without Language, or any accessible store of the experience of others on which to proceed, this would necessarily be little above that of an animal. But of Moral Intelligence there would not be a trace. There cannot be moral relations apart from Society.
71. Hence two noticeable facts : the part played by Sentiment in Philosophy is of immense importance in so far as the problems involve. elements of social relations ; but is simply perturbing and obstructive in problems of cosmical relations. We ought not to deny the admission of Sentiment, but we must definitely assign its sphere. A social theory which omitted it would be as defective as a cosmical theory which admitted it. If Evangelical Geology or High Church Chemistry would be absurd, equally so would be an exclusively physical theory of Marriage, or of the filial and parental relation.
72. The Intellect and the Conscience are social functions, and their special manifestations are rigorously determined by Social Statics, — i. e. the state of the Social Organism at the time being, — which they in their turn determine. The Language we think in and the conceptions we employ, the attitude of our minds and the means of investigation, are social products determined by the activities of the Collective Life. The laws of intellectual progress are to be read in History, not in the individual experience. We breathe the social air; since what we think, greatly depends on what others have thought. The paradox of to-day becomes the commonplace of to-morrow. The truths which required many generations to discover and establish are now declared to be innate. Even discovery has its law, and is only an individual product, inasmuch as the individual voice articulates what has been more or less inarticulate in the general thought. The great thinker is the secretary of his age. If his quick-glancing mind outrun the swiftest of his contemporaries, he will not be listened to ; the prophet must find disciples. If he outrun the majority of his contemporaries, he will have but a small circle of influence, for all originality is estrangement.
Not recognizing the social influence, men seldom appreciate the true point of view in discussions respecting ancient and modern Literature. It is undeniable that Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, Hipparchus, and Galen were not less splendidly endowed than Shakespeare, Bacon, Newton, Comte, or Helmholtz, — their intellectual lineaments may have been as grandly drawn, but it is absurd to pretend that the products of the ancient and the products of the modern mind are of anything like equal value.
73. Some of our Impulses are simply organic activities, others are Instincts. There is no Instinct to breathe, to digest, to secrete, etc., for there never was a time when an alternative action was possible with these organs under their appropriate stimuli, — the actions were necessarily determined in one way only. But food is selected by Instinct ; the bird flies, and the mammal walks by Instinct : these actions are tentative, and guided by discerning. Feeling. The sexual instinct is obviously an impulse guided by Discernment.
Directly connected with the Nutritive Instinct are three egoistic Impulses, offensive and defensive, which may be characterized as the Aggressive Instincts. The animal must destroy, or it could not feed. A rival threatening to take some of this food rouses Anger, the emotion of a thwarted impulse. The thwarted sexual impulse calls out the same feeling. Derived from this will be in the higher imaginative animals the love of Domination ; the desire to make others afraid of, or subservient to us. Where food is abundant, and accessible, there is little development of these tendencies ; as may be observed in the herbivora, who rarely fight unprompted by the sexual impulse. Tigers would be sociable were animal food as abundant and accessible as vegetable food. War is the outcome of this tendency. In Trade we see the war spirit animated by the desire for Property.
The so-called instinct of Self-preservation is a fiction. The only impulse at work there is the shrinking from Pain ; and this in the matured experience leads to the intelligent act of self-preservation.
As the Aggressive Instinct springs from the Nutritive, so the Sexual Instinct springs from the Reproductive. It is the first of the sympathetic tendencies, the germ of Altruism. Love, which is the social motor, has this origin. Thus modified, the tendency to Domination becomes the love of Approbation ; it is the sympathetic form of the egoistic impulse. The love of wife and children extends to relatives and friends, to the tribe, to the nation, to Humanity.
How intimately the social and religious emotions are connected with this primary fact of the mutual dependence of two human beings, and how from it slowly emerge all the marvels of Art and Science, must be exhibited in detail.
74. Having briefly indicated the Psychological Principles, I will now indicate what is their outcome with respect to the great metaphysical question touching an external reality. It will be argued at length in a separate Problem ; but as the publication of this Problem is distant, and as its conclusions will everywhere be implied, I take this opportunity of clearly marking my position.
The doctrine of this work, then, may be called Reasoned Realism. It is distinguished from the Natural Realism, the Hypothetic Realism, and the Symbolical or Transfigured Realism of modern thinkers, no less than from the unhesitating Realism of unreflecting minds. It is a doctrine which endeavors to rectify the natural illusion of Reason when Reason attempts to rectify the sup-posed illusion of Sense. I call it Realism, because it affirms the reality of what is given in Feeling ; and Reasoned Realism, because it justifies that affirmation through an investigation of the grounds and processes of Philosophy, when Philosophy explains the facts given in Feeling.
75. The reality of an external. existence, a Not-self, is a fact of Feeling so indissolubly woven into Consciousness, that the very terms in which Idealism seeks to disprove it are themselves derived from it. Now this fact, because it is a fact of Feeling, and ultimate, can neither be got rid of nor explained by interpretation of it into terms of some more general fact. Why then has Philosophy persisted in the attempt to explain it ? Simply because Philosophy, being in its very nature Explanation, persists in attempting to explain even the inexplicable ; dissatisfied with ultimates, it is prone to ask what is their ultimate ? This search for light behind the light is the natural illusion of Reason, the will-o'-wisp of Philosophy ; and this can only be rectified by showing what are the grounds and what the limitations of Knowledge.
76. The facts of feeling are directly given. All the phenomena constituting the external reality to us are presented discontinuously ; and it is the office of Philosophy so to connect them that their actual continuity be discerned; and we thus not only have the separate feelings, but also a feeling of the relations of these feelings. The Logic of Feeling, which is primary, has to be supplemented by the Logic of Signs, which is derivative. Analysis attempts to display, in symbols, what has been implicit in sensation. But — and this is the point too commonly overlooked — all interpretation must finally be a reduction into terms of Feeling, all the symbols must signify sensations. Feeling is the starting-point and goal of investigation. All that we can know of the external is what we have felt or might feel.
77. This being the ground, what is the limit of Knowledge ? The limit is attained when we have attained what in Algebra is called the "form of a function." In Mathematics a "function" is the quantity which varies when some other quantity varies. When observation of two phenomena discloses that the one -- say the density of a gas — varies with another, — say its pressure, — the density is said to be a function of the pressure ; when vital activity is observed to be exalted or depressed with increase or decrease of respiration, the activity is said to be a function of the respiration. Such knowledge of a function is valuable, but it is obviously not final. What is still needed is the form of the function, -- the manner in which the two quantities are combined. When this is reached the limit is reached. When the law of a series is found, nothing remains to be sought. When we know the how, it is idle to ask the why. The fact is what it is, and what its factors are : if we know the fact and the factors, to ask for more is to ask, why 2 X 2 = 4. The gas presses against the sides or the containing vessel, because the gas is composed of movable molecules dashing about in all directions with various velocities, and the amount of this pressure must of course increase in proportion to the diminution of the space in which these motions take effect, since on every inch of surface there will then be a proportionately greater dashing of molecules. Thus the smaller the vessel becomes, the greater must be the density of the gas contained in it, since the gas fills the vessel ; and the greater the density, the greater will be the pressure excited by the gas. Now if it be true that the gas molecules in their movements repel each other inversely as the fifth power of the distance. (or, indeed, if any other law of repulsion can be established), we shall then be in possession of the form of the function, and the final result of analysis will be reached. To go beyond this, and to ask why the molecules repel according to this law, is irrational, because travelling beyond the real limits and conditions.
78. Now it may seem a very bold thing to say, but I hope to justify the assertion, that with respect to the world-old debate on the relation of Object and Subject we have not only a knowledge of the function, but of the form of the function ; or, to put it in more familiar language, we not only know that an external Not-self exists, — know it with the same assurance that we know an internal Self to exist, — but we also know the manner in which the two are combined in Feeling and Thought.
Fully aware of the paradoxical aspect this statement must présent td almost every reader, I only ask him to suspend his judgment on it until he has accompanied me through all the evidence which this work will offer. Having made my statement, I will here say no more, but call attention to the unsatisfactory nature of the position commonly held. The ordinary man believes that the objects he sees, touches, and tastes do veritably exist, and exist as they are seen, touched, tasted. They have the qualities he feels in them. The philosopher, dissatisfied with the facts directly given in Feeling, though he, no more than the ordinary man, doubts that these qualities are felt, endeavors to explain why it is that they are ,so. To explain a fact is to interpret it by its factors, to analyze it into its constituents ; which again means to interpret a feeling in terms of feeling. This need for an explanation is exclusively human. No animal explains ; he feels, and his action is the direct consequence. But man desires to understand what he feels, in order that he may modify the course of events, by rearranging their separate factors. To do this he must take the complex whole to pieces, and see of what it is composed. The speculative intellect carries out in the remote regions of knowledge, what the practical intellect daily performs in the familiar regions of Practice it takes the object to pieces.
79. Great and beneficent as the results of this analytic tendency have been, there have also been attendant drawbacks. By cultivating this tendency to look away from the given reality, in search of its prior conditions or its presumed factors, men have learned to slight the plain indubitable facts of Feeling, in favor of the obscure and doubtful representations of these facts in Thought, — that is to say, replacing perceptions by conceptions, facts by theories and hypotheses, men have come to distrust the Logic of Feeling, even within its own domain, and to rely on the Logic of Signs, even when it contradicts that of Feeling. Accustomed to attach exclusive importance to symbols irrespective of the realities, they have forgotten that ideas can be valid only as representative of sensations, and symbols can be useful only when capable of interpretation. For what was the starting-point of every theory ? An observation, And what is the test of the theory ? A reduction of its inferences to sensations. The theory started to explain a fact ; the inferences were intended to re-present what would be presented in Feeling, were the inferred facts, facts perceived. Obviously, therefore, every theory must be a failure which ends in denying, or ignoring, the original fact. Yet this assuredly is the case with the current theories of Perception, idealistic and realistic. The original fact given to all, is that of an external reality present in Feeling ; the fact that a Not-self exists, that objects affect us by their presence, and have qualities variously felt by us, — this, I say, may possibly be explained, interpreted in other terms of Feeling, and classed with other facts, but cannot be ignored, or denied, without violation. of first principles.
80. Yet this is done by metaphysicians under various forms. What they have to explain is not the fact which is ultimate, but the factors of the fact, i. e. the indirect conditions of this direct reality, the invisible constituents, objective and subjective, of this visible phenomenon. That is to say, to exhibit in analysis what was given in a synthesis ; to reach if possible the " form of the function." How have they proceeded on this quest ? From of old they made the false step of proclaiming, the natural illusion of Sense ; founded on a precipitate conclusion from practical mistakes, this notion of the Senses as sources of deception led to the conclusion that Reason was the only ground of .security. If Sense deceived us, Reason corrected the false reports. Reason henceforward became authoritative, final, This, which may in turn be called the natural illusion of Reason, can only be dispelled by a thorough investigation of the genesis of Reason ;, and since that genesis exhibits it in the light of a derivative form the primary facts of Feeling, — the virtual representation of what would, be actual presentation, — we cannot hesitate to assign a lower validity to its symbolical constructions than to the primary facts which those constructions render intelligible. It is surely obvious that no theory of Perception can have the certainty that belongs to the Perception itself ;, no explanation of a conclusion can be valid which ignores the very facts concluded, shut up in the starting-point.
81. It was to explain the perception of an external reality that Philosophy started on its quest. The Idealist schools find the explanation to be, — that there is really nothing to explain except the illusion that an external reality exists. The Realist schools, while admitting that an external reality veritably exists, declare that it can never be known by us as it exists, but only under some form in which we clothe it ; there is, therefore, still a touch of the old illusion lingering in it, and our surest knowledge is after all phantasmal.
82. The Reasoned Realism of this work denies altogether. the assumed distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, — except as a convenient artifice of classification by which the unknowable otherness of relations is distinguished from the knowable relations : that is to say, noumena standing for things in their relations to other forms of Sentience (if there are such) than our own ; and phenomena standing for things in any conceivable relations to Sentience like our own. Getting rid of the Ding an sick, or noumenon, as a phantasm that has no existence for us, consequently cannot corne within our perceptions, nor within any theory of perception, and is therefore altogether banished from the sphere of Knowledge, we are led through our psychological analysis back to the synthetic starting-point, — namely, that the external world exists, and among the modes of its existence is the one we perceive. Rationally interpreted, we may accept the. ordinary belief that color is a quality of the object seen, that heat is in the fire, roughness is in the rough surface, etc. ; and at the same time we may accept the philosopher's assertion, that all these qualities in objects are feelings in us. Psychogeny will show us that color, heat, etc., are, from one point of view, both in the objects and in us ; from another point of view, they are in neither.
83. Let me explain. When first men began to analyze their perceptions, they were so greatly impressed by the importance of the subjective aspect, and the dependence of Feeling on the state of the sentient organism, the same object producing such various sensations at different times, that they reversed their primary and instinctive judgment, and instead of saying, " qualities be-long to objects," they now said, " it is we who invest objects with the qualities of our feelings." From that time the subjective aspect has so predominated that Psychology has almost lost its hold of the objective world ; and in many treatises resembles an Astronomy which should record the laws of planetary movement, ignoring the existence of planets and perturbations ; or a Biology which should explain Life by processes of composition and de-composition, denying that there were any organisms in relation to a medium to manifest these.
84. Kant boldly carried out this reversal of the primary judgment of Feeling. The external phenomena were to him only " objects" in virtue of the Mental Forms imposed on the noumenon. I do not discuss the question here ; but only say that the doctrine of this work stands by the primary judgment of Feeling, and is a Reasoned Realism because it does so. The external world must be at first simply a confused chaos, without shape or order, when reflected in a Sentience which has not acquired shaping reactions. But as the sentient Organism develops, the external Order emerges ; not because this Order is the creation of the Organism, stamped upon the chaos, but because this Order is assimilated by the Organism, — selected, according to its shaping reactions, from the larger Order of the Real. The undifferentiated animal substance -slowly develops into highly differentiated tissues and organs, through the action on it of the external agencies, which leave their traces in a modified structure and capability of reacting : the pulpy mass of the brain acquires, through manifold experiences, a structure more and more variously definite, with corresponding reactions ; and as Feeling becomes differentiated and defined, Qualities arise in the Felt. It is thus that the nebula of the external is condensed into objective phenomena, and the confused irradiation of Sensibility is grouped into feelings.
85. Is this figured Cosmos figured in Feeling through the adaptation of the sentient organism to the external Real, or is it simply a subjective construction—the figuration of Sensibility — which we illusively project out-wards and receive back again in reflection ? Do we see objects colored because objects colorably affect the retina? or do we see them colored because the retina casts its tints upon them ? Do we acquire our modes of sentient reaction through modifications impressed by the actions of the external ? or do we bring with us, and from another source, the Mental Forms in which the unshaped external takes shape ?
These different statements of the same fundamental problem suggest somewhat different answers. Between Realism and Idealism, I should say that the question must be rendered more definite by a preliminary settle-ment as to whether we ask a question of Psychogeny or a question of Psychology. If it is the genesis of our modes of sentient reaction, and their relation to the external, which we consider, then the answer will take the realistic form ; since Psychogeny, tracing the evolution of Sensibility in the organic world, must conclude that it is the External Order which determines the Internal Order, by determining the organic structure of which Sensibility is the property: the evolution of perceptions, instincts, volitions, conceptions, is through successive adaptations of the successively modified structure ; precisely as the evolution of all the vital phenomena is through successive adaptations.* But if the question be not one of genesis, if it assume the existence of the organized structure with its developed aptitudes, the answer will be a sort of compromise between the realistic and idealistic answers. Psychology accepting the developed Organism, as one of the factors in the fact of Perception, estimates the influence of this co-operant, and concludes that since the Organism necessarily reacts according to its modes, it may be said to color objects, although this mode of reaction is itself a mode originally due to the action of objects. It is Light which fashions the retina to luminous responses. Not that the external Real which stimulates the retina can be supposed to be itself luminous : it is only one factor of the luminous product. Nor can the retina, apart from stimulation, be luminous : it also is only one factor. But Light—the Object —is both factors: thus the object is necessarily object-subject; and subject is equally subject-object. ,I do not agree with those realists who conceive the thing represented in Perception, in the way mathematicians regard an algebraic function as represented by a curve, — object and subject forming a Dualism having something of a pre-established harmony, but no real union. I would rather liken the Thing represented in Perception, to the weight of the atmosphere represented by the height of the mercury in the barometer; while the differences between weight and height, and between atmosphere and mercury, are wide, both rest on a common identity of pressure. The pressure of the atmosphere is the pressure exerted on the mercurial column, and the barometrical expression of this pressure is, in one sense, no more like the object expressed, than a feeling is like the vibrations it expresses ; yet, in another sense, the barometrical expression 'is what it expresses, and the feeling is what it expresses.
86. It seems to me a grave objection to Idealism that there is no possibility of separating Object from Subject, or Subject from Object, in Feeling, but only in Reflection; and Reflection is not primary, but derivative. Nay, even here it soon appears that the distinction is simply that of aspects. We declare the existence of a Real apart from Feeling, and of events linked together by other ties than those of our modes of conceiving them ; because if we assume such an existence it enables us to explain the phenomena which agree with, and the phenomena which contradict our previsions. Granting this assumption to see what are its consequences, we find that, having through successive adaptations acquired an order in our feelings corresponding with the order in things, we can from it predict what will be the order of events on a future occasion ; and this prediction is verified, not simply in respect of the events following the order we have prefigured, but the order which will appear the same to others who have no such prefiguration of it, and cannot therefore be sup-posed to have introduced their subjective constructions into it. A chemist, suppose, has learned the order of events by which salts are produced. He can produce a salt where there is no salt. If his conception of the real order were a subjective construction without objective correspondence, he could only see what he had foreseen, and the salt would inevitably appear to him. But on proceeding to realize his conception he sometimes stumbles on a contradiction : no salt is produced : he sees what he had not foreseen. Why ? Because he had assumed that the order of real events would be that of his ideal scheme ; whereas in reality there has been some other order, some events not included in his construction, and he has to seek these out, reform his construction, and then proceed to verify it when thus reformed.
87. But while Idealism tries to get rid of the primary fact that Not-self is the correlative of Self, and in no wise a product or projection of Self, but a given factor in Consciousness, having the same validity as Self, all the schemes of Realism with which I am familiar err on the side of neglecting the one factor or the other.
The ordinary man, undisturbed by philosophic speculation, accepts a Dualism of Mind and Matter, and imagines the External Order to be something wholly independent of the Internal Order, imagines Things to exist precisely as they are felt and thought, even when there is no sentient subject to feel and think them. But the philosophic realist also more or less avowedly accepts a Dualism ; since, although he may reject the crude distinction of Mind and Matter, he keeps to the wide distinction of Motion and Feeling, with its correlative distinction of Object and Subject, as two parallel existences which can never approach each other, much less unite. The Subject is conceived under the likeness of a kaleidoscope ; every external force will disturb its arrangement of colors, and the rearrangement will accurately represent the amount and direction of the external force, but will have no other similarity or point of community with it. In this view our perceptions are symbols of the external reals, but have no more likeness to the reals, no more community of kind, than a numerical figure has to the figures of the numbered objects.
88. This view has advocates so eminent that I must decline the discussion. of it until the fitting occasion arrives for treating it exhaustively. Here, where I am avowedly indicating my own position, and not endeavoring to prove it, the statement must suffice that I regard the Subject in no such alienation from the Object; and regard Perception as the assimilation of the Object by the Subject, in the same way that Nutrition is the assimilation of the Medium by the Organism. Out of the general web of Existence certain threads may be detached and rewoven into a special group, — the Subject, — and this sentient group will in so far be different from the larger group, — the Object ; but whatever different arrangement the threads may take on, they are always threads of the original web, they are not different threads. The elements of the sentient Organism are the elements detached from the larger group ; the motions of the sentient Organism are the motions of these elements. We do not suppose that when what is called the physical motions of molecules are grouped into what is called the chemical actions, and surprisingly novel phenomena emerge, there has been anything essentially superadded to the primitive molecules and their forces. Nor do biologists now suppose that when physical and chemical actions are specially grouped and vital phenomena emerge, anything essential has been superadded to the primitive threads of objective existence. The chemical phenomenon is new, the vital phenomenon is new ; but the novelty is one of special grouping of the old material and the old energy. In like manner, when the psychical phenomenon emerges from the vital, and the social phenomenon from the psychical, there is a regrouping, not the introduction of new material, above all, not a casting away of the old. The Subject is inseparable from the Object, in any real sense ; is only separable ideally. As the flower which comes into existence through the action of the sun incorporates the energy of the sun, and grows by what it takes from the sun, so the sentient Organism incorporates the energy of the External, and reproduces all that produced it.,
89. To those who have accepted the view of Life being an emergent, not due to a conflict between the external and internal, but to their co-operation, the extension of the view to Perception lies near at hand. To those who have accepted the view of Mind drawing material from the Social Medium, and who admit that the human being lives; feels, and thinks by the continual assimilation of such material, the following question may be submitted : When the mind perceives any social fact, and apprehends its social significance, is the fact real, or not ? Let the fact be a religious service performed in a cathedral, or a political service performed in a legislative assembly. The sensible phenomena are of course perceived through sensible channels, and are interpreted with more or less ac-curacy according to the registered experiences of the observer; precisely as any cosmical fact will be perceived and interpreted. In both cases there is a synthesis of sensible impressions, feelings reproducing former feelings and if these are interpreted, it is by an ideal construction which is determined by previous constructions. By an animal, or a stranger, the sensible phenomena which the . religious service presents would be very differently interpreted but the sensible phenomena presented in any cosmical process would also be differently interpreted by them ; since interpretation means mental assimilation, the significance of the phenomena must depend upon the pre-perceptions and pre-conceptions which they arouse. Nevertheless, wide as the gap may be between the interpretation of the savage and the interpretation of the citizen, the reality of the religious service is unaffected : it is to each what they feel it to be, and it is to each what they think it to be ; in other words, they have been sensibly impressed by certain reals, and have interpreted these impressions by means of certain symbols. From these subjective differences it has been concluded that there is an objective existence independent of all, and unlike each ; I hold, on the contrary, that the objective existence is to each what it is felt to be.
We have already (§ 25) briefly indicated what must hereafter be exhibited in detail, that whatever is felt is necessarily real, since Reality and Feeling are correlative. Feeling only arises in the sensible excitation of the Organism by something acting on it, whereas whatever is thought, conceived, is necessarily symbolical, since conceptions are not perceptions but symbols : they are not the sensations themselves in a synthesis, but general signs indicating such synthesis ; as algebraic letters are not the numbers and magnitudes themselves, but symbols of their relations. This, which is obvious enough in the case of general conceptions, — Life, Cause, Nation, Virtue, etc., — is perhaps less obvious yet equally demonstrable in the case of less general conceptions, — Flower, Horse, River, etc., which are markedly distinguishable from the perceptions of a Flower, a Horse, or a River, which are always syntheses of feelings, and are real because both the elements (the sensations) and the synthesis are the actual and direct products of the external and internal factors ; whereas the conceptions formed out of these perceptions, although they have only validity in so far as they accurately represent real syntheses, are in them-selves indirect products, mere symbols. The conception of Virtue, for example, is altogether unlike the concrete actions which it signifies ; unlike in its elements, unlike in its synthesis. It is not a real, i. e. an external agent capable of exciting a corresponding perception, but an abstraction, a symbol expressing the many feelings which the concrete actions are capable of producing ; and is comparable to the algebraic symbols, which, though utterly unlike the quantities they represent, do nevertheless stand for those quantities, and are operated on with equal facility: In some of our conceptions and in some of our pictorial symbols, there is a sensible suggestion of likeness between the sign and the thing signified ; in the conception of Flower — or in the symbol of a Lion representing the kingly attributes of a Chief — there can be traced some perceptive suggestion. But in other conceptions and symbols no resemblance, no perceptive suggestion, is traceable ; if there were originally a suggestion, it has long since faded from the view ; and in all cases the symbol is constructed out of different elements in different ways, so that it is really unlike what it stands for, is different from what it signifies.
This contrast between Conception and Perception, between the Symbolical and the Real, which is a fundamental point in Psychology, renders intelligible what was said (§ 63) respecting the Ideal World absorbing the universe in a Transfiguration ; and at the same time marks my dissent from the theory of Transfigured Realism, up-held by Helmholtz and Spencer; for that theory professes to be a theory of Perception, and declares Perception to be symbolical ; whereas, according to the principles here expounded, Perception being the resultant of the two factors, internal and external, the conclusion deduced is that the object thus felt exists precisely as it is felt; existing for us only in Feeling, its reality is what we feel. The great thinkers whom I am here opposing fully admit the premises of this conclusion, with this reservation : they hold that since the internal factor is a necessary co-operant, it must alter by its co-operation the character of the external, and the product of the two will be unlike either. Having for many years maintained this position, I am not insensible to its significance. I shall endeavor, however, to reconcile the differences, and to show that Perception, because it is a resultant, not a symbol, does not alter the Real ; on the contrary, an object only is to us what we feel it to be, — it exists in that relation. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of the external factor having another existence in relation to other factors ; all that can legitimately be affirmed is that this particular thing in this particular relation is what it is in. this relation, i. e. what it is felt to be. What we mean by saying that a thing is real simply amounts to this : it will always in such or such relations have such or such modes of existence, and in all similar relations similar modes.
This conclusion is as absolute as that two multiplied by two will always be four, and that two multiplied by three will always be six.
This question of the reality of an external world will have to be treated at length in a separate problem ; I here indicate simply the principal lines of the conclusion to which I have been led. Neither crude Realism nor any form of Idealism satisfies all the conditions of the problem. The world conceived by us, the world in Thought, is demonstrably not a picture of the Existence lying outside of us and unrelated to us : it is a Transfiguration' effected by the ideal construction of real presentations in Feeling. Were this External, such as we conceive it, existing objectively, Science would not have been in travail for centuries ; the objective existence would have been plain to Sense, needing no Science to make its order plain. On the other hand, were this External a purely subjective creation, the projection of an ideal order, it would have needed no study to understand it, for it would have spontaneously unfolded its mysteries before our gaze. The necessity of long-continued observation and reasoning, the necessity of analytical operations to make clear the sequences of observed events, the changes in our knowledge, and the slow evolution of our conception of the External Order, disprove both Realism and Idealism. The psychological facts that Existence is directly perceived and indirectly conceived, that what is felt is real, and what is thought is symbolical of what is felt, suffice to justify the theory of Reasoned Realism. -
90. No little confusion arises from an almost inevitable ambiguity. We apply the term Object to the Not-self. This Not-self may be either the objective aspect of the world felt and thought, i. e. of the External in actual and virtual relation to Sentience ; or the universe of existence, conceived in its totality, including that smaller section of it which is grouped by a Subject. When we say that there is identity of Object and Subject, the meaning ought to be that in respect of Existence in its relation to Consciousness, Object and Subject may abstractedly be considered under different aspects, but they are one and the same phenomenon.
"Nichts ist drinnen, Nichts ist draussen, Denn was innen, das ist aussen, So ergreifet ohne Saumniss, Heilig offentlich Geheimniss."
But this can no longer be said of the Universe considered as the totality of Existence, under which aspect the Object is not the other side of the Subject, but the larger circle which includes it. This is, however, a topic which must be discussed hereafter.
Reasoned Realism not only justifies the primary judgment of Feeling, but gets rid of the notion that because Knowledge is necessarily relative therefore it cannot be real. I hope to show that instead of invoking an Unknowable as the dark Dynamis to which all researches point, — instead of concluding that knowledge of things as they are is impossible, and that our most certain results are only symbols of an unknown reality, — the conclusion will be, that although the region of the Unknowable may be infinite, within the region of the Know-able we do know things as they are, know them absolutely, comprehensively, — in any rational sense to which the term Knowledge ever was applied.
This chapter may be fitly closed with the words of Auguste Comte : " Le but le plus difficile et le plus important de notre existence intellectuelle consiste à transformer le cerveau humain en un miroir exact de l'ordre extérieur. C'est seulement ainsi qu'elle peut devenir la source directe de notre unité totale, en liant la vie affective et la vie active à leur commune destination. La possibilité d'une telle transformation repose sur la part nécessaire de l'ordre extérieur dans notre propre exercice mental, dont il fournit toujours les premiers matériaux. Outre cette alimentation élémentaire, il y influe aussi comme stimulant, et même comme régulateur, ainsi qu'envers toutes les autres fonctions vitales, végétatives ou animales."
( Originally Published 1874 )
Problems of Life and Mind:
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Method Of Science And Its Application To Metaphysics
The Rules Of Philosophizing
The Limitations Of Knowledge
The Sensational And A Priori Hypotheses
The Sensible, Extra-sensible, And Supra-sensible
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