Introduction - The Social Philosophy Of Instinct

( Originally Published 1922 )

Conceptions of human nature and behavior have a profound influence on Social Philosophy. When the behavior of man regarded as determined largely by the play of mechanical and impersonal forces Social Philosophy is quite different from what it is when the behavior of man is regarded as determined by the influence of ancestral spirits or by innate impulses longing for expression. Views regarding the source of human values also exert a profound influence on Social Philosophy. When the source of values is regarded as external to the individual, that is, when values are regarded as sentiments impressed on the individual by his group and culture, Social Philosophy is quite different from what it is when the source of values is regarded as internal. To an even greater extent do conceptions regarding the value of the individual influence Social Philosophy. For, obviously, the Social Philosophy that rests on the assumption that the individual is of value principally as a means to help achieve the ends of some transcendental power, say that of the State, is quite different from the Social Philosophy committed to the view that the State is of value only as a means to help realize the instinctive ends of the individual.

This is as it should be. It is good that conceptions of human nature are regarded as determining what is good for man. If human nature is not to determine what is good for man, what is? The relation pointed out between views of human nature and Social Philosophy is what we should wish. Writers, then, who seek to build their Social Philosophy on their conception of human nature follow the right method and are not to be criticised for this. Yet the writings of many of our Social Philosophers seem to indicate that they should be criticised for not exercising due care and criticism in reaching their conclusions regarding human nature. The writers to whom I refer are found for the most part among the group which may be called the biological sociologists.

Under the influence of evolutionary thought and the accompanying emphasis placed on genetics, many writers in this group have reached very definite conceptions regarding human nature and the motives which determine human behavior. In many circles it is assumed that, as a result of the evolution of the species, we possess certain inherited or innate forces in virtue of which we act and which largely determine how we act. Our behavior, according to this view, is determined not by the give-and-take relations existing between us and our environment but by forces which we inherit as a result of the give-and-take relations our ancestors sustained to their environment.

Conceptions of this nature have deeply colored the Social Philosophy of today. Indeed, one who reads current discussions of social problems cannot fail to be impressed with the significance that is attached to supposedly innate determinants of human behavior. It is hoped that by various manipulations of these forces, or instincts-that is, by sublimation, repression, suppression, thwarting, expression, and so forth the good and evil of our society will be explained. It is also hoped that through a knowledge of these innate characters we shall be able to give a psychological interpretation of our moral ideas and sentiments, of our institutions and customs, and of culture in general. In spite of the prevalence of these tendencies and hopes, the assumptions on which they are based seem in many cases to have been accepted uncritically. It is too readily assumed that our values, desires, impulses, and emotions are determined by forces which we inherit as a result of the behavior or environmental conditions of our ancestors.

This conception of force in terms of which phenomena can be explained has disappeared from the physical sciences. That it should still persist in the biological and social sciences is not hard to understand. It is due to a great extent to the origin of our conception of force. Our notion of force is deeply rooted in overcoming obstacles. At such moments we feel ourselves animated by a great force, which is putting forth every effort to accomplish the desired end. Likewise in our moments of inspiration and enthusiasm we feel ourselves lifted up and ennobled by a power or force which holds us in its grasp. It is not unnatural that a notion thus acquired should be held fast as an explanation of the very experiences in which it was discovered. It is because we experience forces directly or immediately in our behavior that we wish or hope to interpret our behavior in terms of a force. It is for this reason that this old notion of force, though abandoned in physics, continues to play an important part in our explanation of social and organic behavior.

The explanation of the abandonment of this use of force in the physical sciences will make clear another reason for its persistence in the biological sciences. It is not hard to understand why it should have been abandoned in the physical sciences; for there we can calculate forces exactly and balance one against the other. As soon as we are able to do this, we begin to treat them as functions of the situations in which they appear, rather than as forces independent of the situation and in terms of which the situation can be explained. Forces thus come to be regarded as results of the situation, and hence cannot be used to account for the situation or activity in which they appear. This is not so easily done in the biological sciences. There the data are much more complex, and we find greater difficulty in viewing the forces as products of the situation in which they appear.

This difficulty, however, should not be allowed to mislead us. An illustration drawn from one of the purely physical sciences will make clear how we should regard all forces. For example, let us take the activity that is involved in the precipitation of a chemical from a solution. In an activity of this sort we feel no need of a "crystalline force" to bring about the precipitation or crystallization. Yet in this activity force is beyond doubt involved. But the force, like the activity, is quite naturally regarded as a function of the situation in which it appears, and no one thinks that it is to be regarded as a sort of agency in virtue of which the activity takes place. The phenomenon of crystallization or precipitation is consequent upon variations in the temperature of the solution, or upon some other change in the total situation. Hence, there is no need of a force to account for the activity. Given certain conditions, the chemical crystallizes, and any force that may be involved is merely an aspect of the phenomenon rather than an entity or power manifesting itself in the process of crystallization.

This seems very obvious when we are dealing with purely physical processes. Yet we find it difficult to view the forces manifested in the behavior of organisms in the same way. This is due in part to the complexity of the behavior. It is also due in part to the fact that we seem to feel a necessity of accounting for the fact that organisms not only act as they do but that they act at all. Activity itself seems to require in the opinion of some an explanation. To view activity as consequent upon antecedent conditions and upon the total situation* is not regarded as satisfactory by many. Such explanations are held to be in-adequate, since they do not tell us in virtue of what force the organism acts. This inadequacy is met by the simple device of positing in the organism various forces corresponding to the behavior observed. Thus the in-adequacy is met, and the needs felt for a real explanation are satisfied.

Formerly physicists, in answer to similar meta-physical needs, were led to posit in a falling stone a force which impelled it to seek its proper place. Yet obviously the force manifested in the fall of the stone is a product of the situation, and cannot be used to account for the phenomenon. That is to say, given a stone placed in a certain position, it will fall, and with its fall force will be generated. It does not fall, however, because of the force. Rather there is force because it falls.

In the same way the forces experienced in the behavior of organisms should be regarded as due to the situations in which they appear. It must be recognized that many of our experiences seem to involve forces that exist independently of the situation in which they are felt. This, however, should not mislead us. For the apparent independence of these forces is due largely to our inability to correlate them sufficiently exactly with the known and variable elements in the situation, and to the fact that the same force or instinct or emotion may be aroused by different stimuli. Yet we may rest assured that the forces experienced in our behavior are no less determined by the variations that are constantly taking place in the relations that we sustain to our environment than the forces that are brought into existence by purely physical conditions. Given an organism with a certain structure, physiological condition, and mass of experience in a certain environment, there will be generated out of this situation forces which are as strictly determined as any force generated in the physical world. Out-side of such situations there are no forces affecting the organism and impelling it to various activities or de-sires.

Our metaphysical prepossessions make it difficult for us to regard behavior in this way. The questions inevitably arise: In virtue of what agency or force does the organism act? Why does the organism act in this way rather than in some other? It is because we are not satisfied to regard the forces experienced in behavior as arising here and now in the situations in which they function and to view activity as consequent upon antecedent conditions and activities that these questions arise. It is for this reason that we posit in the organism ready-made forces called instincts. Thus we learn not only why organisms act. but also why they act as they do !

This need is not felt in accounting for perception and sensation. When an organism in a certain physiological condition is placed in a certain environment it perceives or is sensitive. No necessity is felt of ac-counting for this as the result of a force of perception or sensation. It is regarded as sufficient to account for this as the result of the relation of the organism to its environment. This is true no matter what the nature of the organism may be. In some the perception is different from what it is in others. But, what-ever the nature of the perception may be, we feel no necessity of accounting for it as the result of a force of perception. Yet, if the perception or sensation should have an emotional character or be accompanied by an impulse, a necessity is felt of accounting for these latter as the results of certain forces or instincts within the organism.

Thus, for example, if a man perceives that he has been insulted, there is felt no need of a force of perception. But if, as a result of this, he should become angry and attack the person offering the insult, there is felt a need of accounting for this as the result of a force. This need is satisfied by the instinct of pugnacity. Likewise, if he sees a boy being abused, and he again becomes angry and attacks the person abusing the boy, the same explanations are given.

This difference between our explanations of perception and our explanations of emotions and impulses may be regarded as due to the fact that our perceptions are definitely correlated with certain organs, whereas our emotions and impulses are not. Thus we see because we have eyes; hear because we have ears, etc. No corresponding organs can be as-signed to our emotions and impulses. Hence arises the need of something analogous to the organs of perception to account for our emotions and impulses.

If, however, the absence of sense-organs gives rise to the necessity of positing in the organism forces to account for mental states which are not definitely correlated with particular organs, vision and audition must likewise be regarded as due to such forces; for in simple organisms there are no sense-organs, yet they are sensitive to both light and noises. Perception in such organisms, therefore, must be due to a corresponding instinct of perception. But if a force is required to account for perception in simple organ-isms, a force is also required in organisms no matter how great the complexity; for complexity does not do away with the necessity of force. It may diminish the amount required, or use more efficiently the force placed at its disposition, but it cannot operate with-out it.

In fact, this is the position of those who emphasize the importance of instincts. Structure is not a sufficient explanation of the organism's behavior. With-out the driving power of an instinct, they tell us, the structure would lie motionless and inert. Though one does not stress the necessity of a force of visual perception, in virtue of which the eye sees, one does stress the necessity of a force in virtue of which the organism experiences strong emotions and impulses. Many seem to think it is because there are pent up in the organism various forces that the organism performs many of its characteristic activities.

A certain degree of reality is attached to these forces, because, as illustrated above, the same emotion may be aroused by many stimuli, We are no more able to correlate the emotion with a definite class of stimuli than we are to correlate it with a definite organ. As a result, the emotions and impulses seem to have an independence which invites us to account for activities as their expressions. This is not altogether in error. The behavior of the insulted man, as well as his behavior on observing the abused boy, would probably have been quite different had not the emotion of anger and impulse to fight been aroused. This says little more, however, than that the behavior would not have been the same had it been different. The fact that the emotion was aroused by different situations should not be regarded as an indication that the emotion has an existence of an independent nature any more than the fact that the precipitation of a chemical may be produced by lowering the temperature of the solution or by evaporating part of it should cause us to regard the precipitation as due to a force existing independently of the situation. In both cases the behavior is determined by the total situation. Just as precipitation occurs under certain conditions, so the emotions which are experienced come into existence under certain conditions. If an emotion should arise under a thousand different conditions, it would, none the less in each case, be an aspect of the situation without an independent existence of its own.

It is because we neglect to see that emotions and impulses are generated in the situations in which they appear that we are confronted with difficulties regarding their origin. It is because they are assigned an existence of their own that it becomes necessary to explain how they came into existence. Men at all levels of culture have felt this necessity. The primitive man, the theologian, and the modern biologists and psychologists have each advanced numerous theories to account for the existence of the various forces in virtue of which organisms are able to act and which cause them to act as they do.

As may be supposed, these theories have fundamental differences. In many respects, however, they are quite similar. A mere statement of the theories will make clear the similarity. Any act which the primitive man cannot account for in terms of the usual experiences of the individual is regarded by him as due to an impression or urge from an ancestor or some other hidden force. Similarly, any act which the theologian cannot explain is regarded by him as due to an impression from God. The evolutionist goes a step further. He explains not only the unusual acts but the usual also as due to impulses or tendencies that have been impressed on us by the species.

No one need deny that there are fundamental differences between these views. There is, however, a fundamental similarity, which may be briefly stated: they agree that the origin or source of our impulses or motivating forces lies outside of the situation in which they appear, and that the impulse or force is of such a nature that it can be regarded as the impulsive force back of the behavior.

The conception of such determiners of behavior, whether regarded as coming from an ancestral spirit, or from Deity, or from the species, exerts a profound influence on social practices and theories. This is not hard to understand. Behavior that is due to impressions from a powerful ancestor or from God must be given a right of way over all other considerations, and one need but urge that he is acting in accordance with such an impression to win universal approbation. For who dares to question the advisability of an act that is so determined ! If the good in such a course is not apparent, so much the worse for our power of perception and understanding. The good is there. We need only to discover it.

The influence of instinct as used by many is as pro-found. Instinct by many is clothed with the hidden goods that formerly adhered to transcendental purposes. According to this view, it is held that the individual inherits a mass of psychic tendencies which have proved their fitness and value as guides to behavior by their faithful service to the species. The good that inheres in their expression may not be apparent to us, but it is there. Otherwise the race could not have survived. If we do not see the good, the fault is ours. Its existence is guaranteed by the evolutionary process itself. We need only to discover it.

The discovery of the good is in many cases difficult. It is generally held, however, that the good lies in the natural functioning of the instinct. Accordingly, the natural functioning is greatly emphasized. But, in spite of this emphasis, and of the ambiguity of the term natural, no one takes the trouble to define clearly its meaning. Sometimes it seems to be identified with the desires and impulses which follow most closely bodily structure and needs. At other times it seems to be identified with the primitive. At still other times it seems to be identified with the fundamental.

One can readily understand that the exalting in this way of such an ambiguous and indefinite principle of activity should provide the ready means of justifying the most egoistic and selfish desires. For desires of an egoistic nature answer best the various descriptions of the natural. Such desires are closely related to bodily needs. They are primitive and they are fundamental. On the other hand, the desires that are born of social contacts become highly unnatural. These do not follow so closely the lines laid down by physiological needs. They are not necessarily primitive, nor are they fundamental. Hence, the extolling of the instinctive and the emphasis placed on the natural expression of instinct tend to justify one in satisfying or indulging every egoistic whim and to contemn the demands of society as repressive and as designed to crush the free and unimpeded expression of the best that the race has been able to evolve.

The interpretation of behavior and development in terms of innate forces brings about the same result in another way. Since behavior is due to independent forces existing within the organism irrespective of its experience, there is the tendency to look upon development and behavior as the mere unfolding of innate characters. The adult becomes simply an enlarged edition of the embryo. All that is required for development is that the innate characters be given a free hand to unfold themselves naturally. The most that society can do is to give the individual full freedom to express the forces within him. The best society is the one that interferes least in this process. Society, instead of being regarded as the source of values, sentiments, emotions, and impulses, is opposed to the individual as a great repressive force that pre-vents the individual from realizing his fullest possible development.

To say that the present unrest, discontent, and assertion of egoism are the results of our conceptions regarding the nature of the individual and society would be an exaggeration. These phenomena are too general to be attributed to the Social Philosophy of Western Civilization. The quieting effect of financial and industrial depression indicates that the causes are largely economic. Industrial progress and economic well-being make for individualism. Men must be secured to take care of the surplus; with the in-crease in wealth consumers must also be found. In this way the dependence of man upon man is largely destroyed, and each feels that he is a self-sufficient individual.

This development has been made possible largely by our scientific progress. But scientific progress has in another way tended to destroy the bases of communal solidarity. A comparison of the fears of primitive man with those of the modern will make this clear.

Reared in a country of plenty, free from the superstitious fears that formerly made life a burden, it is hard for us to realize the forebodings and fears that made life for the primitive man a terrible experience. Surrounded, as he was, on every hand with real dangers and subjected to the uncertainties of a precarious existence, he added to these dangers a world of hostile spirits perhaps a reflection of the real dangers that he had to encounter, but unlike most reflections many times more terrible. On every side were ghosts, goblins, and demons of all kinds. At their mercy the individual felt himself, and usually they were hostile. How else could one regard them when his miserable existence was interpreted as a result of their whims !

By proper ceremonies and rites, however, it was possible to persuade them not to injure the group, and at times to induce them to favor the group in a small way. As a result of these hopes and fears the community was knit together in vast co-operative enterprises to win the favor of the spirits or to free the settlement from them. In such ceremonies all were compelled to take part. Neither the community nor Fate would overlook absence.

Similar rites have been practised by all European peoples, and can be found in certain isolated districts of France to this day. t The rites as practised by our forebears were not only for protection against magic. They served to insure bountiful crops. These superstitions have been banished by science, but science, in relieving us of these fears and in -teaching us better methods of insuring bountiful harvests, has removed one of the pillars of communal solidarity. When the community is gathered to perform the one essential ceremony in which all must take part, there is engendered in each individual a feeling of atoneness and dependence on the group, and, in addition, he experiences a certain exaltation and enthusiasm born of the common purpose and of the strength of a united community back of the enterprise.

Science has removed these bonds of social dependence. We no longer entertain the fears which formed their basis. Our fears are quite different. The primitive man feared positive evils. We fear that we may miss our share of the good. These fears have opposite effects. The one engenders a feeling of dependence and co-operation; the other, a spirit of suspicion and hate. The fear of evils brings the group together. The fear of missing goods arrays each man against his fellows in the determined assertion of his "rights."

Thus many of the antisocial tendencies manifested in our society may well be regarded as liabilities of our industrial and scientific progress.

While economic and scientific progress has made for the assertion of individualism, psychological development has in many cases, through its interpretations of behavior, tended to a denial of individual responsibility. If one's actions are the result of heredity or of environmental conditions, for what should one blame himself ? The individual becomes a mere puppet of forces beyond his control. Who can blame him for his desires, or for acting in accordance with them? At the worst he is only their victim. Why should he repress them?

In this way the denial of individual responsibility brings about antisocial tendencies. Strange as it may seem, such opposites as the assertion of individuality and the denial of individuality bring about the same development. On the one hand, there is the stirring up of strife and unrest as a result of the assertion of the "rights" of the individual. On the other hand, the duties of the individual to the group are denied through the denial of individual responsibility. Thus, at the same time that we erect the deep-seated desires and impulses of the individual into "rights" that are not to be questioned, we tend to destroy the feeling of responsibility which should go with deep feelings of personality by telling him that he is not responsible for his desires and impulses or for acting in accordance with them. In this way we teach the individual that his deep-seated desires are his best guides to conduct, and when he acts in a way regarded as undesirable we tend to make excuses for his behavior by attributing his antisocial acts to a corrupting environment.

Thus psychological theories of almost opposite assumptions combine with economic and scientific progress to lead us in the narrow assertion of egoism and individualism that is proving so disruptive to our existing social order.

When I say, therefore, that the conception of instincts as forces entitled to natural expression is exerting a powerful influence in bringing about the present chaotic conditions in society and in Social Philosophy, I am not unmindful of many other factors that are helping to bring about the same result. In fact, it should be recognized that the rôle of instinct in this development is of a secondary nature. Its chief rôle is to lend justification to antisocial tendencies brought about by other factors by exalting these into principles of conduct.

It is true there is considerable disagreement among social writers regarding the value of instincts for moral and ethical guidance. Indeed, another element of confusion is introduced by this lack of agreement. By some it is held that instincts are indefinite, and that they, therefore, fail to furnish us with ethical principles. By others it is insisted that instincts are the ineradicable products of long ages spent in savagery. They are, therefore, regarded as a great liability to the moral life, which makes impossible the realization of "The Good Society." By others it is insisted with as great emphasis that the instincts are guides which have proved their worth in the long evolutionary struggle, and that we need but follow their guidance to achieve the truly moral and good. Accordingly, the last group holds that the evils of society are due largely to the repressions that it practises. To eliminate these evils, they tell us, we need but allow our instincts to function naturally.

It might seem that some doubt should be entertained regarding the reality of forces about which there is such disagreement. This is the view of the present essay. It is necessary, however, that an explanation of the almost universal recognition of these forces be given; for it is natural to suppose that such a wide-spread conception must have at least a basis in reality. This basis is not hard to discover. The wonderfully adaptive behavior of organisms apart from any knowledge of the end that is being reached requires an ex-planation. The sublimity of man's moral ideas, his clear vision of right and wrong, the nobility of his impulses, likewise require an explanation. What better explanation can be advanced than to regard them as due to instincts, or the accumulated wisdom of the species? In brief, what other explanation can be given in a world of cause and effect?

Thus, the old superstitions founded on belief in metempsychosis and theological speculations give place to "scientific" explanations based on the assumption of ancestral memories, or of wisdom and habits acquired by the species.

To discuss the transition from superstition to "science" is the first task of this treatise. The connecting link is the feeling that certain activities can-not be adequately accounted for in terms of the individual's experience and capacities. To supplement explanations in these terms, various conceptions are invoked. However different these conceptions may be, all of them have this in common: instead of solving the problems connected with behavior, they transfer them to another realm. In one case the problems are transferred to a psychology of ancestral ghosts or spirits; in another, they are transferred to the realm of Divine psychology; and in another, they are transferred to the psychology of the species. Yet in no case have we reason to suppose that the new fields are more available for research than the field presented by the individual acting here and now in our very presence.

The study of the similarities found in the belief in metempsychosis and in instinct will serve also to show the sources of the powerful sanction of instinct. It is on account of this sanction that both conservatives and radicals seek to win the support of instinct for their social views. To discuss the significance of instinct for ethical and social guidance will be the task of the second chapter.

The criticism of the use of instinct as a sanction in the second chapter will be of a general nature. In the third and fourth chapters I shall examine the very explicit psychological assumptions on which this sanction rests. This examination, I hope, will make apparent that interpretations of behavior in terms of forces are not only unnecessary and unilluminating, but actually prevent a factual study of behavior on account of the mass of psychological impedimenta, whose origin furnishes such a fruitful cause for controversy. Behavior, I shall point out, should be interpreted not in terms of forces but in terms of the relations the organism sustains to its environment. By so doing one gets close to the facts which should enable him to correlate the activities of an organism with the variable factors which determine that the organism shall act as it does rather than in some other way. At the same time, by so viewing behavior one is spared all the difficulties involved in the origin of instinct, and the many sublimations and repressions which instincts are sup-posed to undergo in making clear the behavior of the organism.