Adultery And Jealousy
( Originally Published 1936 )
DESIRE for variety is, of course, not the only cause of adultery. A married man or woman may for some other reason prefer sexual intercourse with an outsider to connubial intercourse, or may be guilty of unfaithfulness on account of long absence from the spouse or in a case of intoxication. In the latter cases especially, but also in some others, the relations between husband and wife may persist without any serious disturbance.
" A couple ", says Dr. Tenenbaum, " may love each other and enjoy mutual happiness despite the occasional faux pas due to temperamental lapses or chance seduction ".1 This statement is confirmed by some of Dr. Hamilton's tables. Twenty-eight men and 24 women out of one hundred married men and an equal number of married women examined by him acknowledged that they had committed adultery. The distribution of these cases according to their rating as to the present degree of satisfaction with the marriage as a whole showed that 28.57 per cent. of the adulterous men and 16.67 per cent. of the adulterous women belonged to the satisfied group, while 59.72 per cent. of the men and 53.96 per cent. of the women who had not committed adultery belonged to that group. Judge Lindsey, also, remarks that physical infidelity, according to his experience and observation, does not necessarily injure or destroy the spiritual relationship of marriage: " what would destroy one marriage has no effect on another marriage. These matters are for individual decision, based on culture, fineness of feeling, good sense, sensitiveness and good taste ". According to Van de Velde, it is only very rarely that adultery is the sole ground for married hostility. " In a harmonious marriage, harmonious also from the sexual point of view, the woman is only rarely inclined to be unfaithful, and, further, fights such an inclination with all her power and almost always successfully. The man may, perhaps, run more risk of being dominated by sexual feelings for another woman, or wish to satisfy his will to power by overcoming her resistance. He will also more easily yield to such latent tendencies, but this will not cause hostility in a marriage which is otherwise harmonious. Certainly not in the man, because both the sexual and the other ties that bind him to his wife are by far the most powerful. Nor in the woman, because, in an otherwise happy marriage, her love is so great and her attachment so strong, that she forgives. This, if it is done with taste and graciousness, strengthens the marriage bond to. a marked degree ". He adds that it is quite a different matter when disharmony has already existed between the married pair, particularly if they disagree regarding the fulfilment of their sexual desires. Adultery, says Mr. Haynes, " may mean anything or nothing: it may mean nothing more than the caprices of sexual appetite (which are by no means incompatible with a perfectly sincere devotion to a spouse who has become a lifelong friend and partner) or it may be the culminating expression of a fixed detestation by one spouse of the other, accompanied by every kind of cruelty and treachery. The desire for divorce is far oftener due to the incompatibility of the parties than to sexual vagaries ".
Speaking of adultery committed by the husband, Hedwig Wega points out that if it is a purely sensual act, it does not always disturb the relations between him and his wife, and that if the latter " feels sure of enjoying her husband's friendship and respect, if their domestic life is harmonious even after the event, she may consider whether she does right in dissolving her marriage only because his nature, which is more sensual than hers, led him astray ". Another female writer, Gabriele Reuter, says that it is for a woman's own good and for that of her children more important that her husband should show her love, respect, and friendship than that he should preserve unconditional physical faithfulness. Pepys shows in his Diary that in spite of his irresistible passion for sexual variety and his constantly recurring wayward attraction to a long series of women, he retains throughout a deep and unchanging affection for his charming young wife; and neither he nor his wife had the very slightest wish to leave each other. The bond of marriage remained firm, even though it had been degraded by insincerity on one side and the jealous endeavour on the other to secure fidelity by compulsion. Milton wrote: " The adultery is not the greatest breach of matrimony. . . He who affirms adultery to be the highest breach, affirms the bed to be the highest of marriage, which is in truth a gross and boorish opinion, how common soever; as far from the countenance of Scripture, as from the light of all clean philosophy or civilization "
Adultery does not generally lead to divorce—which, of course, does not imply absence of marital dissatisfaction, since there may be various reasons for not dissolving the marriage. Michels even says that it is only in an exceedingly small fraction of cases that adultery results in divorce; and Traumann, another authority on the subject, maintains that when it is the juridical ground for divorce it very rarely is the real ground. Where the- law recognises no other ground, as in England, adultery naturally becomes a pretext for all sorts of reasons. Taking the American statistics, we find that, in 1867, 33 per cent. of all divorces were granted for adultery, 41 for desertion, and 13 for cruelty; whilst in 1928, 9 were granted for adultery, 32 for desertion, and 47 for cruelty.. Dr. Cahen explains this remarkable decrease of divorces granted for adultery by saying that " the increasing leniency of the courts in interpreting mental cruelty no longer makes it necessary for any considerable proportion of couples to bear the shameful publicity of a divorce trial on infidelity ". According to answers given by a group of students belonging to various institutions in Kharkov in 1926, 22.6 per cent. of the divorces which had occurred among them had been effected by men for marital differences of an " ideal " character and only 12.5 per cent. for adultery, while 9 per cent. had been brought about by women on account of adultery.'
In humanity at large adultery is the most generally recognised ground of divorce. Among many uncivilised peoples unfaithfulness on the part of the wife seems to be the only, or almost the only, ground recognised by tribal custom; but we also hear of a few who do not consider a man justified in repudiating his wife on account of adultery, even though he may do so for some other cause. In exceptional cases we are told that the wife has a right to divorce an unfaithful husband. According to Chinese law the husband is liable to punishment if he retains an adulterous wife; whereas " the idea of a wife divorcing her husband for adultery,. or for any reason whatever, is one which excites a smile, as absurd and preposterous, whenever mentioned to the Chinese ".4 The divorce law of the Japanese Taiho Code was substantially the same as that in China; the infidelity of a married woman was a recognised ground of divorce, particularly because her crime caused a confusion of blood whereby a person not in reality related to the ancestors might succeed to the worship.' The right of the husband to divorce his wife at his pleasure is the central thought in the entire system of Jewish divorce law; and the Rabbis neither did nor could set it aside, although they gradually tempered its severity by numerous restrictive measures. On the other hand, the Jewish law has never given the wife a right to divorce her husband; but the Mishnah allowed her to sue for divorce, and if the court decided that she was entitled to be divorced the husband was forced to give her a bill of divorce, although he was supposed to give it of his own free will and accord. The causes for which she could demand such a bill became gradually more numerous; but although she could do so if the husband was guilty of notorious dissoluteness of morals, simple adultery on his part is not, at Jewish law, a sufficient ground for divorce. According to Mohammedan law the husband may repudiate his wife whenever he pleases, whereas the wife can never divorce her husband; she may take steps leading to the dissolution of her marriage, but she could never prefer a complaint before the judge because of her husband's unfaithfulness.' Such a thing is naturally out of the question where polygyny is a legal institution.
In ancient Greece, according to Attic law, the husband could repudiate his wife whenever he liked, and if she had been convicted of adultery it was necessary for him to divorce her, condonation of the offence being visited by atimia, or infamy; but the licence of husbands was taken as a matter of course. In the Roman law a wife in manu, i.e. one who was in her husband's power, could neither require nor prevent a divorce, and the husband's legal authority in regard to the dissolution of a marriage with manus was as absolute---as it was in regard to the other incidents of such a marriage. Gradually, however, marriage with manus fell into disuse, and was, under the Empire, generally superseded by marriage without manus, which conferred on the husband hardly any authority at all over his wife, and the dissolution of which could be brought about by the will of either party. According to the old customary law of the Teutonic peoples, the husband was entitled to repudiate his wife if she was guilty of conjugal infidelity, but the wife had originally no right to dissolve the marriage. In the Frankish period she could, according to some law-books, effect a divorce or leave her husband if he was convicted of adultery—an innovation which has been traced to the influence of Christian ideas.'
Christianity revolutionised European legislation with regard to divorce. According to the New Testament, a man who puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery against her, and a woman who puts away or deserts her husband and is married to an-other is guilty of a similar crime. But there are two exceptions to this rule. Christ taught, according to St. Matthew, that a man might put away his wife for fornication, but for no other reason; and St. Paul lays down the rule, that if a Christian is married to an unbeliever and the latter departs, the Christian " is not under bondage ". Gradually, however, the Western Church made up her mind to deny the dissolubility of a consummated Christian marriage; and this decision influenced profoundly the secular legislation in Roman Catholic countries. But it was rejected by the Reformers. They all agreed that divorce, with liberty for the innocent party to remarry, should be granted for adultery; and prevailing opinion among the Fathers of English Protestantism appears also to have accorded a similar privilege to the wife on like provocation, al-though there were undoubtedly some in the Protestant ranks who were not so liberal in her behalf. But in the Foljambe case, in 1602, the old canon law was revived; and only in the civil divorce law of 1857 the legal principle that a valid English marriage could not be dissolved by judicial authority was at last abandoned.
Divorce could be granted to a husband whose wife had been guilty of adultery, but to the wife only if her husband had been guilty of incestuous adultery, bigamy with adultery, rape, sodomy, bestiality, or adultery coupled with cruelty or with desertion without reason-able excuse for two years and upwards.' In 1923 the equality of the sexes in obtaining divorce was conceded: the husband's adultery alone was made sufficient ground for granting a divorce to the wife.
On the Continent a fresh impetus to a more liberal legislation on divorce was given in the eighteenth century by the new philosophy with its conceptions of human freedom and natural rights. In France they led to the law of 1792, which granted divorce on a great variety of grounds. But twelve years later this law was superseded by the new provisions in Napoleon's Civil Code, which made divorce more difficult; thus though a husband always could obtain a divorce from his unfaithful wife, a wife could obtain it from her unfaithful husband only when he had kept his mistress in the common house. At the Restoration in 1816 divorce was abolished in France; but it was re-enacted by a law of 1884, the provisions of which were simplified by later laws. The divorce law of the Napoleonic Code was again introduced, but with some changer, one of which was that a wife could in all circumstances obtain a divorce for the adultery of her husband.' In other modern laws, also, the spouses are as a rule on a footing of perfect equality, but there are some exceptions to the rule. Whilst any act of adultery in the wife is everywhere a sufficient cause for dissolving the marriage, there are countries in which adultery on the part of the husband only in certain circumstances gives the wife a right to demand a divorce.
From this survey of facts it appears that with regard to divorce a difference between the infidelity of a husband and that of a wife has very commonly been made by custom or law; and the same is the case with regard to judicial separation in Roman Catholic countries where divorce is prohibited.' We notice a similar difference in the penalties attached to adultery. A man who commits adultery with another man's wife may certainly have to suffer. Among savages he has very commonly to pay with his life; and even among many peoples who generally prohibit self-redress he may be put to death by the aggrieved husband, especially if he be caught flagrante delicto. In other cases he may be subject to capital punishment in the proper sense of the word; this was his fate according to Hebrew law, and Christian legislators followed the example. Among a considerable number of savage peoples, especially in Africa, it is the seducer only who suffers, while the unfaithful wife escapes without punishment; but more commonly she, also, is treated as an offender, being discarded, beaten, or ill-treated in some way or other, and not infrequently killed. Often, too, she is disfigured by her enraged husband in such a way as to be deprived of her attractions: he bites or cuts off her nose, or cuts off one or both of her ears or her hair, or shaves her head. A similar punishment has figured even in European law-books; according to a law of Cnut, an adulteress shall have her nose and ears cut off.
It is obviously the rule among savage and barbarous tribes that while conjugal fidelity is considered a stringent duty in the wife, it is not considered so in the husband, although there are interesting exceptions to the rule; and among the peoples of ancient civilization the law requires faithfulness of the wife alone. In China, where adultery in a woman was branded as one of the vilest crimes and the guilty wife was oftentimes " cut into small pieces " (according to the present law, the punishment is only imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years),' a man can with impunity commit adultery with an unmarried woman. In Japan, " while the man is allowed a loose foot, the woman is expected not only to be absolutely spotless, but also never to show any jealousy, however wide the husband may roam ". According to Hebrew law adultery was a capital offence, but it presupposed that the guilty woman was another man's wife. The Indo-European nations in early times saw nothing objectionable in the unfaithfulness of a married man, whereas an adulterous wife was subject to the severest penalties. Until some time after the introduction of Christianity among the Teutons their law-books made no mention of the infidelity of husbands, because it was permitted by custom. The Romans defined adultery as sexual intercourse with another man's wife; on the other hand, the intercourse of a married man with an unmarried woman was not regarded as adultery.' At the same time the idea that fidelity in marriage ought to be reciprocal was not altogether unknown in classical antiquity. In a lost chapter of his Economics, which has come to us only through a Latin translation, Aristotle points out that, for various reasons, it is prudent for a man to be faithful to his wife, but that nothing is so peculiarly the property of a wife as a chaste and hallowed intercourse. Plutarch condemns the man who, lustful and dissolute, goes astray with a courtesan or maid-servant; though at the same time he admonishes the wife not to be vexed or impatient, considering that " it is out of respect to her that he bestows upon another all his wanton depravity ". Plautus argues that it is unjust of a husband to exact a fidelity which he does not keep himself.
In its condemnation of adultery Christianity made no distinction between husband and wife. If continence is a stringent duty for unmarried persons independently of their sex, the observance of the sacred marriage vow must be so in a still higher degree. Yet even in some Christian countries the law makes a distinction between the adultery of a husband and that of a wife, apart from the rules relating to divorce or separation. The French code considers it " excusable " if a husband kills his adulterous wife in the act; and it makes such a wife liable to imprisonment, while the adultery of a husband is punishable only if he keeps a concubine in the conjugal domicile, and then the punishment is merely a fine. According to the Spanish penal code of 1928, the adultery of a wife is likewise punishable in all circumstances, but that of a husband only if he keeps his accomplice in the house or, otherwise, if his behaviour gives rise to scandal. So also, according to the Italian code of 1930, the adultery of a wife, called adulterio, is punishable in any case, but that of a husband, called concubinato, only if he keeps his mistress in his home or if he keeps her elsewhere " notoriously ". In modern legislation adultery, if punishable at all, is generally an indictable offence; but, as a matter of fact, it is very rarely punished. In England an Act passed in the middle of the seventeenth century made the adultery of a wife (nothing is said of a husband) felony, both for her and her partner in guilt, and therefore punishable by death; but this Act fell with the fall of the Commonwealth. Parliament has never acted to deprive the Church of her jurisdiction over adultery, but no attempt to make it punishable by the criminal law has succeeded.' In the United States, where the Puritan tradition as to sexual offences is dying more slowly than it died in England, there are only two states that have no provision whatsoever for the punishment of adultery, whilst in eighteen other states a single act of adultery is not itself a criminal offence. The Russian Soviet law takes no notice of adultery.
That a married man enjoys more liberty than a married woman is largely due to the same causes as make him the more privileged partner in other respects. The infidelity of his wife is often, in a sense, an offence against property, while this is not the case with his own infidelity; and whether, or how far, the latter is stigmatised as an offence against the wife, chiefly depends upon the degree of regard which is paid to the feelings of women. But there are also more special reasons for that inequality between the sexes. It was a doctrine of the Roman jurists that adultery is a crime in the wife, and in the wife only, on account of the danger of introducing strange children to the husband; a result of this would be that his property descended to a person who was not his own child. Moreover, the temptation to infidelity and the facility in indulging in it are commonly greater in the case of the husband than in that of the wife, and actual practice is apt to influence moral opinion. Another reason for the in-equality in question is undoubtedly the general notion that unchastity of any kind is more discreditable for a woman than for a man. And finally, it is a frequent observation that the adultery of the wife has a more disorganising effect on the domestic life than the adultery of the husband.
These points of difference have been emphasised by various writers, who do not suggest, however, that adultery should be a legal ground for divorce solely when committed by the husband. Michels remarks that " the adulterous wife unquestionably commits a more inconsiderate and more blameworthy act than the adulterous husband, for the former deceives doubly by fathering upon her husband the children of another man ". This would more likely be the case if the popular belief that an unfaithful wife is more apt to conceive with her lover than with her husband could be proved to be true. It is supported by Kisch, who, like Matthews Duncan before him, thinks it probable that sexual excitement on the woman's part is an important link in the chain of conditions producing impregnation. It has been argued that the danger of confusion of pregnancy has disappeared with the development of methods for preventing conception,' but it is anything but certain that the lovers trouble themselves about contraceptives. Von Krafft-Ebing writes: " The unfaithfulness of a wife in comparison with that of a husband, is morally much more weighty, and should be more severely punished legally. The unfaithful wife dishonours not only herself, but also her husband and her family, not to speak of the possibility of pater incertus " " The man ", says Kisch, " can make a lapse in his marriage without the consequences of it being necessarily of vital importance; he can at any moment do remorseful penance without the mischief he has caused being irreparable. The infidelity of the wife poisons the soul for ever, shakes the foundation of the harmony between mother and children, makes the legitimacy of the latter uncertain, and leads to an irremediable rupture of the domestic life ". Hedwig Wega observes that while the adultery of the husband is in many cases a purely sensual act, which need not spoil the marriage, that of the wife is in no case a merely bodily attachment. Stendhal remarks that where love is absent, the fidelity of a married woman is something contrary to nature, but that " with love there, one has no taste for any mate but that of the beloved fount ".5 He also writes: " The difference between infidelity in the two sexes is so real, that a woman of passion may pardon it, while for a man that is impossible ".
The disharmony caused by infidelity might not infrequently be tempered by a more careful consideration of the case. Though feelings are stronger than reason, they may be more or less influenced by it. It may then appear absurd to break a previously happy marriage because of a single lapse, due to momentary over-excitement or intoxication, on the part of the husband; and when the wife sins, she may be led astray by a skilful seducer, who overcomes her power of resistance. Lessing makes Emilia Galotti, who does not love the wooing prince but trembles at the thought of being entrapped by his art, exclaim: " Force, force, who cannot bid defiance to force? What is called force is nothing. Seduction is the real force ". Some reflection may even reveal that the apparently innocent party is the true cause of what has happened. In many English divorce suits the adultery of the wife has been found to be the fault of the husband. "Every woman ", says Balzac, " is to her husband just what he has made her ".s According to Stekel, a sexually unsatisfied wife has only to choose between sin and neurosis. But the wife, on her part, may also, through her frigidity or otherwise, be responsible for the infidelity of her husband, and practically drive him to other women. Conjugal unfaithfulness is of course formally a breach of faith, but it is an unreasonable claim that the eternal troth which the two lovers once swore to each other should be an irrevocable pledge in all circumstances; even though the Law, " creeping up behind, as it were, at this critical moment, and overhearing the two thus pledge themselves, claps its book together with a triumphant bang, and exclaims: ` There now, you're married and done for, for the rest of your natural lives ' ". Ellen Key remarks that to talk of " the duty of lifelong fidelity " is much the same as to talk of " the duty of lifelong health "; a man can promise to take good care of his life or of his love, but he cannot unconditionally undertake to preserve them.'
Dr. W. J. Robinson writes that we must teach and show our women and men " that not every woman can necessarily fill out a man's entire life, that not every woman can necessarily occupy every nook and corner of a man's mind and heart, and that there is nothing humiliating to the woman in such an idea (and vice versa). . . . We must teach our men that when they marry a woman she does not become their chattel, their piece of property, which nobody may touch, nobody may look at or smile at.... We must teach our men and women that there is essentially nothing shameful or humiliating in being displaced by a rival. . . . It does not at all mean that the change has been made because the rival is superior. . . . Inculcating those ideas would do away with the feeling of wounded vanity which is such an important component in the feeling of jealousy. Further we must teach our children from the earliest age that jealousy is ` not nice ', that it is a mean feeling, that it is a sign of weakness, that it is degrading to the person who entertains it, particularly to the person who exhibits it. . . . People properly brought up will always succeed in controlling or suppressing certain non-vital instincts or emotions on which society puts its stamp of disapproval, which it considers ` not nice ' or disgraceful. I am, therefore, an optimist in relation to the eventual uprooting of the greater number of components of the anti-social feeling of jealousy. And when woman reaches economic independence, then another component of the instinct of jealousy—the terror of losing a provider and being left in poverty—will disappear ". Dr. Robinson, however, does not imagine that characterising jealousy the way it deserves to be characterised, calling it shameful, savage, primitive feeling, etc., is at once going to banish it from the breasts of men and women in which it has found an abiding place.' Bertrand Russell is of opinion that men should be freed from the duty of sexual conjugal fidelity, but, in ex-change, have the duty of controlling jealousy; " it is better ", he says, " to control a restrictive and hostile emotion such as jealousy, rather than a generous and expansive emotion such as love ". He also thinks that it " can be controlled if it is recognised as bad, and not supposed to be the expression of a just moral indignation ", nay, even thinks it may be hoped that with the right education from the start such self-control will become comparatively easy. It seems to him by no means impossible that the jealousy of husbands should in the future arise only when wives propose to choose some other man as the father of their children.
Edward Carpenter distinguishes two kinds of jealousy, a natural and an artificial. The first arises from the uniqueness of the relationship between two per-sons and the endeavour to stamp this uniqueness on the whole relationship, sexual and moral, and especially on the sexual relationship. This kind of jealousy seems in a sense natural and normal, at any rate for a period. It is felt with terrible keenness and intensity by lovers before the consummation of their passion, and perhaps for a year or two afterwards, though it may be protracted rather indefinitely in the case where the alliance, on one side at any rate, is not quite satisfactory. The other kind of jealousy rests on the sense of property and is the kind that is often felt by the average husband and wife long after honeymooning days—by the husband not because of his especial devotion to his partner, but because he is furious at the idea of her disposing as she likes with what he considers his property, and by the wife because she is terrified at the thought that her matrimonial clothes-peg, from which depend all her worldly prospects, may vanish away or become the peg for another woman s clothes. This kind of jealousy, which is probably not quite so heart-rending as the other but is often passionate enough and lasts on indefinitely, is more especially the product of immediate social conditions. " In the communism and humanism of the future, as the sense of property declines, and as Love rises more and more out of mere blind confusion with the sex-act, we may fairly hope that the artificial jealousy will disappear altogether, and that the other form of the passion will subside again into a comparatively reasonable human emotion ".
Others argue that jealousy is a useless or stupid feeling. Havelock Ellis remarks that " the jealous person seldom makes himself more lovable by his jealousy and frequently much less lovable ". Forel writes: " We often hear of justified jealousy; I maintain, on the contrary, that jealousy is never justified, and that it is only the brutal stupidity of an atavistic heritage, or a pathological symptom. A reasonable man who has doubts as to the fidelity of his wife has certainly the right to assure himself of their correctness. But of what use is it to be jealous? If he finds his suspicions false he has, by his manner, unnecessarily offended his wife and made her unhappy, and destroyed conjugal confidence and happiness. If, on the contrary, his suspicions are well founded he has only to choose between one of two ways. If it is a case of amorous intoxication suggested by another man to his wife, who is often perhaps very unhappy about it, she may then be restored to her husband and pardoned. If, however, love for her husband is entirely extinguished in her, or if she is only a false intriguer without character, jealousy is even more absurd, for the game is not worth the candle, and immediate divorce is necessary ".
Jealousy has a deeply rooted foundation in animal nature. It has been said that it " seems such a necessary psychological accompaniment to biological behaviour, amidst competitive struggle, that one is tempted to consider it genetically among the oldest of the emotions, synonymous almost with the will to live ". But I have ventured to suggest that it may be instrumental to the preservation of the species in another way as well : the murderous rage of the male which tolerates no rivals may be the result of natural selection if promiscuous intercourse is—as it often is, perhaps not without reason, supposed to be—unfavourable to fecundity. The general prevalence of male jealousy among uncivilised races is proved both by an array of statements directly testifying it and by their customs relating to adultery. There are, no doubt, savages who are said to be little addicted to it, and in other cases the absence of jealousy has been inferred from the practice of offering one's wife to a visitor or of exchanging or prostituting wives. But, as I have shown elsewhere, there are special reasons for these customs, which by no means exclude the existence of jealousy among the peoples who practise them. It has been supposed that primitive man was devoid of that feeling. But the prevalence of male jealousy both among the anthropoid apes and the existing races of men constitutes a strong prima facie evidence of its prevalence in mankind during earlier ages as well. Hartland argues that the sense of owner-ship has been the seed-plot of jealousy, and that in consequence this feeling operates only feebly in conditions where the sense of ownership is undeveloped or imperfect. This is to my mind a more than doubtful proposition. It is true that a savage often regards his wife as a kind of property and a man who commits adultery with another man's wife as a thief; sometimes he is called by that name, and in certain parts of Africa he is punished as a thief, having his hands, or one of them, cut off. But if jealousy has anything to do with ownership, the reason is that it is primarily connected with the desire of possession, which is something different.
Ownership implies that a certain person or certain persons are recognised as having a right to the exclusive disposal of a certain thing. It owes its origin to the desire of an individual to keep and dispose of what he has appropriated or produced, but it is by no means identical with mere possession. The male animal jealously keeps for himself the female he has appropriated and is enraged if his possession of her is interfered with, but we cannot say that his jealousy depends on a " sense of ownership ". Sexual jealousy, as Dr. Shand remarks, springs from sexual love. " But sexual love cannot be separated from self-love, with which it constantly interacts; and it is due to the desire of self-love to possess certain things exclusively for self, such as women, power, and reputation, that jealousy principally arises. Thus La Rochefoucauld observes: ` Il y a dans la jalousie plus d'amour propre que d'amour '. The jealousy of a man, particularly a civilised man, differs from that of a male animal, apart from any feeling of injured rights—ownership or any other right. It is coloured by the nature of his love. It is accompanied with humiliation, because " the loss of possession to which jealousy refers, or the failure to obtain it, is of such a nature as carries with it a lowering of a man's self-valuation ". There may also be envy of what the other one has obtained by depriving him of it. There may be fear of another man's offspring being born into the family. But there is one characteristic common to sexual jealousy in all its forms, namely, that it is an angry feeling aroused by the loss, or fear of the loss, of the exclusive possession of an individual who is the object of one's sexual desire. It is impossible to suppose that the feeling of anger will ever disappear from the human mind; so also it is impossible to imagine that the angry feeling of jealousy will disappear, however ugly and useless it may be. How violent it sometimes is among ourselves is illustrated by the fact that in analysing 188 murders committed by sane persons in England, a prison commissioner recently found that the highest number, 46, were due to jealousy, while the same number resulted from a quarrel.
But even when the infidelity of a husband or a wife does not give rise to the angry feeling of jealousy, it may cause deep sorrow; and I think it can be demanded of a spouse to consider whether he or she has a right to inflict such suffering upon the other party. Helene Stocker observes that the refined feeling of love implies instinctively an obligation to avoid, as far as possible, making the beloved person feel pain. It is true, as Bertrand Russell said, that love is a generous emotion. But it is not generous to the person who has to suffer for its generosity towards another.